



The Phyllis Schlafly Report

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How To Wage A Successful Summit

"League mounts campaign to stop SDI" is the headline on a League of Women Voters publication. It provides conclusive proof that this organization, though pretending to be nonpartisan, is just another liberal anti-defense lobby group working against Ronald Reagan's plan to build a Space Shield called SDI (Strategic Defense Initiative).

The publication makes no pretense of objectivity. Let's examine the League's "four fundamental reasons" against SDI.

"SDI will accelerate the arms race." The League claims that the Soviets will respond to SDI on "two tracks," first by developing defensive weapons of their own, and second by building more offensive weapons to "overwhelm" SDI.

The truth is that the Soviets are building **both** offensive and defensive systems as fast as they can bleed the financing out of their economy. Nothing we do or don't do has the slightest effect in altering their goal of offensive **and** defensive superiority.

The Soviets have spent more money on their defensive systems than we have on ours, and also more money than they have spent on their own offensive weapons. As Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger said, we can't afford **not** to build SDI because we know the Soviets are going ahead with their own defensive programs.

The boogeyman that the Soviets can "overwhelm" our SDI with more offensive weapons was exposed by Dartmouth physicist Dr. Robert Jastrow. If we build 100 SDI satellites, the Soviets would have to build an additional 5,000 expensive ICBMs. If the Soviets did this, we could counteract them with only 100 additional SDI satellites.

The cost factors of that "acceleration" are so favorable to the United States and unfavorable to the U.S.S.R. that it would be irrational for the Soviets to do it.

"SDI will violate the ABM Treaty." Our Defense Department and State Department lawyers have reexamined the ABM Treaty and concluded that this is false. The ABM Treaty prohibits only ABM systems "currently" in use in 1972.

The joker word in the ABM Treaty is "currently." The American negotiators tried to get the Russians to agree to ban "future" defensive systems, but they obstinately refused.

"SDI will not work." After this bold, unprovable statement, the League then waffles its claim by asserting that there is "doubt" about the "effectiveness" of SDI and that a "perfect" defense is not possible.

The Defense Department test on June 10, 1984, which accomplished the intercept of a missile in space, proved that we have achieved the technology for the most difficult part of a defensive system. If we can do that, we certainly can build SDI.

The League inserted its own joker word in the argument by creating the strawman of a "perfect" defense. Of course, SDI won't be perfect; nothing is perfect in this world! But SDI will certainly be more perfect than any treaty and, furthermore, can protect us against accidental missile launches or attacks by non-Russians such as Castro.

The League then asks what it thinks is a rhetorical question: "Can we afford to take a chance on an unproven and untested system that must work perfectly on the first try?" Good question. The trouble with the League's argument is that this question is not relevant to SDI because SDI will be fully tested before it is built; but the question is relevant to our present predicament of living under Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD), which is the 1972 ABM Treaty strategy of retaliation. We cannot afford to take a chance on the untested system of MAD that must work perfectly on the first try.

"SDI will break the bank." The League claims that research and development of SDI over the next ten year will cost \$70 billion and that full-scale deployment could cost a trillion dollars. On the contrary, SDI's first phase will cost \$12 billion a year for five years, and the later phase \$20 billion a year for ten years. That compares favorably with the \$40 billion a year we are currently spending to threaten retaliation under MAD.

The League of Women Voters proudly asserts in its literature that the League is a "very vocal advocate of stopping SDI" and that it "pushed for legislation that

would undercut the President's SDI budget request." Make no mistake about which side the League of Women Voters is on. It certainly is not nonpartisan.

The 1988 Republican nominee for President should remember all this when the subject comes up about nationally televised debates. He should reject all proposals to allow them to be sponsored by such an anti-Reagan organization.

Reagan Succeeds At The Summit

Shakespeare's great line that "all the world's a stage and all the men and women merely players" was true in spades when two great actors met in Geneva, Switzerland, November 19-20, 1985. Of course Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev is an actor! He had been traveling to European capitals for the preceding six months giving Academy-Award-winning performances playing the role of a "new-style Russian businessman" with a wife who is a chic Russian "Jackie Kennedy." The media gave them rave reviews but actually were overreacting to the first Soviet boss in a decade who isn't dying and the first Soviet boss's wife who isn't dowdy.

A combination of Gorbachev, his disinformation agents, the liberal anti-Reagan media, and Mondale supporters in the State Department had worked massively in the months before Geneva to persuade President Reagan to give away SDI or at least to "use SDI as a bargaining chip." The media defined "progress" at the Summit as Reagan giving up SDI. Word was passed at the upper levels in Washington that Reagan could even get the Nobel Peace Prize if only he would show "progress" by retreating on SDI.

Ronald Reagan did not fall for that ploy. He knew that the Nobel Peace Prize is tainted money and would be an embarrassment for any American patriot to receive. Henry Kissinger received it for his Paris "peace" agreement which turned Vietnam over to the Communists. A few weeks after the Geneva Summit, the 1985 Nobel Peace Prize became another exercise in leftist propaganda when it was given to a couple of doctors who had organized an international group of pacifist physicians.

Gorbachev roared into Geneva demanding that SDI be stopped. He was accompanied by hundreds of American-speaking Russians who were well-scripted and well-staffed to wage summitry as usual. They gave numerous news conferences reciting well-rehearsed lines and giving pat answers.

Every now and then an unexpected question led the Russians off their prepared turf. A Dutch woman, Irina Grivivna, asked about political prisoners in the Soviet Union. The grim-faced Russians replied, "Political prisoners don't exist in the Soviet Union. ... We don't have prisoners in psychiatric units." When the Dutch woman supplied names of prisoners known to her personally, the Russian spokesman replied, "Madam, I don't know your circle of friends." Irritated, he added, "Must we call the militia to remove this woman?"

Afghanistan? The Russians answered that question by accusing the United States of actively fostering

conditions that would prevent the withdrawal of Soviet troops and then had the gall to demand U.S. "noninterference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan."

President Reagan arrived in Geneva pledging "strength, realism and dialogue." He left Geneva with SDI still on course and with his opinions about the Soviets confirmed. "We cannot assume," Reagan told Congress, "that their ideology and purpose will change."

Geneva was the eleventh summit since World War II, but it was very different from the preceding ten. Geneva was the first summit in which the U.S. President didn't cede any Free World real estate, didn't betray our allies, or didn't accept terms inferior to the Soviet Union. Although CBS-TV news was predicting right up to the day before Reagan and Gorbachev met that SDI would be bargained away at the Summit, President Reagan did not retreat, and Gorbachev left Geneva empty-handed. Reagan's message was substantially the same as the challenge he had issued to Gorbachev a few weeks earlier at the United Nations: Let's race in DEFENSIVE systems that can save lives instead of in offensive weapons designed to kill people.

President Reagan certainly did his part to stand steadfast when he met with the wily, tough Gorbachev. Now, it's up to the American people to do their part in increasing public support for SDI so that Congress will vote full-funding for SDI. We must redefine "progress" to mean progress on SDI -- toward making it possible for President Reagan to make a decision to deploy (build) SDI before he leaves the White House.

The Folly of MAD

President Reagan's SDI is the most innovative and futuristic proposal of his Administration. It is an exciting proposal for real change -- toward a system that can end the race in offensive arms, promote peace, lift the fear of nuclear war, and make nuclear weapons obsolete. It is innovative because it represents a dramatic change from the immoral and defeatist policies of the past.

The awesome fact of the present world is that, if the Soviets fire any or all of their missiles at us, the United States has no way to shoot them down before they destroy us with blast and fallout. For the last 15 years, our policy for dealing with this vulnerable situation has been a policy of revenge -- a promise to retaliate and kill as many million Russians as we can. This is the policy called Mutual Assured Destruction, known by its acronym MAD. MAD is the core doctrine of our relationship with the Soviet Union and of the MAD ABM Treaty of 1972 signed by the United States and the U.S.S.R.

What does it mean that our government pledged MAD in the 1972 ABM Treaty? It means: (a) The U.S. Government promises to keep our nation completely undefended so that Soviet missiles will be able to hit and destroy all their targets in the United States, both military and civilian population. (b) The U.S. Government agrees that, if deterrence fails or accident occurs, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. will mutually destroy each

other. (c) The U.S. Government agrees that, if nuclear war happens, it is our duty to maximize (not minimize) the civilian casualties on each side. (d) The U.S. Government promises that, if the Soviets attack, we will retaliate and kill as many Russians as we can in a supreme act of useless revenge.

On March 23, 1983, President Reagan asked, isn't there a better way? We know there is. That better way is his Space Shield, which he calls SDI (and the media have mislabeled "Star Wars"). SDI offers a way for the United States and the world to get out from under the policy of Mutual Assured Destruction.

Naturally, Soviet Boss Gorbachev doesn't like SDI because it would deprive 90% of his expensive ICBMs of their ability to destroy America. It would nullify his multi-billion-dollar investment in weapons whose **only** utility is to hit targets in the United States. But the American people like SDI. Public opinion surveys show that 90% of Americans believe that our nation must be defended against nuclear missiles.

Why MAD is NOT Mutual

The 1972 MAD ABM Treaty was based on the assumption that there would be a reasonable balance between the two powers in offensive weapons. But that assumption is no longer valid. National Security Adviser Robert McFarlane told a news conference at the Geneva Summit that the Soviets now have a 3-to-1 hard-target kill advantage. That's a long way from mutuality or balance.

There has been no slow-down in the Soviets' relentless build-up of strategic missiles. In the last 15 years, they have deployed four new types of missiles and are developing two more. During that same period of time, the United States has not deployed a single additional land-based strategic missile.

During the past ten years, the Soviet Union has deployed more than 800 MX-type missiles, all of which are much larger and more powerful than U.S. missiles. These include 308 SS-18s, 360 SS-19s, and 150 SS-17s.

The Soviet SS-18 is eight times as large and powerful as the newest U.S. ICBM, the Minuteman III. The SS-18 is the most powerful missile on earth; we have nothing even close to it and, indeed, are forbidden to build anything like it by the SALT II Treaty (which some people want us to obey even though we never ratified it).

The current U.S. ICBM force consists of 500 Minuteman IIIs, 450 Minuteman IIs, and about 30 Titan IIs, all of which were developed before 1971. More than half of the Soviet ICBM force is made up of nuclear missiles deployed since 1975.

The bipartisan Scowcroft Commission reported in March 1984 that the Soviets "now probably possess the necessary combination of ICBM numbers, reliability, accuracy, and warhead yield to destroy almost all U.S. ICBM silos, using only a fraction of their ICBM force. The U.S. ICBM force now deployed cannot inflict similar damage, even using the entire force."

In those two sentences, the Scowcroft Commission proved that the so-called Mutual Assured Destruction

doctrine, under which we are now living, is a fraud. That doctrine is based on the notion that, if the Soviets strike us first, we will hit back with our retaliatory force and wipe them out.

But if the Soviets need to use "only a fraction of their ICBM force" to destroy all our ICBMs, that means they would have plenty left to destroy our cities after we retaliated. That proves that MAD is **not** mutual and that the only destruction it assures is our own.

MAD Grew Out of Defeatism

How did it happen that America, whose national grand strategy during the 1940s and 1950s had been "there is no substitute for victory," came to accept Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) in the 1970s as the centerpiece of U.S. policy? U.S. policy was invented by a little group of elitists who marched to a different drummer, that's how.

The man who became the chief theoretician of this elite group was George Kennan. His friends called him the U.S.'s premier Kremlinologist. He wrote for the Council of Foreign Relations journal and other establishment publications. He was one of a small group of men who became convinced that, in a long-run arms race, the United States could not successfully compete with the highly disciplined Soviets who had the advantage of a dictatorial government.

Kennan and his intellectual friends developed a paralyzing dread of death by nuclear incineration. They concluded that accommodation of the Soviets, even preemptive surrender, was the only way to avoid this fate, and they resolved never to permit patriotic American citizens to thwart their plans.

In 1959 Kennan started his program of comparing the United States with the Soviet Union so as always to downgrade our side and upgrade the Communist side. To achieve this objective, he didn't hesitate to read God's mind, declaring, "We must concede the possibility that there might be some areas involved in this cold war which a Divine Power could contemplate only with a sense of pity and disgust for both parties, and others in which he might even consider us wrong."

In October 1959 Kennan shared his loss of faith in America with the Women's National Democratic Club. His speech revealed his disdain for U.S. institutions and his defeatism in the face of the Soviet threat.

"If you ask me," Kennan said, "whether a country in the state this country is in today: with no highly developed sense of national purpose, with the overwhelming accent of life on personal comfort and amusement, with a dearth of public services and a surfeit of privately sold gadgetry, with a chaotic transportation system, with an educational system where quality has been extensively sacrificed to quantity -- if you ask me whether such a country has, over the long run, good chances of competing with a purposeful, serious and disciplined society such as that of the Soviet Union, I must say that the answer is 'no.'"

In February 1965, Kennan shared his loss of hope in the future with a New York audience of 2,000 in these words: "I plea for something resembling a new act

of faith in the ultimate humanity and sobriety of the people on the other side. ... Our sole hope lies in the possibility that the adversary, too, has learned something from the sterility of past conflict; that some reliance can be placed, in the adjustment of mutual differences, on his readiness to abstain, voluntarily and in self-interest, from the wildest and most senseless acts of physical destruction. If this possibility fails us, we have little to fall back on."

Here was a chief architect of the pre-Reagan foreign policy pleading for an "act of faith" in the "humanity" of the Soviets, who have proved time and again, from Katyn Forest to Budapest to Afghanistan, that they have no humanity, and telling us that "our sole hope" in the future lies (not in our own abilities but) in the willingness of the Soviets to "abstain" from using the weapons they have built. George Kennan and his group are men without faith in America or hope in the future, and so they let a cloak of despair isolate them from reality. Fortunately, nobody in the Reagan Administration is listening to them.

Is the ABM Treaty a Problem?

All the scientific, technological, financial, and political arguments against SDI have been proven false. But the opponents of SDI are so committed to the strategy of Mutual Assured Destruction that they now argue that SDI would be a violation of the 1972 ABM Treaty that is based on MAD.

There are two short answers to this argument. First, we should use Article XV of the Treaty which grants us the legal right to withdraw from the Treaty if we decide that events have jeopardized our "supreme interests." Exercising this right requires only six months notice. Our supreme interests certainly are jeopardized by the Soviet missile force that now is three times more powerful than ours. Soviet violations of the ABM Treaty make it ridiculous that we continue to respect it. U.S. compliance in the face of Soviet noncompliance must make us a laughing stock in the Kremlin and encourage the Soviets to commit even more aggressive violations.

Second, SDI does not violate the 1972 Treaty anyway. In October 1972, the U.S. Defense Department had its lawyers do something they should have done 13 years before -- read the fine print of the 1972 Treaty and report on what it means.

The lawyers came up with a 19-page report concluding that the 1972 ABM Treaty does NOT prohibit the development and testing of "exotic" future space-based defensive systems (such as President Reagan's SDI), and may not even prohibit their deployment. Furthermore, the lawyers' examination of the negotiating documents showed that the United States tried hard in 1972 to persuade the Soviets to ban future defensive systems, but the Soviets consistently rejected the U.S. position.

The State Department then called in its legal adviser to study the 1972 ABM Treaty. He concluded that it does not ban the testing or development of future space-based defensive systems, but that it does ban deployment. National Security Adviser Robert

McFarlane broke the news by saying on TV's "Meet the Press" that SDI testing and development is "approved and authorized by the Treaty" rather than banned.

President Reagan accepted the new Defense Department interpretation as a matter of law but (after heavy lobbying by Secretary of State George Shultz) said that, as a matter of policy we will not test or develop SDI at this time. Reagan could change that policy at any time.

Gerard C. Smith, the chief U.S. negotiator of the 1972 MAD ABM Treaty, argued in a *New York Times* letter that the Treaty's Agreed Statement D provides that new-type systems "cannot be deployed unless authorized by a treaty amendment." Agreed Statement D doesn't say that at all. It says that we agree "not to deploy...except as provided for in Articles III, IV and VI"; but those Articles refer only to defensive systems "currently" in use in 1972.

Smith didn't mention Agreed Interpretation E which demolishes his whole argument. It says that any "future" systems are "subject to discussion" under Article XIV which allows for treaty amendments to be negotiated. We obviously are not bound by anything that is "subject to discussion."

Under the 1972 ABM Treaty, the United States has the legal authority to conduct full research, testing and development of SDI, and to make the decision to deploy SDI. The United States should proceed as fast as it can with this defensive program because, as President Reagan told the United Nations, "If we're destined by history to compete, militarily, to keep the peace, then let us compete in systems that defend our societies rather than weapons which can destroy us both."

History teaches us that weakness invites aggression. The instability in today's world is caused by the fact that the Soviets' hard-target kill superiority over the United States is three-to-one. The world is a safer place today because the Soviets discovered in Geneva that we have a fearless President who is unshakable in his determination to use American technology in defense of liberty. Now it's our job to build public opinion so that the 1986 and 1987 Summits will promote progress in deploying SDI.

Phyllis Schlafly is the author of five books on defense and foreign policy: *Kissinger on the Couch* (1975) and *Ambush at Vladivostok* (1976) covering the Kissinger years, *The Gravediggers* (1964), *Strike From Space* (1965), and *The Betrayers* (1968) covering the McNamara years. She was a member of Ronald Reagan's 1980 Defense Policy Advisory Group and a member of the National Security Subcommittee of the 1984 Republican Platform Committee. President Reagan recently appointed her a member of the Commission on the Bicentennial of the United States Constitution.

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