



# The Phyllis Schlafly Report

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## How To Negotiate A Good Treaty

When we celebrate the Bicentennial of the signing of the Treaty of Paris on September 3, Americans should recite in unison: Blessed are the peacemakers who understand that in peace, as in war, "there is no substitute for victory." This most important, most successful, and most permanent treaty we ever signed was the result of our negotiators' resoluteness and perseverance in pursuing victory at the peace table rather than appeasement or compromise.

The 1783 Treaty of Paris ranks with the Declaration of Independence and the U.S. Constitution as one of the three great documents responsible for launching the Thirteen Colonies as a free and independent nation. Without the Treaty of Paris, the Declaration of Independence would have been merely a piece of campaign rhetoric and the Constitution would not have been written at all.

When men have fought and bled for a cause, they deserve peacemakers who can match the commitment of those who made the supreme sacrifice. Unfortunately, the United States has had some bitter twentieth century experiences with negotiators who lacked the vision or the skill to harvest the fruits of victory, and so gave away at the peace table what brave American servicemen had won at the risk or cost of their lives.

In 1780-83, America was fortunate to have men who were equal to their mighty mission. Their task was to persuade England to accept our independence, to recognize our Thirteen Colonies as a sovereign nation, and to accede to our mastery over a mass of territory twice as large as the Thirteen Colonies.

It is fashionable today to say that peace or arms control should be our primary goal, and that compromise and conciliation are the best means to achieve it. The Treaty of Paris proves that false. American *independence* as a nation of free people was the primary goal of our 1783 peacemakers, and they succeeded because they had the backbone to hold out for three years until they achieved their goal. They never tolerated compromise on any issue that mattered. The Treaty of Paris' two-century lifespan perpetuates not only its no-compromise, hardline provisions, but the

friendship of the warring nations that signed it.

The obstacles to successful treaty negotiation faced by Peace Commissioners John Adams, John Jay, and Benjamin Franklin (who was five years older than President Reagan is now) were truly overwhelming. They were neophytes in the exotic salons peopled by European diplomats skilled in intrigue, deception, espionage, and special-interest scheming.

First was the problem of the British. Contrary to popular belief, the surrender of Cornwallis at Yorktown did not end our military problems with the British, much less our political ones. King George III refused to admit defeat, and British troops remained in New York City, Charleston, Savannah, Canada, and the West Indies. Second was the problem of the Americans who were terribly weary of war, militarily weak, politically divided, and financially broke — hardly elements to generate support for our negotiators 4,000 miles away. Third was the problem of the French who were promoting a "compromise" which would have let Britain keep Georgia, South Carolina and Maine, and would have left the British and Spanish in control of the area west of the Alleghenies and both banks of the Mississippi River.

By the Treaty of Paris, England recognized the United States as "free sovereign & independent states," and the King relinquished forever all claims to American property. The treaty ordained "a firm and perpetual peace" between England and the United States. The Treaty established truly generous boundaries for the new nation: Canada on the north, the middle of the Mississippi River on the west, and Florida on the south. This vast area gave us room to grow and become a great nation.

John Adams hailed the Treaty as "one of the most important political events that ever happened on this globe" and one that "has had and will have, the most important consequences." He was right. By the Treaty of Paris, we validated the Declaration of Independence, acquired a vast new territory, received international recognition as a sovereign nation, and established a lasting friendship with England.

# The Stakes in Central America

Hardly anybody wants to come right out and say what the real issue is in Central America. Contrary to the thrust of the questions at President Reagan's press conferences, the real issue is not human rights, democracy or elections; it's not a phony comparison with Vietnam; it's not what the public opinion polls say; it's not even the personality of Henry Kissinger.

The crucial issue in Latin America is: will we allow the Communists to take over another country and let the dominoes fall all the way to the Rio Grande? Is the Monroe Doctrine really as dead as Khrushchev once boasted?

Why do we care if a few more "people's republics" like Castro's Cuba emerge in Latin America? Is the defense of Central America from Communism in the self-interest of the United States?

If there were no other reason to care, the refugee problems would be enough. Every country where a Communist regime has taken over has witnessed a mass exodus of refugees. Thousands of them have reached the United States from faraway countries.

If the Communists take over Central America, their refugees would not have to show the uncommon courage of the "boat people"; they would be able literally to walk across our borders. Our problems and our costs would be massive.

Central America is clearly the most important to American security of the more than a dozen wars of "national liberation" which the Soviets are waging around the world. If the Soviet-Cuban backed forces take El Salvador, then Honduras and Costa Rica will fall soon after. Mexico would become a problem we could not escape, and it would be a real problem with its corrupt, openly pro-Communist government, its 100% inflation, and its impoverished peasantry so eager to come to the United States.

The Communist arms build-up is going on all the time. The Soviet Union has poured at least \$2 billion into Cuba and Central America in the past two years and built Cuba into a world-class military power. In April, Brazil even intercepted four Libyan transport planes loaded with arms bound for El Salvador.

Yet, when the press got a chance to question President Reagan at a news conference, they asked him to explain AMERICAN naval vessels in the Caribbean; they didn't ask him about arms-carrying Russian ships!

The press asked President Reagan to justify giving American servicemen the right to defend themselves if they were attacked, but failed to ask him about the presence of Russian troops and advisers in the Western Hemisphere, or the fact that Soviet military advisers in Cuba outnumber U.S. military advisers in all Latin America by a ratio of 25 to 1. Reagan properly responded by saying "what's new?" about allowing American GIs to defend themselves against attack.

The liberals complain incessantly about the miniscule amount of aid President Reagan has requested to prevent the Communists from capturing another country. Incidentally, it's only one one-hundredth (1/100th) the sum we are giving to the International Monetary Fund to bail the big banks

out of their bad loans to Communist and Third World countries. The liberals just don't talk about the immense Soviet military aid.

Few things show the liberals' bias so much as their phony demand for "human rights" in El Salvador. That beleaguered nation did have an election in March 1982; more than 80 percent of the eligible voters participated and voted anti-Communist even though they were under the terrorist threat of "vote in the morning and die at night."

The liberals crying about "human rights" in El Salvador are the same people who told us that Chiang Kai-shek was corrupt and reactionary while Mao-Tse-tung was an agrarian reformer; and now we have Communist China. The liberals told us that Batista was corrupt and reactionary while Castro was an agrarian reformer; and now we have Communist Cuba.

The liberals told us the Shah of Iran was corrupt and reactionary while Khomeini was merely a religious leader; so now Iran has the most reactionary regime of the 20th century. The liberals told us Somoza was corrupt and reactionary and the Sandinistas were idealistic reformers; so now we have Communist Nicaragua, and it is also a base for exporting Communism to its neighbors.

This year is the 160th anniversary of the Monroe Doctrine — our pledge not to allow any new European colonies in the Western Hemisphere. Our credibility is at stake in El Salvador and Nicaragua. If we can't defend our interests there, no one will believe we can or will defend ourselves anywhere.

## Covert Activity in Central America

The anti-Reagan media and the Congressional liberals would have us believe that there is something evil, new and un-American about covert activity in Nicaragua. On the contrary, if you have read Solzhenitsyn, you would know that it is always a social good to save a nation from Communism. Furthermore, there is a successful precedent for U.S. covert activity to overthrow a Communist government in Central America. It happened in Guatemala in 1954; and thereby hangs a little known piece of history.

President Dwight Eisenhower determined that a Communist government in Central America was intolerable to U.S. security and a violation of the Monroe Doctrine. He appointed a distinguished U.S. career diplomat, Whiting Willauer, to head the operation.

Willauer was a brilliant man, a lawyer and a linguist, who had served as U.S. Ambassador to several countries. He had been special representative to the Philippines to reconstitute the civilian economy after World War II. He had held an important position with General Claire Chennault's Flying Tigers during World War II, he was the legal coordinator of Admiral Richard Byrd's second Antarctic expedition, he held a pilot's license, and he was an expert diver, having received an award for dangerous rescue work.

In 1954, Willauer was appointed Ambassador to Honduras for the specific purpose of helping to overthrow the Communist regime in neighboring Gua-

temala. Willauer headed the U.S. team consisting of Ambassador Robert Hill, John Puerifoy, and several CIA men.

The Willauer team accomplished a unique objective: the successful overthrow of a Communist regime; and Guatemala has been free from Communist control ever since. Allen Dulles later gave Willauer a commendation which stated that the Guatemalan revolution could not have succeeded without his guiding hand.

On December 10, 1960, Secretary of State Christian Herter called Willauer into his office and said that President Eisenhower had "a very special job" for Willauer. He was asked to be the senior partner of a two-man partnership with a top CIA man in directing an operation that had started in March that year, run by Cubans but backed by the CIA.

Five days later, Willauer started work as the top representative of the U.S. Government on the Bay of Pigs invasion to overthrow Castro in Cuba. After the Eisenhower Administration was replaced by the Kennedy Administration in January 1961, Secretary of State Dean Rusk personally telephoned Willauer and asked him to continue on the same job.

Within weeks, however, the tide turned in the Kennedy Administration. At a meeting in Rusk's office on February 8, Willauer reviewed the invasion plans for top State Department officials. It became apparent that, while Willauer's main objective was to make the Bay of Pigs invasion a success, the others were more interested in what other countries would *think* of the invasion.

On February 14, Willauer's CIA partner phoned Willauer and said, "We can't talk to you any more. We can only talk to other people." Not only the CIA, but everyone in the State Department clammed up and refused to talk to Willauer about anything. They simply froze him out of further plans without a word, even without getting the benefit of Willauer's expertise for whomever replaced him as project director.

We all know now that the Bay of Pigs invasion was one of America's most humiliating defeats. Castro's air force was not knocked out; the Swan Island radio station "somehow" failed to broadcast the signal alerting the Cuban underground to revolt; the Lignum Vitae Island radio station was forbidden to tell the Escambray guerrillas to cut the only rail line from Havana to the Bay of Pigs; some invaders armed with 30-caliber machine guns received 50-caliber ammunition; others armed with Garand rifles received cartridges made for Springfields; paratroopers had no sleep for two nights and no food or water for seven hours before jumping into Cuba; and American warships steamed away without even offering the out-gunned invaders a Dunkirk-type evacuation.

A few months later, Whiting Willauer died of a broken heart, knowing if he had been kept on the job, people now dead would be alive, and seven million people would have been liberated from Communism. Five years later, in a frank interview with journalist Stewart Alsop, Kennedy's Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara said about the Bay of Pigs: "You know damn well where I was at the time of decision — I recommended it."

President Reagan's options in Nicaragua are not easy, but they are clear. He can liberate a Central

American country from Communism as Eisenhower did in Guatemala; or he can acquiesce in a planned defeat and leave a nation enslaved by Communism as Kennedy did.

## Kissinger and Latin America

A recent New York Times/CBS public opinion poll (printed on the front page as though it were important news) is a good example of how phony news is manufactured. The poll claimed that "despite months of controversy over U.S. policies on Central America, most of the American public does not know which side the Reagan Administration supports in either El Salvador or Nicaragua."

The Times pompously advised its readers that this survey of 1,365 adults nationwide has only a 3 percent margin of error. However, that's only the margin of error on the question that was asked. The big error was in the wording of the question.

Instead of asking if the Reagan Administration backs the government or the anti-government forces, the survey question should have been, "Which side does the Reagan Administration back in El Salvador and Nicaragua — the Communist or the anti-Communist?" The big majority of American people would have had no trouble giving the accurate answer.

The issue in Latin America is not whether one faction or another is in control in various little countries, but whether the Kremlin-Castro axis will get another base in the Western Hemisphere. Ronald Reagan and the American people understand that issue rather well, even if the New York Times pollsters don't.

Henry Kissinger has bounced back from the damage inflicted on his reputation by Seymour Hersh's book *The Price of Power* into the chairmanship of a commission to advise the President about Latin America. Unfortunately, Kissinger seems to have an inferiority complex when he deals with the Communists, and they usually get the better of him.

In 1960, Kissinger fell hook, line and sinker for the phony "missile gap," John F. Kennedy's presidential campaign slogan. Kissinger wrote in his 1961 book: "It is generally admitted that from 1961 to at least the end of 1964, the Soviet Union will possess more missiles than the United States. . . . The missile gap in the period of 1961-1965 is now unavoidable. . . . It may mean that we could lose if the Soviet Union struck first. In that case, we would be fortunate if we escaped a surprise attack."

By 1970, Kissinger had discovered the truth about that time period. He wrote: "In as late as 1962, during the Cuban missile crisis, the Soviet Union had around 40 ICBMs. We had over 1,000 bombers and over 200 missiles that could reach the Soviet Union. . . . In short, our strategic superiority was overwhelming." Richard Nixon put the ratio of our 1962 strategic superiority over the Soviets as 8-to-1.

A comparison of these two Kissinger writings reveals how he imagined the threat of a Soviet strategic force substantially more powerful than ours, how he thought this nonexistent Soviet missile force had such a margin of superiority over us that they had a first-strike capability against us, and how he believed the Kremlin dictators had the will to use this missile force so that we would be "fortunate" if they did not

surprise-attack us.

Kissinger's 1961 vision of the United States "losing" to the Soviets was a kind of sick defeatism. There never was any factual basis for this fear; there was every possible reason for absolute confidence that, in a confrontation, the Soviets would lose; and that is exactly what did happen in the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962.

Kissinger's tour de force was the SALT I agreements which he negotiated and got Nixon to sign in 1972. Under SALT I, the United States accepted inferiority at the ratio of 3-to-2 in Soviet-U.S. missiles and submarines.

Kissinger's rationalization for this inferiority was this: "As a result of decisions made in the 1960's, and not reversible within the timeframe of the projected agreement, there would be a numerical gap against us in the two categories of land-based and sea-based missile systems whether or not there was an agreement. . . . Therefore, any time over the next five years (1972-77) we were confronting a numerical margin that was growing, and a margin, moreover, that we could do nothing to reverse in that five-year period."

Kissinger lives in a make-believe world in which the Soviet Union (which can't even feed itself) is ten-feet tall. He thinks that the United States (which has a Gross National Product twice that of the U.S.S.R.'s) is a pitiful helpless giant who can't catch up.

If Kissinger carries his surrender syndrome to his Latin America task, the Communists will soon take El Salvador and start the falling dominos in the Western Hemisphere. One can only hope that Kissinger has learned something in recent years from the rejection of SALT II and from Ronald Reagan's defeat of Jimmy Carter.

### Low Frontier of Unconventional War

The bombing in Beirut should remind us that we face a third dimension in warfare in addition to strategic (nuclear) and conventional (non-nuclear). Usually called unconventional warfare, General John K. Singlaub also calls it the "low frontier."

Unconventional warfare has many faces. It includes terrorism, sabotage, guerrilla actions, passive resistance, and support of dissident groups. It also includes economic warfare, political warfare, psychological operations, subversion, disinformation activities, and propaganda.

The Soviets have a full-scale operation in all types of unconventional warfare. It is probable that the Soviets have just as much a margin of superiority over us in this third dimension of warfare as they do in ICBMs and in tanks.

The Soviets are quite familiar with the writings of the ancient Chinese military strategist, Sun Tzu (350 B.C.), who said that the best general is he who avoids violence and achieves conquest by surrender of the enemy.

A major part of the Soviets' unconventional warfare against us since the end of World War II has been a "peace offensive." Years ago, Louis Budenz, former managing editor of the Communist *Daily Worker*, titled his book *The Cry is Peace* to describe this Soviet propaganda campaign. Like the thief who cries "Stop, thief!" to distract attention from his crime, the

Soviets accuse America of disrupting world peace.

Of course, there are different kinds of peace. We certainly don't want the peace of surrender as they have in North Korea, North Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Cuba, Angola, and Eastern Europe. Nor do we want the peace of the 1,500 slave labor camps that form the Gulag Archipelago.

The chief weakness of the Russian empire is the yearning for freedom of the captive peoples behind the Iron Curtain. If the Soviets were confronted with ten satellite problems like the resistance in Afghanistan and Poland, there would be rampant panic in the Kremlin.

General Singlaub believes that Western strategy must recognize the entire spectrum of conflict and exploit the weaknesses of the enemy. In a recent speech, he made constructive suggestions for an American strategy to cope with the third dimension.

1. Adopt a national strategy which recognizes the entire spectrum of conflict, and has a policy for dealing with all facets, including the low frontier of unconventional conflict (as well as strategic and conventional). Our strategy must have a sound, offensive non-military component.

2. Exploit the weaknesses of the Soviet empire. No football game was ever won by a team which stayed on its own side of the 50-yard line. The Achilles heel of the Russian empire is the disaffection of the peoples behind the Iron Curtain; the captive peoples behind the Iron Curtain are our best allies.

3. Stop the process of our self-surrender through subsidizing the Communist system. We must limit the flow of technology, food, and credits to the U.S.S.R.

4. Face up to the fact that Mainland China will never be a U.S. ally under any scenario that one could reasonably imagine. Such wishful thinking is a real danger to our security.

5. Recognize that the centerpiece of Soviet ideology is the continuing "class struggle." The Soviets are at war all the time, even when not using guns.

6. Use the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe to counteract Soviet and Chinese disinformation. VOA and RFE broadcasts should explain the facts about political and economic freedom.

7. Beef up the special operations forces in our Army, Navy, and Air Force; and reestablish the intelligence collection capabilities of the CIA.

8. Loosen legislative restraints which frustrate our ability to defend American diplomatic and military personnel in other countries. For example, current law forbids us to use U.S. funds to train police forces in other countries (even though some small countries cannot afford to train their own police sufficiently to provide local protection to our embassies). The recent bombing in Beirut was the 50th attack on our embassies abroad in recent years.

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