



The Phyllis Schlafly Report

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We Must Deploy SDI Now

SDI: Searching for Its Identity

We've finally gotten the media to use President Reagan's label "SDI" (Strategic Defense Initiative) for his plan to make nuclear weapons obsolete, instead of the media label "Star Wars." But the issue has now become not the name but the substance. We've got it named, all right, but what is it?

That may sound like a silly question, but it is *the* most important question about SDI. We know we need it, we know it will work, we know we can afford it, and we know we can't afford *not* to have it because the Soviets will soon have theirs.

But what is it? Is it science research on a laser or particle beam system that needs years of development and testing and cannot be operational until the mid to late 1990s?

Or is it a non-nuclear system, whose technology is already developed and tested, and is almost ready for deployment? To be deployed or not to be deployed, as Hamlet would say, that's the question.

The reason SDI is searching for its identity is that President Reagan and other SDI advocates have made their case so persuasively that all but a handful of Congressmen want to be perceived by their constituents as pro-SDI. Even liberals and accommodationists find it impolitic to argue against SDI, so they have devised more devious methods of opposing it.

Before and during the Geneva Summit in November 1986, the principal push by the anti-SDIers was to urge Reagan to "use SDI as a bargaining chip." That ploy failed; the President didn't fall for it.

Now, the anti-SDI agitators have a new game plan. They say, "We love SDI, but we want to research it to death." That would make SDI just a delectable morsel of pork barrel for the scientific community, and for the Congressional districts that enjoy the expenditure of funds. But that would not give America a defensive system.

Of course these anti-SDIers don't say "research SDI to death." They just say, "SDI needs at least ten more years of research, so meanwhile let's extend the MAD ABM Treaty of 1972. This will promote 'arms control' and it won't hurt us because SDI isn't ready to build anyway."

A smart lawyer once said, "I can win any case if you let me ask the question to be decided." Likewise, the fate of SDI depends on who defines it.

The anti-SDIers are trying to define SDI as an exotic

laser system, not yet developed, that will not be deployable for 15 to 20 years. The pro-SDIers define SDI as the non-nuclear "smart rock" technology that is already tried-and-tested and could be in place and protecting America within five years.

A "smart rock" is a little piece of metal with a computer brain and a heat-sensitive device. It's like the heat-seeking missiles we routinely use for air defense except that the smart rock is mounted on rockets that can go several hundred miles out into space. This kind of smart bullet was successfully tested against a U.S. Minuteman warhead on June 10, 1984. It scored a bull's eye at a height of 100 miles. Later tests were successful at heights of hundreds of miles.

Since America desperately needs life insurance against an accidental or deliberate nuclear attack, we should start immediately to put smart bullets on small rockets launched from the ground. A space-based system is essential, too, and by the 1990s, when technology has improved, smart bullets should be deployed on satellites orbiting the earth.

Of course, science advances, technology improves, and the lead time on sophisticated systems keeps lengthening. We should always keep researching so we will have the best system 5, 10 and 15 years into the future.

But we also need protection for the here and now. As SDI Congressional leaders Senator Malcolm Wallop and Representative Jack Kemp wrote the President, to defer deployment of American defenses for five to seven years "would place the United States in a no-win position and the Russians in a no-lose position."

The Soviets blamed the Chernobyl disaster on human error. We can't afford to allow the American people to be the victims of a Soviet human error about nuclear missiles. SDI can defend us from a military Chernobyl as well as from a deliberate attack. But SDI can defend us only if it is deployed and ready for action; it cannot defend us at all if it is on the drawing board scheduled for production in the next century.

Lessons of the Reykjavik Summit

Contrary to the biased news coverage about the Reykjavik, Iceland, Summit in October 1986 between President Ronald Reagan and Communist Party boss Mikhail Gorbachev, that meeting was a success and our President emerged on the high ground standing tall for freedom. That's why the Party-controlled press in the U.S.S.R. gave zero news

coverage to the Summit.

The American people rejected the outrageous interpretations that the media liberals tried to hang around Reagan's neck and came out strongly in support of the President. It was like Grenada all over again.

The Great Communicator made the SDI issue come alive with homey analogies that everyone can understand. He called the SDI space shield an insurance policy in case the Soviets don't keep their promises, and he compared our implacable demand for a defensive system to our retaining gas masks after nations promised not to use gas warfare.

This makes sense to the American people. Polls now show that 75 percent of Americans think that SDI is a good idea, while only 23 percent think it is a bad idea; and 68 percent agree that Reagan should not give up SDI even for big reductions in nuclear weapons, whereas only 20 percent disagree.

Reagan's position is that an SDI space shield is the key to practically everything in our relations with the Soviet Union — the key to our survival in the face of the Soviet nuclear missile force, and even the key to getting the Soviets to talk to us about weapons reduction. Reagan's position is eminently rational and credible, and the anti-SDI position is not.

Despite overwhelming public support for SDI, its opponents have come up with a sixpack of arguments. They're not persuasive, but they need to be answered.

1) "SDI won't work." That's false. On June 10, 1984, our Defense Department sent a missile up into space at 10,000 miles an hour where it scored a bull's-eye at a height of 100 miles against another missile traveling at 10,000 miles an hour. This proved that we can accomplish the intercept, the most difficult part, so the great "can-do" America can surely build the rest of the system.

2) "SDI won't be perfect." That's true, but SDI certainly will be more perfect than any treaty. Even if SDI were only 90 percent perfect, that would provide real deterrence and therefore give us 100 percent protection. If the Soviets knew that 9 out of 10 of their missiles would be shot down, leaving our Minuteman missile force mostly undamaged and in control of the world, the Soviets wouldn't shoot any of their missiles at us.

3) "SDI is too expensive." That's false. SDI will cost only about \$30 billion over the next seven years. This figure compares favorably with the some \$40 billion we are now spending to continue maintenance and modernization of the offensive nuclear missiles required by our current MAD Mutual Assured Destruction strategy.

4) "SDI would be useless because the Soviets would 'overwhelm' it with more offensive missiles." In order for the Soviets to build enough additional missiles to get through our SDI space shield, they would have to beef up their missile arsenal to ten times its present size. They would have to build an additional 5,000 ICBMs at a cost of \$5 trillion. This is unrealistic and terribly costly. Fortunately, we are in a time-frame when the cost factors favor the defense instead of the offense.

5) "SDI would violate the MAD ABM Treaty of 1972." That's not true. The 1972 ABM Treaty prohibits only anti-missile defenses that were "currently" in use at that time. The Soviets absolutely refused to limit future systems.

6) "SDI needs ten more years of research so it won't hurt us to extend the MAD ABM Treaty during that time." That's false and is a deliberate delaying tactic by those who are curiously comfortable with the concept of keeping America completely undefended.

Over the past several years, U.S. scientific ingenuity has designed, developed and tested systems that can defend large geographic areas with non-nuclear, smart rock, kinetic-energy devices. They can destroy attacking warheads by striking them at a very high velocity instead of with a nuclear explosion. U.S. technology is unfolding far more rapidly than anyone believed possible a few years ago. We've made major breakthroughs in infra-red sensors, optics, computers and miniaturization so that we can track, target and destroy incoming warheads.

Even the 1972 MAD ABM Treaty allows us to deploy 100 interceptor missiles at Grand Forks, North Dakota. The Soviets already have their one anti-missile site deployed and maintained around Moscow, so there is no reason for us not to have ours.

President John F. Kennedy announced in 1962 that we would send a man to the moon. At that time, we certainly did not possess all the necessary technology and hardware, but the commitment was made by our President to start marching toward a definite goal. That finish line was reached under President Richard Nixon in 1969 when Americans walked on the moon.

Likewise with SDI. Since President Reagan has made it clear that he will not abandon SDI at any price or for any concessions, the time is ripe for him to announce that we will start immediate deployment of SDI. Of course, technology will improve as the years go on, but that's no excuse for not starting to defend America today.

Gorbachev's Bulldown Proposal

Soviet boss Mikhail Gorbachev made President Reagan an offer: First, scrap SDI (Strategic Defense Initiative) and, second we'll join in a "bulldown" of nuclear weapons. Should Gorbachev be taken seriously?

No, he should be ridiculed as the hypocrite he really is. Logic, fact, and experience all teach us that, if or when any bulldown begins, *that* is precisely when we will need SDI (a space shield) most of all because the bulldown creates the opportunity for the cheater to strike.

The United States and the Soviet Union each now have about 10,000 nuclear warheads. If one side cheats by 1,000 that doesn't make a great deal of difference.

But if each side builds down to only 1,000 warheads, a cheater who hides 1,000 which he claimed he destroyed could make a fatal difference. In a world of no nukes, one nuke is king! When nations agreed to outlaw gas warfare, they wisely kept their gas masks in case any aggressor decided to cheat.

Even if both sides abolished all nuclear weapons, someone might build a new one. We can destroy the bombs but we cannot destroy the scientific knowledge. We simply can't put the genie back into the bottle.

Gorbachev's plan is completely unverifiable because the Soviets are going full-steam ahead with mobile missiles. "On-site verification" used to be the acid test of Soviet arms-control compliance, but it's a farce if they agree to it today because

there isn't any "on-site location" for mobile missiles. They can be moved around on command, on railroad tracks, on trucks, hidden in the thousands of square miles of Siberia, under foliage, roofs, or cloud cover.

The United States can never play a hide-and-seek game like that because the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post* will constantly monitor and disclose our missile sites. The factors of mobility and cheating make Gorbachev's proposal nothing but a media ploy.

SDI is, for good reason, the centerpiece of the Reagan plan for the strategic defense of America. He knows that the "balance" of nuclear terror is badly out of balance, and Mutual Assured Destruction isn't mutual any longer.

The 10,000 Soviet warheads are mostly of the first-strike kind. They have 6,500-8,000 high-accuracy missiles which can hit a military target in 30 minutes within a 250-yard radius 8,000 miles away. Since there are only 2,000-4,000 military targets in the United States, the Soviets can simply target two warheads on each one and destroy our ability to retaliate.

The 10,000 warheads owned by the United States are very different: only 900 of them are first-strike weapons as opposed to the 2000+ military targets in the Soviet Union. A first-strike force requires both accuracy and numbers, and we don't have the numbers of sufficiently accurate missiles.

The majority of our nuclear force consists of 3,000 bombs designed to be delivered by planes which take 12 hours to reach their destination and 5,000 submarine missiles, which are relatively inaccurate because nobody knows where they will be when a command is given to fire them. They are accurate only within a 400-500 mile radius, and that's not good enough to knock out a military target.

This ominous imbalance is what makes Ronald Reagan steadfast in his determination to build SDI, a space shield which can kill enemy missiles before they kill us. He also knows that the Soviets are moving ahead with their fifth generation of missiles: SS-24, SS-25, SS-26, SS-27, and SS-28; they have long since passed the bounds of reasonable deterrence.

Not only do the Soviets have this awesome superiority over the United States in first-strike weapons, but they have their own "SDI" funded at ten times what Congress has appropriated for ours. On the December 10, 1986 NBC-TV Nightly News, John Chancellor said that, while we have been occupied with the Iran question, the Soviets successfully tested an accurate, reliable smart-rock SDI-type defense against missiles. President Reagan requested \$3.7 billion for FY1986, but Congress appropriated only \$2.5 billion. For FY1987, President Reagan requested \$4.8 billion, but Congress appropriated only \$2.8 billion.

In a current classic case of chicanery, two Soviet scientists received a Nobel prize for their work on Russia's SDI, and then signed a letter denouncing the American SDI.

In addition to all these massive offensive and defensive systems, the Soviets have enough hardened civil-defense bunkers to shelter 175,000 people. That means they can assure the survival of the Party, military, and scientific officials who are important to their goal of world domination.

Soviet Sabotage Of SDI?

Are the Soviets engaged in a worldwide strategy to

sabotage our SDI and space programs and terrorize those participating in them? The disasters have cost billions of dollars, the coincidences are startling, and they cry out for thorough investigation by the Senate and House Select Committees on Intelligence. Let's catalogue the catastrophes and coincidences.

1. On January 28, 1986 our space shuttle Challenger, launched from Cape Canaveral in Florida, exploded seconds after take-off, killing the entire crew.

2. On April 18, 1986 a Titan II (our most dependable rocket), launched from Vandenberg Air Force Base in California, blew up five seconds after lift-off, destroying a badly-needed reconnaissance satellite.

3. On April 25, 1986 a Nike-Orion rocket, carrying a scientific probe, misfired after a NASA lift-off from the New Mexico desert. This was the first failure after 55 successful launches.

4. On May 3, 1986 a Delta rocket, launched from Cape Canaveral in Florida, had to be destroyed by ground controllers after a mechanical malfunction sent it spinning out of control 70 seconds after lift-off. This was the first failure after 43 straight successes, and destroyed a \$57 million weather satellite.

The previous reliability for these rockets was impressive. The shuttle had a 100 percent success record; the reliability of the other three systems was 95 percent. The chance of four failures in a row, from launches conducted by two different agencies (NASA and the Department of Defense) from different launch sites, are mathematically astronomical. The specific cause of each failure was different, but most of these rockets had to be destroyed by radio command from the ground to prevent debris from falling into population areas.

5. On May 30, 1986 the French Ariane rocket exploded at the Kourou launch site in French Guinea. The French say it would have been easy for one well-placed person to have caused the disaster by sabotage.

6. On July 18, 1983, 34-year-old U.S. Air Force Captain William Howard Hughes, Jr., whose job included training officers to destroy rockets that malfunction after launch, was sent to the Netherlands to work with NATO. He disappeared and has never been seen again. Our intelligence agencies believe that Hughes defected to the Soviet Union or was captured by Soviet agents. On December 8, 1983, the Air Force declared him a deserter.

Hughes had been the "lead analyst" of the Command Control and Communication Surveillance Systems at the Air Force Operational Test and Evaluation Center at Kirkland Air Force Base in Albuquerque, N.M. His knowledge is more valuable to the Kremlin than the information transmitted by the important spies who were prosecuted in 1986.

7. On the morning of the Challenger launch on January 28, 1986, four Soviet spy ships were in Florida waters. The Soviets have consistently stationed their electronic spy vehicles, disguised as trawlers, as close to every U.S. space launch as the Coast Guard would allow, in order to gather data on our shuttle's performance.

Four hours before the Challenger disaster, the Soviet spy ships suddenly steamed northeast at full speed. No explanation was ever offered. Why were they mysteriously absent from the scene of the only shuttle disaster we've had?

8. On July 9, 1986, Karl Heinz Beckurts, a prominent nuclear physicist and research chief of West Germany's largest electronics company, Siemen's Corporation, was killed in Munich by a powerful remote-controlled bomb that destroyed his car while he was driving to work. A note left at the scene of the attack identified the Red Army Faction of the infamous terrorist Baader-Meinhof Gang as the criminals, and their motive as Beckurts' involvement with the American SDI.

It is possible that the five disasters, the disappearance, the departure of the Soviet ships, and the death are all coincidences. We have had several successful launches since then. But the vast U.S. intelligence gathering apparatus, in Congress and the Administration, owes the American people a thorough investigation and public disclosure of the evidence.

Media Bias About Salt II

Advocacy journalists in the national news media showed their bias against Ronald Reagan and against U.S. defenses by their "reporting" about the so-called "breaking" of the SALT II "Treaty." This happened when a B-52 bomber, equipped with cruise missiles, was recently put into active service.

Newspapers and network television constantly laced their reporting with emotion-charged terms calculated to lead the American people to believe the false proposition that the Reagan Administration has violated a treaty. The page one story in the *New York Times* was headlined "U.S. exceeds limit set in 1979 accord on strategic arms."

This so-called "news" article even presumed to ascribe ulterior motives to the Reagan Administration, quoting one anti-defense Congressman as charging that the Reagan Administration took this action only in order to "shore up conservatives' support" at a difficult time and to prove that it is "acting decisively." Just to be sure that readers didn't overlook this point, the Congressman's picture was printed with a caption that repeated the slur on Reagan's motives.

The national network newscasts repeatedly used such terms as "violated" SALT II and "exceeded the SALT II limits." To give verisimilitude to this false reporting, CBS-TV showed old news clips of Jimmy Carter signing the SALT II Treaty with Communist Party chief Leonid Brezhnev on June 18, 1979.

This type of news reporting is dishonest, biased, and reflects the consuming desire of the national media elite to achieve their liberal policy goals by the way they select and "frame" the news. The media's success in manipulating public opinion about SALT II is aided by the American people's general lack of knowledge about the United States Constitution.

Under the U.S. Constitution, a treaty is not a treaty unless it is signed by the President AND ratified by a two-thirds majority of the U.S. Senate. The SALT II "Treaty" is NOT a treaty at all under U.S. law because it was never ratified, and no amount of showing Jimmy Carter fraternizing with Brezhnev can make it a treaty.

Article 19 of SALT II states that the treaty "shall be subject to ratification in accordance with the constitutional procedures of each Party." Clearly, the Soviets were on notice that anything Jimmy Carter signed was NOT a treaty unless the Senate ratified it, so it was disingenuous of Mikhail Gorbachev to attack Reagan for ignoring SALT's so-called "limits," and it was mischievous of the media to give him air

time to act out his tantrum.

Pretending that the United States should obey the terms of the SALT II "Treaty" is like a woman demanding that a man be faithful to her even though he never married her. If the marriage ceremony was never completed, she is just shouting in the wind.

The news media try to rationalize their proposition that the United States has some kind of obligation to abide by the SALT II terms by saying that the Soviet Union declared it would abide by the treaty anyway. So what! That's like the woman who was left standing at the altar saying that she will be faithful to the man who got away. That doesn't create any obligation on him.

When Ronald Reagan campaigned for the Presidency, he labeled SALT II "fatally flawed." The recent newspaper stories should have been headlined, "Reagan fulfills campaign promise to reject SALT II." There are so many reasons why SALT II was opposed by Ronald Reagan, the Senate and the American people, that it is no wonder Gorbachev is eager to lock us into its unfavorable terms.

SALT II defines "bombers" so as to include our B-52s but to exclude the Soviet Backfire bomber, which is 15 years newer. Under SALT II, the Soviets can keep building as many new advanced bombers as they want, but the United States would not be permitted to do likewise unless we scrap an existing bomber or missile launcher for every bomber we build.

Article V sets up a phony "equality" by creating a sublimit of 1,320 MIRV-equipped ICBM and SLBM launchers plus cruise-equipped heavy bombers, but not limiting the carrying capacity of either the individual weapons or the total weapons force. That is like limiting two trucking firms to a fictitious equality of 1,320 "delivery vehicles," even though one firm has all 50-ton tractor-trailers and the other has only one-ton pickup trucks.

Within this so-called limit of 1,320, the Soviets have 820 "heavy" ICBMs (many of which can deliver 50 times more bang than our ICBMs), whereas our ICBMs are all defined as "light."

Anyway, if anyone "broke" the SALT II "Treaty" it was the Soviets. Our government has confirmed 22 SALT II violations by the Soviets. But I'll bet you didn't read that in any of the news stories telling about President Reagan "exceeding the limits."

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Phyllis Schlafly is the author of five books on defense and foreign policy: *Kissinger on the Couch* (1975) and *Ambush at Vladivostok* (1976) covering the Kissinger years, *The Gravediggers* (1964), *Strike From Space* (1965), and *The Betrayers* (1968) covering the McNamara years. She was a member of Ronald Reagan's 1980 Defense Policy Advisory Group and a member of the National Security Subcommittee of the 1984 Republican Platform Committee. President Reagan appointed her a member of the Commission on the Bicentennial of the United States Constitution.

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