



# The Phyllis Schlafly Report

VOL. 19, NO. 3, SECTION 1

BOX 618, ALTON, ILLINOIS 62002

OCTOBER, 1985

## SDI: The Only Way to Achieve Arms Control

"The critics of Ronald Reagan's SDI are so illogical. In the same breath, they say 'it won't work' and 'it will accelerate the arms race.' But they simply can't have it both ways, it's impossible for both criticisms to be true." That was the comment of a mathematician friend of mine. Mathematicians are so logical. They live in a world where everything is rational and adds up. They recognize that the critics of SDI don't make sense.

The claim that SDI won't work is proven false by the successful test in the South Pacific on June 10, 1984. That test accomplished the intercept of the missile in space, obviously the most difficult part of the system.

The claim that SDI will impede arms control is the most ridiculous of all. SDI is the *only* way to achieve arms control. It is the only route to fulfill Ronald Reagan's vision of making the threat of nuclear war obsolete.

Consider this scenario. The United States builds an SDI — a defensive system to shoot down incoming nuclear missiles before they hit us. It isn't perfect, of course (what is perfect in this world?), but it can shoot down 98% of incoming missiles.

With our defensive shield in place, the President then gives our defensive technology to the Soviets. Or, alternatively, the Russians steal it and build their own "SDI."

At that point, it is clear that the tremendous arsenals of offensive nuclear missiles on both sides have been rendered almost worthless. Not only will there be no incentive to build any more expensive ICBMs, but there would be no real disincentive to scrapping, say, 500 missiles a year in a mutual build down.

*That's* real arms control, and SDI could bring it about! Conversely, so long as there are no defensive systems (and nuclear weapons have a "free ride" to their targets), there is every incentive to keep and increase those nuclear arms. Both nations believe it is too dangerous to reduce their present levels and that it is not cost-effective to scrap weapons on which they have spent so much money.

Every now and then one hears an anti-SDI activist pontificating that defensive weapons are worthless be-

cause they are always and easily overwhelmed by offensive weapons. One wonders if these people have read any history or traveled abroad.

The walled cities of medieval Europe, standing on a hill and often surrounded by a moat, are examples of a defensive system which kept their people safe from attack and defied all offensive weapons for hundreds of years. Just look at Carcassonne, for example, in southern France and you will see that it is obvious that, prior to the invention of the airplane, no offensive weapons existed which could overwhelm the defenses of the 13th century walled city.

Like the walled cities, SDI is a defensive system. The reason Mikhail Gorbachev rants and rails against it every time he opens his mouth is not because it threatens the Soviet Union, but because it threatens to reduce the value of the Soviets' \$500 billion nuclear weapons investment to zero.

In a recent ABC-TV "Viewpoint" special, in which various people were allowed to voice their complaints about media bias, I asked the question, did the media hang the label "Star Wars" on Reagan's SDI (instead of using the name he gave it, or "High Frontier" which was the original name) in order to make the American people believe that the system would "take war to the stars" and conceal the fact that it is purely defensive? Ted Koppel pronounced that a "legitimate" question and tossed the ball to ABC's Sam Donaldson to reply. After trying to claim that he uses "Star Wars" in order to help "people understand," he then resorted to a cop out. He said to me, "I like your red dress."

The interesting part of the "Star Wars" semantics is that, after President Reagan launched his March 23, 1983 SDI proposal to make nuclear war obsolete, the next morning the press reported it accurately and made no mention of "Star Wars." But when Senator Edward Kennedy attacked Reagan's plan and tagged it with the label "Star Wars," the media universally picked it up and has been using it massively ever since.

A much more accurate label for Reagan's SDI would be "Space Shield." It is not warlike in any way; it is a shield against war. According to the President's Science Adviser, Dr. George Keyworth, the Soviets are

spending more than \$3.7 billion on their defensive system, and we can't afford to do any less.

## Understanding Nuclear Weapons

Are you confused when you hear talk about ICBMs, MAD, SS-18s, ABM, Trident, Minuteman? Do you feel out of it when the news or the conversation turns to talk about nuclear this or strategic that?

The answer to your problem is at hand. It's a new book called **How To Make Nuclear Weapons Obsolete** (Little, Brown & Co., 1985) by a scientist who knows how to talk to non-scientists (which includes most of us). It isn't as simple as *The One Minute Manager*, but two hours with it can enable you to converse both with people who know something about the subject and those who don't.

The author, Robert Jastrow, is the founder of NASA's Institute for Space Studies and has been prominent in the space program since its start. Now a Professor of Earth Sciences at Dartmouth College, he is a nationally-recognized expert in nuclear physics, planetary science, and astrophysics.

Jastrow explains all the average citizen needs to know about satellites, missiles, warheads, ABMs, lasers, particle beams, and other exotic technologies which may become a reality by the end of the century. His illustrations are especially helpful in explaining our weapons and comparing them with the Soviets'.

No sooner was the SALT I ABM Treaty signed in 1972 than the Soviets built and deployed an entire new generation of ICBMs that were bigger, more destructive, and more accurate. They "knocked the stuffing out of Mutual Assured Destruction," the MAD theory on which the ABM Treaty rested. The Soviets built a giant missile force able to destroy us, but in SALT I we had signed away our right to defend ourselves.

So what kind of a response does that reality require? Our options are (a) Launch on Warning (hit the nuclear button as soon as we get the warning from U.S. satellites and radars that Soviet missiles appear to be on the way), (b) ride out the attack and let the bulk of our land-based missiles be destroyed, (c) massively build up our own land-based missile forces to match the Soviet ICBM force on equal terms (this would take 500 MX missiles carrying 5000 warheads), or (d) build a defense.

Defense is the best response. Technologies already "on the shelf" will allow us to put into place in the early 1990s a simple but highly effective two-layer defense at a cost of roughly \$60 billion.

The United States now has the means to build a miniature missile with elaborate computer brains called a "smart bullet" or a "smart rock." It can sense an incoming Soviet ICBM, steer itself into its path, and disarm the nuclear bomb inside the ICBM. Its action is like tossing a keg of nails into the path of the speeding warhead, and that's enough to upset the fragile electronics which control the nuclear bomb's mechanism.

The smart bullet can protect our missile silos, communication lines that connect the President with top military commanders, bomber airfields, and submarine bases. This will decrease the vulnerability of our nuclear forces, improve our chance of retaliation, and therefore make any attack less likely.

Its effectiveness is conservatively estimated at 90%, and Dr. Jastrow thinks a defensive system will work even if it is only 80% effective. That means we can shoot down four out of five Soviet warheads in a mass attack, and the Soviets will know that we can strike back with our surviving weapons because most of our retaliatory forces, key missile silos, Trident submarine pens, air bases, and chain of command will survive.

It would be even better to have a defense to shield the American people, too. The laser defense is not yet proven, but it holds the promise of destroying Soviet missiles as they rise from their silos. A laser beam is like a searchlight which travels at the speed of light, focuses on the metal skin of an ICBM and burns right through it, just as the light of the sun can burn through a piece of wood or paper when focused on a narrow spot by a magnifying glass.

Jastrow also explains the particle beam, which shoots a stream of fast-moving hydrogen atoms at the missile, and may prove to be even better. Whereas the laser beam is absorbed at a missile's surface and does not get into the interior, the atoms in a particle beam pass right through the metal skin of the missile and enter into the brains of the missile, driving it off course so it tumbles and destroys itself.

Jastrow's book proves that we need not be fearful of the future so long as we use our technology to defend ourselves. Technology can, indeed, make nuclear weapons obsolete.

## Let's Admit Arms Control Is a Failure

"Oh, but it will interfere with arms control!", cry the liberals at every event that might cast a cloud over the Reagan-Gorbachev meeting in Geneva in November. But the real truth is that arms control is already a failure and we should admit it.

During the dozens of conferences over the last 20 years, in which our announced objective has been arms control, the military balance shifted from U.S. superiority to Soviet superiority. If arms control were a scientific experiment, it would long ago have been abandoned as a failure and, worse, as life-endangering to those who believe in it.

The SALT I Agreements of 1972 were our magnanimous offer on the altar called "arms control." The United States agreed to abandon the strategic nuclear superiority on which our national security had been based for the preceding 25 years, and we offered the Soviets the olive branch of nuclear parity.

But that didn't satisfy the Soviets. They went into SALT I negotiations with nuclear superiority as their goal, including a first-strike counterforce capability and a strong defensive system. They used "arms control" as a tactic to achieve that objective.

During the decade following SALT I, U.S. defense spending declined until it is only 5% of our Gross National Product. Soviet military spending, on the other hand, steadily increased to become 20% of the U.S.S.R.'s Gross National Product.

During this period the Soviet Union spent three times more on strategic nuclear forces than did the United States. That's why President Reagan, using electronic charts, told a nationwide television audience

in 1981 that, "The truth of the matter is that the Soviet Union does have a definite margin of superiority — enough so there is risk and there is what I have called a window of vulnerability."

Today the Soviets have four times more strategic nuclear delivery vehicles and warheads than when SALT negotiations began, and they are on the verge of major defensive capabilities. Three-fourths of the Soviet nuclear systems are less than five years old.

The United States now has 8,000 fewer nuclear weapons than when SALT began and we have reduced our megatonnage at least threefold. Three-fourths of our weapons are more than 15 years old.

The Soviets agreed to enter into the SALT I negotiations and to sign the SALT I ABM Treaty in 1972 primarily to stop our ABM program which was then ready for deployment. The Soviets in 1972 were deeply engaged in a crash program to catch up with us in offensive nuclear weapons. They couldn't afford another crash program on ABM, so they used treaties instead of technology to catch up with us.

In 1962, the United States had nuclear superiority over the Soviets on the order of 8-to-1. It is obvious that the Soviets could not have achieved today's nuclear superiority over us without two concurrent movements: they built additional weapons at a rapid rate, and we dragged our feet.

Our foot dragging was done in the name of arms control. U.S. politicians sought the illusive goal of arms control much as the medieval knights sought the Holy Grail. Only those who pursued arms control were considered "pure" enough (pure, as in Sir Galahad) to receive respectful treatment from the media on foreign and defense issues.

It's clear to anyone who has the wit to see that the primary and perhaps sole reason why Gorbachev is so eager for a summit conference in Geneva is his attempt to stop the deployment (and even the research) of our anti-missile technology of the 1980s, namely, SDI. The Soviets are using arms control talks today to deny us the use of technologies which might give us the chance to offset their nuclear superiority and reduce their ability to checkmate us with nuclear blackmail.

Arms control treaties are always a bad deal for the United States: (a) they don't restrain the Soviets, who use ambiguous language and loopholes to continue building whatever they had already planned; (b) they do restrain us because our State Department binds us to the interpretation most advantageous to the Soviets; and (c) the Soviets (as President Reagan has formally reported) are in massive violation of the treaties.

We should be honest enough to admit that the objective of arms control cannot be reached by the route we have traveled in the last 20 years. Our objective should not be arms control anyway; it should be American security and independence.

### **Does SALT Prohibit SDI?**

The opponents of Ronald Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), having lost all their other arguments against it, now claim that it would violate the

SALT I ABM Treaty of 1972. That's just as false as saying that it won't work (after the June 10, 1984 test in the South Pacific proved otherwise).

If the drafters of the SALT I ABM Treaty had wanted to prohibit future defensive systems, they knew exactly how to do it with no ifs, buts, or whereases. Article V of the Treaty provides that "each party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based."

If the treaty drafters had intended to prohibit future "exotic" ABM systems (using more advanced principles), they could simply have added: "or which are based on other physical principles and include components capable of substituting for ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars." But they did not add those words.

It is a universally accepted principle of legal interpretation of documents that, where certain things are prohibited, the failure of an express inclusion must be interpreted as an intent to exclude that prohibition so long as the draftsmen of the document demonstrated that they knew how to accomplish that result if it were desired.

Why, then, is there any argument as to whether the Treaty does or does not prohibit the SDI space shield system? The answer is that the SALT Treaty was written with brilliant ambiguity, thereby allowing scholars and diplomats to argue forever over its meaning.

John Newhouse's *Cold Dawn: The Story of SALT* claims that SALT's "banning exotic future defensive systems was an enormous contribution." Two recognized experts on nuclear strategy, Dr. William Kintner and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., flatly contradict this, saying, "The Treaty applies only to the current state of the art ABM, namely, phased-array radars and short-range and long-range interception. Innovations in missile defense, for example, those based on a new principle such as the laser, are not proscribed."

How much does it matter whether we build or don't build a defensive system? It's the difference between life and death, between freedom and slavery, that's all. If the Soviet Union becomes the first to develop a defensive system that would provide a total or near-total defense against enemy missiles, the Soviets would be invulnerable to U.S. retaliatory attack and would be entirely free to engage in nuclear blackmail, and even to launch a genocidal missile attack against the United States and get off scot-free.

The 1972 SALT I ABM Treaty, in this as in other portions, provides the Soviets with a typical one-way loophole. On its face, it appears to apply to both sides but, in actual practice, it is an escape hatch open only to the Soviet side.

Here is how the matter of new defensive systems was clouded up in the SALT I Treaty. Under Article I, "each party undertakes not to deploy ABM systems" except as expressly permitted in Article III of the Treaty; this would appear to prohibit future defensive systems. But Article II defines an ABM system, for the purposes of the treaty, as a "system to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory,

currently consisting of: (a) ABM interceptor missiles . . . (b) ABM launchers . . . (c) ABM radars . . ." What is the effect of the word "currently"?

SALT Agreed Interpretation E, which was initiated by both sides, is a masterpiece in compounding the ambiguity. It says that, if "ABM systems based on other physical principles . . . are created in the future, specific limitations on such systems and their components would be subject to discussion." If limits on future defensive systems require "discussion," then obviously they are not prohibited by the Treaty.

The Soviets know that it cannot be convincingly proved that future defensive systems are barred by the SALT I Treaty. So, they are free to interpret the Treaty in the sense most favorable to them (and indeed have been going steadily forward with their own "Star Wars" program), while the usual clique in the United States claims that we are strictly bound to the interpretation most unfavorable to us and to U.S. strategic power.

The Reagan Administration has the obligation to interpret the Treaty in the most favorable way for U.S. security and to proceed immediately with its SDI space shield program. If anyone objects, then we should use Article XV which gives each party the right to withdraw "if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests." Our "supreme interests" are certainly jeopardized by the Soviets building a defensive system when we are not.

### Reagan's Summit With the Soviets

It is a time-hallowed tradition in the Soviet Union that the incumbent dictator will test each new American President in an ordeal of summitry. This practice was temporarily put on the backburner during the illnesses and deaths of Leonid Brezhnev, Yuri Andropov, and Konstantin Chernenko, but Mikhail Gorbachev is eager to revive it and meet with Ronald Reagan.

The prospect of U.S. Presidents meeting with Soviet bosses does not evoke optimism. Past summits are a dismal record of vain illusions shattered by diplomatic defeats. Our past Presidents seem to be no match for the single-minded toughness of Kremlin dictators who know what they want and are uncompromising in seeking their goals.

President Franklin D. Roosevelt told William C. Bullitt in 1943, "I have just a hunch that Stalin doesn't want anything but security for his country, and I think that if I give him everything I possibly can and ask nothing from him in return, noblesse oblige, he won't try to annex anything and will work for a world democracy and peace."

So, FDR went to Teheran in 1943 and to Yalta in 1945 and gave Joseph Stalin Poland and Eastern Europe, strategic bases in the Far East, and three votes in the United Nations. We got nothing in return.

President Harry Truman's attitude toward Stalin was: "I like old Joe. He's a decent fellow." So Truman went to Potsdam, reaffirmed Yalta, and divided up Germany.

President John F. Kennedy traveled to Vienna to meet Nikita Khrushchev in 1961. Khrushchev shouted and threatened to move against West Berlin with conventional forces, and even to use nuclear weapons. Kennedy said it was "a very sober two days."

Khrushchev made his personal estimate of Kennedy's character and then taunted him, in a message sent via the poet Robert Frost, that the Kennedy Administration was "too liberal to fight — even in defense of U.S. vital interests." Kennedy made no response; so Khrushchev conspired with Castro in 1962 to plot the clandestine deployment of offensive nuclear missiles to Cuba.

Richard Nixon went to Moscow in May 1972 to meet with Leonid Brezhnev and sign the SALT I Agreements at 11:00 p.m. after a state banquet, free-flowing liquors and numerous toasts, just in time to make the Friday evening national TV newscasts in the United States. Only later did we find out that the fine print pledged us to the mad doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction and an inferiority in ICBMs and missile-launching submarines by a ratio of 3 to 2.

Brezhnev welcomed President Gerald Ford with bear-hugging and vodka at Vladivostok in Siberia in 1974. Then Brezhnev ambushed Ford into agreeing to the essential elements of what later became SALT II.

Jimmy Carter traveled to Vienna in 1979 and kissed Brezhnev on the occasion of the signing of the SALT II Treaty. It was so disadvantageous to the United States that the Senate never ratified it.

After that sorry series of sellout summits, can we hope that Ronald Reagan will do any better than his predecessors of both parties? Yes, because Ronald Reagan is a very different man from his predecessors. He has an easy-going personality and might even say, "Mikhail, there you go again." But underneath Ronald Reagan understands the awesome power and evil of the Soviets, and that their game plan is to trick America out of our SDI so they can build their own and then blackmail us. Furthermore, public opinion surveys show that 90% of Americans believe that our nation should have a defensive system to shoot down nuclear missiles, and that is what SDI would do.

All Americans should support President Reagan in prayer and in public opinion so that he can look Gorbachev in the eye and say, "Sorry, Mikhail, SDI is non-negotiable. We are going to build SDI now, and we invite you to build your own. Let's turn the 'arms race' into a race of *defensive* weapons. The result will be to make *offensive* nuclear weapons obsolete and prevent world war for generations to come."

---

Phyllis Schlafly is the author of five books on defense and foreign policy: *Kissinger on the Couch* (1975) and *Ambush at Vladivostok* (1976) covering the Kissinger years, *The Gravediggers* (1964), *Strike From Space* (1965), and *The Betrayers* (1968) covering the McNamara years. She was a member of Ronald Reagan's 1980 Defense Policy Advisory Group and a member of the National Security Subcommittee of the 1984 Republican Platform Committee. President Reagan recently appointed her a member of the Commission on the Bicentennial of the United States Constitution.

### The Phyllis Schlafly Report

Box 618, Alton, Illinois 62002  
ISSN0556-0152

Published monthly by The Eagle Trust Fund, Box 618, Alton, Illinois 62002.

Second Class Postage Paid at Alton, Illinois.

Subscription Price: \$10 per year. Extra copies available: 50 cents each; 4 copies \$1; 30 copies \$5; 100 copies \$10.