



The Phyllis Schlafly Report

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The Science and Strategy of High Frontier

Who Opposes High Frontier?

Ronald Reagan's Star Wars proposal (also called High Frontier), the non-nuclear, space-based defensive system to enable the United States to shoot down incoming nuclear missiles, is sensible, moral, cost-effective, and non-threatening. So where does its opposition come from?

President Reagan's commitment to his space-based Strategic Defense Initiative was first stated publicly in his nationwide TV address on March 23, 1983. Most of his top defense men are for it, including Secretary Caspar Weinberger, Joint Chiefs Chairman General John W. Vessey Jr., Under Secretary of Defense Fred Ikle, and Science Advisor Dr. George Keyworth.

Even public opinion polls show public support levels for space-borne defenses at a remarkable 75% to 80%. That alone should assure speedy passage in an era when the pollster is the guru of modern politics.

We know it is technologically workable. The "it won't work" syndrome was shot down on June 10, 1984, when the U.S. Army conducted a spectacularly successful test in the South Pacific.

We know that its cost is within reason. A Lockheed vice president publicly stated that it can be built and deployed in five or six years at a price of \$25 to \$30 billion. Engineers and industrialists say that we can have an actual anti-missile defense for about the same cost (\$26 billion) as the Pentagon wants for mere research and development.

If this sum were appropriated at the pace of \$5 billion a year, it would be less than 3% of our current military budget. It's less than half the annual amount sunk in the failed CETA make-work project. It's less than a third of what the Carter Administration was willing to pay to put 200 MX missiles on a "Race Track."

Obviously, the Soviets don't like the idea of any American defense and this is echoed in their disinformation outlets. But where does the non-Soviet-influenced opposition come from?

A whole network of bureaucrats, foundation elite, and academics have fashioned their careers by becoming a sort of "lay ministry" of a pseudo-religion called

"arms control." Its liturgy is an ingenious fabric of agreements, proposals and counter-offers, laced together by the weird arithmetic of SALT I and II and START.

Psychologically, these people can't bring themselves to accept the notion that their measuring of missiles and crafting of concessions is an exercise in futility. After they have spent years trying to cram technology into the SALT box, they are unable to deal with Reagan's vision of a future in which new technology can obsolete SALT-controlled weapons.

Suppose you are a Pentagon bureaucrat or think-tank expert who for years has been seeking ways to deploy the MX missile under SALT and MAD (Mutual Assured Destruction). You have spent hundreds of millions of taxpayer dollars on studies and tests of super-hardened silos, multiple firing positions, deceptive basing, and mobile launchers.

Or, suppose you are a State Department or Arms Control and Disarmament Agency bureaucrat who has spent years learning the jargon of arms-control negotiations. You have built your career, advancing in pay and prestige, by specializing in the arcane subject of playing small facets of large and sophisticated weapons like pawns on the chess board of diplomacy.

No wonder you feel threatened by High Frontier with its concept that MAD should be scrapped and that reliance on offensive-only weapons is a mistake, morally as well as strategically. No wonder you feel threatened by High Frontier with its idea that automatic arms control through technology is better and safer than speculative arms control through treaties.

The anti-High Frontier naysayers, having lost most of their arguments after the successful experiment of last June 10, have rallied 'round the strawman that High Frontier should be rejected because a "perfect defense" is impossible. But we don't need a perfect defense; if we develop the capability of shooting down two-thirds, or even half, of incoming missiles, that is a more powerful deterrent than any treaty.

It's time to put the monkey on the back of the gloom-and-doomers and say that there is no point in continuing arms-control negotiations because it is im-

possible to achieve a "perfect treaty." American engineers have a better record of achievement than our diplomats, and it is far more likely that we can build a near-perfect space-based defense system than we can sign a near-perfect treaty.

Attack on Star Wars with Phony Science

The arguments leveled by some well-known scientists at Ronald Reagan's Star Wars proposal (also called High Frontier) don't stand up to scientific examination. They are false by factors of 25 to 1,600, according to Robert Jastrow, a former NASA physicist and now a Dartmouth College professor.

The Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS) attacked the High Frontier proposal on the argument that "thousands" of satellites would be needed to provide an effective defense. The UCS put the precise number at 2,400 satellites. This argument was supposed to demolish Star Wars because it is estimated that each satellite would cost a billion dollars and, if "thousands" are needed, the plan would indeed be a "turkey" as the UCS called it.

Dr. Jastrow examined all the evidence from both sides, conducted his own experiment and calculations, and came up with the conclusion that 100 satellites were adequate. The Livermore Laboratory concluded that 90 satellites would suffice, and we might get by with 45. So, the cost of the system would not be many trillions of dollars but would, instead, be a sum that can easily be absorbed in the amount already earmarked for spending on our strategic forces during the next 10 to 15 years.

How did the UCS explain its exaggeration of the number of satellites by a factor of about 25? The UCS never admitted its egregious error; but at a Congressional committee, a UCS spokesman lowered its estimate from 2,400 down to 800 satellites. In a more recent publication, the UCS dropped its estimate further to 300.

The UCS report also claimed that the Star Wars proposal would require putting a 40,000-ton device in orbit, a weight which would make the proposal ridiculously impractical. Dr. Jastrow shows that UCS made a mistake by a factor of 1,600; the correct weight of this device is 25 tons (about the same payload carried by a single NASA shuttle).

The Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) came forward with a different piece of phony science to try to discredit the High Frontier proposal. The OTA said that, if we try to build a real defense, the Soviets would simply build more missiles in an effort to "overwhelm" our system, and we would have to increase the number of our orbiting satellites in direct proportion to the increase in the number of Soviet missiles.

If true, this would have the effect of making the High Frontier program politically and financially impractical. Since our satellites would be very expensive, a trade-off of one new U.S. satellite for each new Soviet missile would be too costly.

But the OTA report is very erroneous, according to the theoretical physicists at Los Alamos and at Liver-

more. Scientists at both laboratories showed that the number of satellites we would need to counter a Soviet attack would be only in proportion to the square root of the Soviet missiles. This means that, if the Soviets build four times as many missiles, we would have to build only twice as many satellites to prevent them from "overwhelming" our defense.

Put another way, Dr. Jastrow explains that, if we build 100 satellites, and the Soviets want to "overwhelm" our defense (which means building enough new missiles so that the number getting through our defensive shield would be the same as if we had no defensive system), the Soviets would have to build more than 5,000 additional ICBMs and silos. If the Soviets did this terribly expensive thing, the United States could counter their thousands of new missiles with only 100 additional U.S. satellites.

The cost trade-offs favor the defense over the offense. The Soviets would be bankrupted long before we begin to feel any pain.

In another sample of pseudo-science, the OTA asserts that, in the third or terminal phase of the defense, we would need 280,000 "smart" mini-missiles to destroy the Soviet warheads after they are over the United States. According to Dr. Jastrow, competent professionals have concluded that no more than 5,000 would be needed.

Dr. Jastrow explains that the OTA is off by a factor of more than 50 because it made the irrational assumption that we would need to defend every single U.S. missile site against the entire Soviet missile force. It is absurd to argue that the Soviets might launch their entire missile force against *one* of our 1,000 Minuteman missile sites.

The anti-Star Wars scientists have biased their own conclusions by an error known in the trade as a GIGO calculation (garbage in, garbage out). If you make an original assumption that is absurd, your conclusion will likewise be absurd, even though your mathematics are completely accurate.

Soviet Star Wars Strategy

One of the phoniest demonstrations of grandstanding indulged in by Walter Mondale in the late, non-lamented presidential campaign of 1984 was his tirade against Ronald Reagan's Star Wars. Let's "keep the heavens free from war," he emoted.

The fact is that the Soviets have already taken weapons of war to outer space (please, not to Heaven), and the real question is, will we confront and compete with those weapons up there? Or, will we wait to take action until after their weapons have exploded on our homes and cities?

A new study by the respected Heritage Foundation gives chapter and verse on how the Soviets have already deployed "most of the essential building blocks for an effective countrywide strategic defense system." In other words, the Soviets are far ahead of us in protecting their own population; so it is patently dishonest for anyone to claim that our proposed High Frontier non-nuclear defense system would "accelerate

the arms race.”

The Heritage Foundation report shows that, since signing the 1972 SALT I ABM Treaty, the Soviets have spent more on defensive weapons than on offensive weapons and now are probably outspending the twice-as-wealthy United States about 4-to-1. Russia (where people endure perpetual scarcity in food and essential consumer goods) has been committing massive resources to its own Star Wars strategy.

Soviet activity in the defensive field was already in gear by the mid-1950s. U.S. intelligence discovered an ABM test region in Siberia in 1957. It is probable that the Soviets tested an ABM interceptor against an ICBM in flight during their big series of nuclear tests in 1961.

By the late 1960s, Soviet inferiority in ABM technology was so obvious that the diplomats rushed to the rescue and accomplished what their scientists could not. They achieved Soviet superiority in defensive weapons by persuading the United States to stop our ABM development and deployment and enter into SALT negotiations.

It is well documented that the principal Soviet objective in pushing for the SALT I ABM Treaty was to stop in its tracks the U.S. deployment of an anti-ballistic missile (ABM) which had been successfully tested and approved by both Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon. The Soviets succeeded: the 1972 treaty codified the peculiar notion of leaving our nation without any defensive system to shoot down incoming missiles (otherwise known as MAD: Mutual Assured Destruction).

The SALT I Treaty allowed each side to build one ABM site only. Our one and only in Grand Forks, ND, was dismantled under legislation sponsored by Senator Ted Kennedy the day after it became operational.

The Soviets, however, who did not share Kennedy's pacifist illusions, have ever since been building defensive systems as fast as their technology permits. The Soviets have built ABM interceptors surrounding Moscow in order to protect missiles, industry, and millions of people, 10,000 surface-to-air missiles with some ABM or anti-cruise missile capabilities, and a tremendous fleet of advanced interceptor aircraft.

Soviet space projects include a space shuttle, a very large expendable launch vehicle comparable to the U.S. Saturn V, a second generation anti-satellite system, manned space planes, and permanently manned space stations.

The Soviets have been acquiring the prerequisites for a high-technology space-based missile defense. They have done ten years of research on directed-energy weapons, developed a nuclear explosive generator, tested lasers against low-orbiting spacecraft, carried out a number of “electric beam” experiments, and have 10,000 scientists working in high-energy programs.

Now that the Soviets are confronted with a U.S. President who believes in the elementary proposition that America must be defended with a defensive system that defends, that experienced negotiator Gromyko has been globe-trotting to try to stop the United States from building a defensive system while the Soviets race

ahead. They want to slow the pace of our SDI, divide us from our allies, and complete their own ABM systems on schedule.

It should be obvious to the most starry-eyed of dreamers that the only reason the Soviets have come to the bargaining table is that Ronald Reagan is steadfast in his plan to build a defensive system which would make nuclear war obsolete by (a) deterring attack, deliberate or accidental, and (b) saving lives if that unhappy event occurred.

The Key to Arms Control

It's become very clear that number-one on Mikhail Gorbachev's 1985 “wish” list is a ban on Star Wars. This objective ranks ahead of the Kremlin's collateral desires to kill the MX missile, keep Pershing IIs out of Europe, and steal plans for the Stealth bomber.

Gorbachev obviously doesn't believe Helen Caldicott's claims that the Star Wars system “won't work.” If it won't work, instead of hysterically demanding that we scrap it, Gorbachev could enjoy a good belly laugh at our multi-billion-dollar boondoggle.

So, Gorbachev took advantage of the big press coverage he received on his trip to England to indicate that his condition for “success” in any new round of arms negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union is for President Reagan to scrap his plans for Star Wars. Gorbachev contended that any U.S. initiative in space would kill any chance of reducing current nuclear armaments. Unless Star Wars is abandoned, he said, “it would be unreal to hope to stop the nuclear arms race.”

As reported by the U.S. media, Gorbachev's statements were sandwiched between layers of speculation that he might be Konstantin Chernenko's successor. The liberal press glowingly described Gorbachev as young, better educated, interested in new ideas, “fresh thinking” but not radical, one who calls for “profound reform,” relaxed with a good sense of humor, smiling, and having a wife with a Western image.

Gorbachev's attack on Star Wars was a tactic orchestrated by the Kremlin. Konstantin Chernenko blustered that Star Wars is “a new, additional threat to peace” causing a situation “fraught with baneful consequences.” TASS added that “the prevention of a space weaponry race is of key importance.”

Star Wars is, indeed, of “key importance” to arms control negotiations. It is so important that, if Ronald Reagan didn't have a Star Wars program, the Soviets wouldn't be willing to talk at all. The possibility that the Reagan Administration might fulfill its promise “to make nuclear war obsolete” (and thereby render useless the Soviet nuclear arsenal) is precisely what has driven the Russians back to the bargaining table.

Ronald Reagan understands this. He said that the Star Wars program is perhaps “the greatest inducement to arms reduction.” That's why he won't discuss defensive weapons with the Soviets without simultaneous negotiations on offensive weapons. Reagan views Star Wars as a way to end our dependence on offensive weapons.

Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger understands Gorbachev's game. Weinberger says that Star Wars is the "one thing the Soviets seemed to be determined to block" but the United States "will not give up the Strategic Defense Initiative or the opportunity to develop it. It's the only thing that offers any real hope to the world." National Security Adviser Robert McFarlane also has the smiling Russian's number, saying that Gorbachev's statement was "a little disingenuous. It implies that the Soviet Union surely has no interest in defensive systems, and that's manifestly untrue."

Even if we believe that the likelihood of a planned nuclear attack by the U.S.S.R. is remote, the chance that someone would fire a single missile, with an atomic bomb in its nose, increases daily because of three reasons: the possibility of an accidental launch because of the sheer number of missiles and increased chance of human error or technical failure; terrorist attack (by suicide leaders such as those who drove a truckload of high explosives into a building); and the unpredictable motives and calculations of Third World countries.

No arms control treaty negotiated with the Soviet Union could ever protect us from those dangers, but Star Wars (otherwise known as High Frontier) could.

Shultz Should Learn from Yalta

For the protection of U.S. interests and his own place in history, Secretary of State George Shultz would be well advised to study the records of a famous agreement made by the United States and the U.S.S.R. 40 years ago. It is known by the name of the place where the principals met, Yalta.

The *New York Times* editorialized on February 12, 1945, "This conference marks a milestone on the road to victory and peace." *Time* said, "By any standards, the Crimean conference was a great achievement." *Life* said, "As conferences go, this one was a success."

The verdict of history, however, is that Yalta was a sellout and a betrayal. The U.S. Secretary of State, Edward Stettinius, Jr., conferred every morning and evening with Alger Hiss, who was later convicted of falsely swearing he was not a Communist spy. A former State Department official, J. Anthony Panuch, wrote a memorandum warning that Alger Hiss "exercises a Svengali-like influence over the mental processes of Junior Stettinius."

Three weeks before Yalta began, Stettinius ordered that Hiss be given all the top-secret files and documents pertaining to the Conference. At the negotiating table, Stettinius sat at Roosevelt's right, and Hiss sat immediately behind the President.

At Yalta, the Soviet Union was given southern Sakhalin, Port Arthur, the Kurile Islands, control of the port of Dairen and the Chinese-Eastern Railroad, and was allowed to keep Outer Mongolia which Russia had seized from China.

At Yalta, Germany was dismembered, disarmed, demilitarized, and required to give slave labor to the Soviet Union. The anti-Communist refugees from Russia were to be forcibly returned, a shameful promise

which was later carried out as Operation Keelhaul.

The treatment of Poland at Yalta was a blot on our honor which can never be erased. The United States and Britain agreed to withdraw recognition from the Polish government-in-exile (which had loyally borne the brunt of the war), and instead grant diplomatic recognition to a Communist-controlled Government.

Yalta decreed that the United Nations would be started with a conference in the United States in April 1945. Membership was to be limited to "peace-loving" countries which had declared war on Germany and Japan. The Soviet Union was given three votes.

When President Roosevelt returned and reported to Congress, he denied that Yalta had anything to do with the Far East. After his death, when it became clear that the Far East concessions to the Soviets were a crucial part of Yalta, his supporters developed the excuse that those concessions were necessary in order to induce Stalin to come into the war against Japan.

The Yalta Papers released by the State Department in 1955, however, clearly prove that this was no excuse. The papers include a report sent by the U.S. Ambassador to Russia, Averell Harriman, four months prior to Yalta which said that "we now have a full agreement...not only to participate in the Pacific War, but to enter the war with full effort."

Furthermore, at least a month before Yalta, Major General Leslie R. Groves, wartime head of the atomic bomb project, had sent word to the President that the atom bomb would be ready to drop August 1, 1945.

The official Yalta Papers make clear that Stalin had planned from the start to locate the Big Three Conference on his own territory so he could dominate it. Alternative sites considered had included Scotland, Alaska, Athens, Cyprus, Istanbul, Jerusalem, Alexandria, Rome, and the French Riviera.

Winston Churchill commented that "If we had spent ten years on research we could not have found a worse place in the world than Yalta. ...it is good for typhus and deadly lice which thrive in these parts."

Obviously, the typhus and lice were not the only "bugs" at Yalta. Our diplomats should be constantly on guard against all kinds when they meet with the Soviets.

Phyllis Schlafly is the author of five books on defense and foreign policy: *Kissinger on the Couch* (1975) and *Ambush at Vladivostok* (1976) covering the Kissinger years, *The Gravediggers* (1964), *Strike From Space* (1965), and *The Betrayers* (1968) covering the McNamara years. She was a member of Ronald Reagan's 1980 Defense Policy Advisory Group and a member of the National Security Subcommittee of the 1984 Republican Platform Committee.

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