



The Phyllis Schlafly Report



VOL. 21, NO. 11, SECTION 1

BOX 618, ALTON, ILLINOIS 62002

JUNE, 1988

Let's Protect American Lives!

Protecting human life against fatal accidents is something that Americans spend enormous funds for, enthusiastically and generously. We require office buildings and hotels to install sprinkler systems to guard against fire, and we build land-costly medians to prevent highway accidents.

These sums are spent for life protection. They are over and above the large sums we spend for damages after mishaps occur, such as for fire insurance on our homes and accident insurance on our automobiles.

So, how come we have spent no money to protect ourselves against an accidental launch of deadly nuclear missiles? Obviously, an accident is possible; Chernobyl is dramatic proof of that.

An accident could occur in many ways: a computer malfunction, an illiterate misreading the signs, maintenance or safety personnel misjudging the warning signs (such as in the recent Los Angeles skyscraper fire), or an unauthorized launch by a man gone berserk.

An "accident" could even result from a terrorist attack. Who knows what some wild man will plan? We've seen plenty of 20th century examples of suicidal attacks that seem totally irrational to us. At the present time, the American people have no protection whatsoever against a nuclear Chernobyl. Congressman Jack Kemp (R-NY) asks the ultimate question: why not, and what are we going to do about it?

His solution for this precarious national predicament is the Accidental Launch Protection System (ALPS). It would protect our nation against accidental and unauthorized ballistic missiles.

ALPS is a two-layered ground-based defense system consisting of elements that have already been developed as part of our Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) program. ALPS would use current technologies capable of deployment by the mid-nineties. ALPS would consist of two interceptor missiles (ERIS, the Exoatmospheric Reentry Intercept System, and HEDI, the High Endoatmospheric Defense Interceptor), a ground-based radar, and a ground-based surveillance tracking system.

Kemp recommends that the initial ALPS site be the unused ABM site at Grand Forks, North Dakota, which is fully permissible under the 1972 ABM Treaty. We did have a functioning ABM there, but it was closed after one day's

operation under a Congressional amendment sponsored by Senator Edward Kennedy (D-MA).

Kemp urges building a second ALPS site at Washington, D.C. This second site was permitted under the 1972 ABM Treaty, then disallowed under the 1974 Protocol, then apparently permitted again under last December's U.S.-U.S.S.R. agreement which refers to the ABM Treaty "as signed in 1972."

Thus, Kemp's ALPS would be in compliance with the 1972 ABM Treaty. While it is silly to concern ourselves about compliance with a treaty that the Soviets have already so massively violated, Kemp's plan would stay within the ABM Treaty's strictures in order to keep the debate focused on the real issue of protecting the American people against an accidental launch of nuclear missiles.

Kemp's ALPS proposal will be offered as an amendment to the FY 1989 Defense Authorization Act. It would require the Secretary of Defense within 120 days to provide Congress with a plan (which could include options) for early ALPS deployment as an integral element of a strategic defense system.

Kemp believes that the urgent need for ALPS is demonstrated by a dramatic lesson in the Persian Gulf. When the *USS Stark* was attacked there last year, its defensive system was not operating, so 37 American sailors died under the Exocet missile attack. However, when the *USS Wainwright* was attacked in the same area a few weeks ago, our defensive technology was functioning, and none of the attacking missiles hit our ship.

ALPS would be a vital insurance policy against an accidental or unauthorized launch of ballistic missiles (which can deliver nuclear or chemical weapons), whether launched by the Soviet Union, by a radical third power, or by a terrorist group. ALPS would also give us hands-on knowledge and experience in developing a defensive system as part of our strategy for deterrence.

The Pentagon's latest report on "Soviet Military Power" describes the major Soviet ABM modernization program at its Moscow site, plus the increasing evidence that the Soviets are working toward a nationwide territorial defense as well as a space-based strategic defense. ALPS would start to close this ABM Gap, that is, the huge Soviet ABM advantage.

Rhetoric and Reality About SDI

The rhetoric and reality about Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) are so completely at odds that they cannot be reasonably reconciled. To put it bluntly, the anti-SDI arguments advanced by the Soviets — and by the anti-SDIers in the United States — make no sense.

If a U.S. SDI "won't work," then why are the Soviets spending more on their SDI-type defenses than we are? If a U.S. SDI is "provocative" and "war-threatening," then why aren't the Soviet SDI-type defenses similarly dangerous?

Actions speak louder than words, and it is clear that the Soviets believe that a missile defense against ICBMs *will* work, and they spend \$20 billion annually in pursuit of that goal. By contrast, we have been spending less than one-third that amount and Congress recently voted to cut the SDI budget even further.

The Soviets strategic defense effort is massive and comprehensive, and has been functioning since the 1960s. The Soviets are working on the same advanced strategic defense technologies that we are exploring for SDI, including kinetic energy, particle beam, radio-frequency, and laser weapons.

The Soviets even have the gall to parade the same Russian scientists who work on their own defensive technologies to allege that "it can't be done" or "it's destabilizing." This cynical ploy reminds us of one of Nikita Khrushchev's more colorful expression of contempt for Americans: "We spit in their faces and they call it dew."

In addition, Soviet spending for defensive systems includes a 100-interceptor ABM system around Moscow (permitted by the 1972 ABM Treaty) which is now being upgraded, the giant radar installation at Krasnoyarsk (a violation of the ABM Treaty), vast civil defense installations to shelter the top Soviet leadership and key industry, and tremendous strategic aircraft defenses (12,000 SAM launchers). Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci recently said that Soviet actions prove that they do not share Ronald Reagan's belief that a nuclear war is unwinnable.

It's obvious that the Soviets want to continue building their own defensive systems in order to survive a nuclear war, while at the same time they try to bluff or negotiate us out of building any defenses to enable America to survive. One prong of this effort is to lock us into a treaty of ingenious ambiguity that enables the Soviets to do whatever they want, while the left-wing political-media consortium in the United States clamors that we must hew to what we think the treaty should have meant.

That is precisely what is going on in the disputes about the "broad" and "narrow" interpretations of the 1972 ABM Treaty. While the left harangues about arcane nuances of the treaty's cleverly-drafted ambiguities, the Soviets plow ahead with their \$20-billion-a-year strategic defense programs, and the American people don't realize that we have no defensive system at all.

There will surely be a strategic defense system operation in the next few years. The only question is, will both the United States and the Soviet Union have a defense, or only the Soviet Union? We can't afford *not* to build SDI.

The predictions that SDI won't work are, to quote Secretary Carlucci, "like saying 10 years before we had helicopters that helicopters can't work." The naysayers who

say something "can't" be done are out of touch with both the American "can do" psychology and our rapidly developing new technologies.

One of the biggest myths about SDI is that SDI and the proposed START Treaty (to reduce the numbers of ICBMs) are contrary objectives and that we must choose between one or the other. That's false; we can choose both.

In fact, a reduction in ICBMs makes SDI even more necessary, more cost-effective, and more operationally efficient. A reduction in numbers of ICBMs would make defense easier, and the building of SDI would discourage building or modernizing more ICBMs. In combination, both would contribute to deterrence.

START alone cannot deter a Soviet attack because even the most optimistic targets for ICBM inventory reduction would still leave the Soviets with enough nuclear weapons to kill millions of Americans. However, SDI alone could deter a Soviet attack because even a partially effective strategic defense system would so complicate the planning for a first strike as to discourage it altogether.

How the Soviets Plan to Survive Nuclear War

When the Department of Defense published this year's annual illustrated book called "Soviet Military Power: An Assessment of The Threat, 1988," the national news media correctly headlined which of its 175 pages were the most newsworthy. They were the half dozen pages on strategic defenses, including ballistic missile defense systems, exotic future defense systems, and especially the underground facilities known as passive defenses.

The reason these systems are so significant, as compared with the many other strategic and conventional weapons systems described in this book, is that they prove the Soviet commitment to building the capacity to survive and win a nuclear war. That runs contrary to the prevailing "wisdom" that it is "unthinkable" for any country to try to survive and win a nuclear war.

The new booklet, issued under the imprimatur of Defense Secretary Frank Carlucci, describes and illustrates the below-ground facilities in which the Soviets plan to ensure the safety of their leadership in the event of nuclear war. This program includes the construction of deep underground bunkers, tunnels, secret subway lines, and other facilities underneath Moscow and other major Soviet cities, as well as the sites of military commands.

These underground installations are hundreds of yards below the surface and can accommodate thousands of people. This Soviet civil defense program, which has been going on for 40 years, is shrouded in total secrecy, and Carlucci's new report is the first authoritative look the American public has been given.

The purpose and progress of these facilities have remained unchanged through successive Kremlin regimes and through successive U.S.-U.S.S.R. treaties. Even the SALT I ABM Treaty of 1972 did not slow down the continuing construction of underground defenses built in preparation for nuclear war.

The new Carlucci report says that a major expansion of these underground facilities started just about the time this

ABM Treaty was signed. Another round of construction of these complexes began in the 1980s while Soviet leaders were publicly emphasizing that a nuclear war would be so catastrophic that it didn't make any sense.

The result of this 40-year effort is that Soviet bosses are prepared with a massive network of shelters that can house all the government ministries and a full-scale communications system. These installations are equipped with highly effective life support systems capable of protecting their leaders against chemical and biological attack.

In case of nuclear war, the Soviet leaders can go hundreds of yards below the surface, board secret subway lines, ride miles away from the heart of Moscow, then fly to remote facilities. The Soviets have fleets of aircraft, trains, and other vehicles that provide options for survival. The Soviets clearly expect to exercise national command and control through all phases of a protracted nuclear war.

The new Department of Defense report makes clear that the Soviets are working on all other aspects of strategic defenses, too. Around Moscow, the Soviets have the world's only operational ABM system. In addition, the Soviets have built a variety of detection and tracking installations that can be used for a nationwide territorial ABM system.

The Soviet SDI-type programs involve a much greater investment of plant space, capital and manpower than the United States is expending. They are spending more on research in laser, particle beam and kinetic energy weapons for anti-satellite and anti-missile defenses.

The new Defense Department book quotes Mikhail Gorbachev as admitting last November 30 that "The Soviet Union is doing all that the United States is doing, and I guess we are engaged in research, basic research, which relates to these aspects which are covered by the SDI of the United States."

His statement certainly gives the lie to the pacifist propagandists in the United States who rail about our trying to "militarize" space. The Soviets have already done exactly that.

The new Carlucci report is a stunning antidote to the media pabulum dished out daily about how "times have changed" and Gorbachev has ushered in a new era. The facts in the book support the report's conclusion that, "Rhetoric notwithstanding, Soviet defense spending has risen, not diminished, under Gorbachev's aegis."

A Fighting Chance to Survive

If a nuclear war ever occurs, I hope I die immediately because "the survivors will envy the dead." We've all heard that sentiment spoken so often that it is seldom disputed.

Few who use that phrase have ever thought about its consequences, and fewer still know where it originated. It was spoken first by Kremlin boss Nikita Khrushchev, who didn't believe it at all. The Soviets have built elaborate, hardened shelters to enable their Communist Party hierarchy to survive a nuclear war.

Do Americans who mouth Khrushchev's phony phrase really believe it? Probably a few do. But most people, when given the option between life under very difficult conditions or death by incineration will choose life under almost any circumstances.

If your house were to catch fire tonight, would you grab

your children and run outside? Would you run outside even if you could never afford to buy another house? Even if you had to spend the next five years in a tent? Most people would answer yes.

Would you run from your burning house even if you had to spend the next two weeks in a New York subway car and then face an America on the outside roughly the equivalent of life in the mid-19th century, that is, without running water or indoor plumbing? That's the sort of shelter Dolly Parton grew up in back in Tennessee, and she survived quite well.

The reason we are asking all these hypothetical questions is that the U.S. Government has falsely assumed that we would all prefer to die than to survive a nuclear attack. Those who would choose a hard life rather than death have *not* even been given a fighting chance to survive.

Other governments, on the other hand, have given their citizens protection against nuclear war. Switzerland, Sweden, Communist China, and the Soviet Union all have extensive shelter systems into which their people can go in the event of attack.

The authors of a paperback book called *Fighting Chance: Ten Feet to Survival* (Oregon Institute of Science and Medicine, P.O. Box 1279, Cave Junction, OR 97523) are asking the question, if they can do it, why can't we? Why doesn't the U.S. Government give us a fighting chance to survive a nuclear war?

In a breezy, colloquial style, authors Dr. Arthur Robinson and Dr. Gary North present an intriguing plan. Our government could buy mass-produced, highly-resistant shelters and install them ten feet underground all over the country at an average cost of \$200 per person. An additional \$100 per person would provide needed supplies for survival during the year after a nuclear attack.

Is this costly? Yes, but with the federal budget now at \$1 trillion, what's more important than saving the lives of American citizens?

Robinson and North propose the mass production of shelters about as comfortable as a New York subway car. Spending a week or two in a crowded subway car isn't anybody's idea of a vacation, but it sure beats burning in a nuclear attack. The goal is survival, not comfort. Each shelter would hold 150 people. Each person would occupy about 2.3 square feet of floor and 21 cubic feet of space. That's about the same as the Germans had in their bunkers during World War II. They survived and lived to rebuild their country after it was devastated by firebombs.

This amount of space per person is one-half the standard for Soviet and Swedish shelters. For an additional \$50 per person, our shelters could be as comfortable as theirs.

The authors propose that we build these shelters over a two-year period, starting with shelters for the 55 million children in schools and colleges. Students are more concentrated, the space is readily available, and it would be easiest to shelter this quarter of our population. The best places to build shelters for adults would be neighborhood parks, parking lots, office buildings and stores.

Is it the government's responsibility to build shelters for us? The government builds street lights and roads, gives police protection, and maintains an army and navy, and it should be just as important to provide shelter for civilians against enemy

attack.

The opponents of a shelter system say that it's too expensive. But the Red Chinese, who are some of the poorest people on earth, have built a tunnel system better and more expensive than the Robinson-North proposal. If the poverty-stricken Chinese can afford it, it is obvious that we can.

The Robinson-North proposal is a practical plan to provide shelter against nuclear war for 90 percent of our population, thereby making civilians undesirable targets for any enemy attack. This would convince the Soviets that we are determined to survive. That is the best way to discourage them from trying it.

On the other hand, the best way to encourage a nuclear attack or nuclear blackmail, or both, is to let the Soviets believe we do not even have a fighting chance to survive it.

A civil defense shelter program has one major drawback. It won't protect us if it isn't built.

Scenario Shows SDI Needed

Opponents of SDI (Ronald Reagan's proposal to build a Strategic Defense Initiative) are fond of saying it is worthless because "SDI cannot provide 100 percent protection against nuclear missiles. If the Soviets fire their missile force against us, some missiles are bound to get through and would kill millions of people."

Even if that statement were true, it is no argument against building SDI because the most likely scenario is that only one missile would be fired at us, not a thousand. Against an attack by one or two nuclear missiles, SDI could provide 100 percent protection.

The oft-repeated cliche that "a nuclear war is unwinnable" is predicated on the unprovable assumption that any nuclear war would be an all-out nuclear war. However, a limited nuclear attack by the Soviets against us is more probable because it could enable the Soviets to win by forcing our surrender without massive destruction.

Scientific progress in missile technology has increased the ability to hit a specific target more accurately. Targets can be chosen for their military significance, such as land-based ICBMs in their silos, and for the most part, those are not near big cities.

Let's consider some possible scenarios. If the Soviets decide to dump their entire arsenal on us in a massive surprise attack, they would have good reason to believe that any U.S. President would order massive retaliation. That would set up the scenario of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD).

If, on the other hand, the Soviets fire just one missile, targeted on our Minuteman missile sites, and perhaps on just one U.S. city, this would set up a very different chain of events.

With the Russian missile streaking toward a U.S. target and due to hit within 30 minutes, Mikhail Gorbachev calls Ronald Reagan on the Hot Line and says, "A Big One is on the way as a demonstration of what we can and will do, so I call on you to surrender now or we will destroy your country." What would our President do? What **could** he do?

If the President responded with massive retaliation, that would surely compel the Soviets to respond in kind. This would indeed fulfill the prophecy of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD).

Suppose the President made a limited, tit-for-tat response.

He could select and destroy a comparable Soviet target and hope that both sides would say, "That's that; now let's talk this over." Would the President actually push the button for a limited strike in the face of the predictable clamor from Congress and the media shouting their fear of escalation and that "nuclear war is not worth such a gamble"?

Even if our President had the will to order "fire," he would have to consider the possibility that the already-deployed Soviet-SDI would be adequate to defend against one or two missiles (even though it might not be leakproof against a massive U.S. retaliation). The more our President increased the probabilities of getting through the holes in a leaky Soviet SDI, the more he would increase the probabilities that the Soviets would react with a massive MAD response anyway.

Is it unthinkable that the Soviets would use mass murder of civilians as a tool to force U.S. surrender? The Soviets have a long record of killings and the number of Afghan victims, even in the Gorbachev glasnost era, is one million.

Our President's third option is just as ominous. He could try to work out the best negotiated surrender he could persuade the Kremlin to accept.

As the potential aggressor, the Soviets can plan and wait for a window of opportunity in our political circumstances when there may be a wavering of resolve on the part of whoever sits in the Oval Office. As the potential victim, America must protect itself against every eventuality.

There is one solution to this dilemma: build SDI now. It would not need to be able to shoot down thousands of incoming warheads with no leakage. It would need to address the more likely possibility of defending us against one or a few incoming warheads.

A U.S. SDI system would also be an effective shield against a missile launched against us by accident, by terrorists, or by a third country. Just consider this additional scenario. Our President answers the Hot Line and Gorbachev solemnly says, "Mr. President, we've had a computer malfunction and one of our missiles will impact on New York City in 25 minutes. We're terribly sorry; it was an accident; we will help you clean up the damage."

Dare we leave our nation with no defenses and no options? That is the overriding issue in the 1988 Presidential election.

Phyllis Schlafly is the author of five books on defense and foreign policy: *Kissinger on the Couch* (1975) and *Ambush at Vladivostok* (1976) covering the Kissinger years, *The Gravediggers* (1964), *Strike From Space* (1965), and *The Betrayers* (1968) covering the McNamara years. She was a member of Ronald Reagan's 1980 Defense Policy Advisory Group and a member of the National Security Subcommittee of the 1984 Republican Platform Committee. President Reagan appointed her a member of the Commission on the Bicentennial of the United States Constitution.

The Phyllis Schlafly Report

Box 618, Alton, Illinois 62002

ISSN0556-0152

Published monthly by The Eagle Trust Fund, Box 618, Alton, Illinois 62002. Second Class Postage Paid at Alton, Illinois. Postmaster: Address Corrections should be sent to the Phyllis Schlafly Report, Box 618, Alton, Illinois 62002.

Subscription Price: \$15 per year. Extra copies available: 50 cents each; 4 copies \$1; 30 copies \$5; 100 copies \$10.