



# The Phyllis Schlafly Report

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## The Costly Lessons of SALT

When we plot on a graph what has happened to the U.S. dollar, it is clear that our runaway inflation started with the signing of SALT I in 1972. If our leaders don't learn the lesson of the financial cost of SALT I, we will find to our sorrow that the cost of SALT II is far higher.

During the years of undisputed U.S. nuclear superiority, 1945 to 1967, which were disparagingly known as the Cold War, we had hard currencies, a stable dollar, and inflation only in that controllable degree which accompanies an increase in the Gross National Product. The U.S. nuclear umbrella was the basis not only for political freedom, but for trade relationships and agreements, the stability of the flow of raw materials in and finished products out, and the availability of oil and other energy sources at reasonable prices.

The U.S. nuclear umbrella was credible from 1945 to 1967 because of the vast superiorities (peaking at 8-to-1) in numbers and megatonnage of our strategic weapons system. Although these superiorities began to melt away after 1967, the last year in which the United States added a single strategic weapon (ICBM, SLBM, or longrange bomber) to our forces, our umbrella retained a residual credibility because of the lag in international perception that the strategic balance was shifting in favor of the Soviets.

Publication of the SALT I statistics, showing Soviet 3-to-2 superiority over the United States in ICBMs and in nuclear missile-firing submarines, destroyed the credibility of the U.S. nuclear umbrella. A little more than a year later, the Kremlin openly and brazenly goaded the Middle East oil producers to use their "oil weapon" against the West, which they did by imposing a five-month embargo and a fivefold price increase.

The financial cost of Oil Embargo I to individual American citizens is simply incalculable. The prestigious International Institute for Strategic Studies in London evaluated the Arabs' 1973 use of their oil weapon as bestowing "the greatest shock, the most potent sense of a new era, of any event in recent years."

Look at the Consumer Price Index to see what happened to the U.S. dollar. Based on the 1967 dollar (the last year the United States acquired an additional strategic weapon), the Consumer Price Index in 1972 stood at 125. By 1979 it had shot up to 217, and inflation is now running at 13.4 percent a year.

This means that it takes \$2.17 to buy what \$1.00 would buy the year the United States stopped building

nuclear weapons. This means that more than half of all your savings in bank accounts, savings and loan companies, life insurance, pensions, and other money investments has been stolen from you. The price of gold rose from \$60 in the year of SALT I to \$300 in the year of SALT II.

According to conventional wisdom, stocks are supposed to be a good hedge against inflation. From 1950 to 1968, stocks did as expected, rising 436 percent during a period of relatively slow inflation. Since 1968, stocks have fluctuated widely and the 1979 average is a pitiful two percent higher than in 1968. This means that stocks in 1979 have lost half their 1968 value.

Now the great American industrial nation, a people on wheels to whom gasoline is almost as essential as water, faces the prospect of gasoline rationing because of the possibility of Oil Embargo II imposed by the OPEC nations. Whether imposed by Arab whim or Soviet inducement, there would be nothing we could do except pay more, drive less, and watch inflation destroy all our savings.

The Kremlin must be laughing at Defense Secretary Harold Brown's vain boast that the United States will use force, if necessary, to keep oil flowing from Saudi Arabia. We couldn't keep the oil flowing from Iran. President Carter would not dare to send in U.S. troops as President Eisenhower so successfully sent our Marines to Lebanon in 1958.

The only way to save the U.S. dollar from collapse is to restore the credibility of the U.S. nuclear umbrella so that it can protect the economic stability as well as the political freedom of the Western world. That is what SALT II prevents us from doing. It would cost us more than any treaty we ever signed.

### Cross-examining Kissinger

If Henry Kissinger had been subjected to cross-examination on SALT I, it would have exposed the loopholes and inequalities of that agreement, and our country would not be in the predicament of weakness we are today. On SALT II, Kissinger was questioned by Senate committees and on Meet the Press, events which never took place during the SALT I debate.

The SALT I Agreements of 1972 were Kissinger's handiwork; he negotiated them and he was their principal advocate. He never testified on SALT I before appropriate Congressional committees, claiming

“executive privilege.” He answered a few questions from Congressmen on June 15, 1972, in a staged media event in the East Room of the White House which had many peculiar aspects such as refusal to allow his voice to be sound-recorded.

When Secretary of State Kissinger was engaged in SALT-selling in 1972, he stated that there was a “safeguard” (his word) in SALT against the Soviets’ substituting new “heavy” missiles for old “light” missiles. It was not until seven years later, a few weeks ago on Meet the Press, that *Chicago Sun-Times* reporter Rowland Evans publicly nailed Kissinger on his “safeguard” falsehood.

There was absolutely no such “safeguard” in SALT I and, immediately after its signing, the Soviets started substituting their new heavy SS-19s for their older light SS-11s. Evans made Kissinger admit three crucial points: (1) that “the Soviets pressed against the legal limits of SALT I” by “sharp practice,” (2) that he “did not know in 1972 what missiles the Soviets would be testing in 1974,” and (3) that “our weakness today is bound to create opportunities for political nuclear blackmail against us by the Russians” in the Middle East like 1973 (the year of Oil Embargo I).

Evans accurately pointed out that Kissinger overlooked mentioning those crucial points in his Senate testimony, preferring to shift the argument to a need for an increase in the defense budget. But when those three admissions are applied to SALT II, as they should be, our conclusion must be that the Treaty must be rejected.

SALT II is shot through with just as many loopholes, inequalities, and ambiguities as SALT I, and we can expect the Soviets to press their advantage at least to the legal limit (if not beyond). Even if our satellite reconnaissance and verification were adequate (and they aren’t), we still cannot know what missiles the Soviets will be deploying two years from now. SALT II makes us just as wide open to political nuclear blackmail in the Middle East as SALT I, but with far more fatal consequences.

We already had a taste of this during the crisis in Iran. Brezhnev ordered the United States not to meddle in Iran, and President Carter and Secretary Vance meekly replied that we had no intention of meddling. We are already paying the price in gasoline shortages and higher prices, and we and our allies will pay more as our nation is perceived as unable to defend even our own vital interests.

Dr. Ghazi A. Alghosaibi, Saudi Arabia’s Minister of Industry and Electricity, said in a July speech in Los Angeles: “Your industrial way of life for the coming decades will collapse without Arab oil. The independence of the Arab countries in the face of expanding Communism cannot be maintained without your strength and resolve. No interdependence could be more complete.”

Translated into plain English, SALT II = Soviet superiority in nuclear arms = Soviet ability to wage political nuclear blackmail in the Middle East = curtains for the independence of Saudi Arabia and Israel = more gasoline shortages in America.

Ratification of SALT II by our Senate will advertise to the world that we accept strategic inferiority to the Soviets and are willing to place our future in the hands of the good faith of the Kremlin bosses. Any “peace” bought at that price will be as dangerous as the “peace in our time” bought by Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain at Munich in 1938.

## Fear of Nuclear War

Fear of nuclear war is the specter which hangs over the SALT II hearings and debate. President Carter led off with the charge that those opposed to the treaty are warmongers. Gromyko escalated the emotion by ominously threatening that the Soviets may not talk to us again if the Senate does not ratify.

The hearings revealed Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and Secretary of Defense Harold Brown as men afraid of the consequences of rejection of SALT II. The searching TV camera closeups showed them unsure and halting, speaking slowly, weighing every word as though one slip might cause the world to cave in on them.

The Vance-Brown team gave viewers the impression that they are afraid to ask the Soviets for any concessions, no matter how reasonable, and afraid to repudiate the one-sided deal the Soviets forced upon us. Vance and Brown didn’t dare to ask the Soviets to agree to equality in missiles, megatonnage, MIRVs, throw-weight, bombers, or submarines.

The uncertain TV performance of Administration leaders was matched only by the obedient performance of our military leaders. It is difficult to see how anyone could seriously think they would dare to oppose Commander-in-Chief Carter on a major policy matter. Only retired officers have the liberty to do that, as General John K. Singlaub discovered.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1972 were conned into supporting SALT I on the Administration’s promise: Go along with SALT I and we will give you the B-1 bomber and the Trident submarine; if you oppose SALT I, it will be approved anyway, but you won’t get the B-1 or the Trident. The JCS swallowed the bait and dutifully supported SALT I; but the B-1 was scrapped and not even one Trident is in the water yet.

The TV performances of our civilian and military leaders recall the words of the master strategist who started the Soviet Union on the greatest weapons-building program in all history. Nikita Khrushchev warned: “I’ve always realized full well that the fear of nuclear war in a country’s leader can paralyze that country’s defenses. And if a country’s defenses are paralyzed, then war really is inevitable: the enemy is sure to sense your fright and try to take advantage of it.”

Thus, it isn’t rejection of SALT II that will bring on war, but our leaders cringing in fear of nuclear war. If the Kremlin bosses were watching U.S. television this summer, they surely could sense the fright of Vance and Brown, and the total subservience of our military leaders to the Vance-Brown policies. We would be fools if we think the Soviets will not take advantage of that fear.

How different Vance’s behavior is from that of another Secretary of State, Christian Herter. After one of Khrushchev’s tantrums, on May 9, 1960, Secretary Herter explained U.S. policy with razor-sharp precision: “The threat of surprise attack presents a constant danger. It is unacceptable that the Soviet political system should be given the opportunity to make secret preparations to face the Free World with the choice of abject surrender or nuclear destruction.”

But that is exactly what SALT II does. It gives the Soviet political system the opportunity to make secret preparations to face the Free World with the choice of abject surrender or nuclear destruction. Although verification and cheating are major concerns, the more important factor is that SALT II allows the Soviets legally

to build a first-strike, nuclear war-winning capability.

Lt. General Edward L. Rowny, a member of the U.S. SALT II negotiating team, testified that "the treaty would sanction and codify the strategic inferiority of the United States." He said the treaty permits the Soviets to maintain 308 launchers for heavy intercontinental ballistic missiles possessing more destructive power than all U.S. ICBMs and submarine-launched ballistic missiles combined.

If there ever was a debate which the American people should be allowed to see on national television, it is the U.S. Senate debate on SALT II. It would give us a chance to show the world that there are some American leaders who speak forthrightly for American interests and military strength, rather than cringing in fear which can only encourage the Soviets to press their advantage.

## The National Will and SALT II

"Linkage" was supposed to be good when Henry Kissinger tried to link the United States in economic interdependence with the Soviet bloc in order to create a mutuality of self-interest that supposedly would flow over into political policies. "Linkage" is supposed to be bad when SALT II critics try to link treaty ratification with Soviet behavior in Africa or the Middle East.

Despite the fleeting nature of fashions in words, there is a real linkage between SALT II and the national will. Do Americans have the will to stand up for our own self-interest? Or have our leaders dissipated our national will through tactics of complexity, confusion, and classification?

In a rare interview in *U.S. News & World Report*, former Senator Margaret Chase Smith, the only woman ever elected to both the Senate and the House, said that our country is going through a "national crisis" because "people have lost their will." She blamed this loss of will on the conflicting statements made by our leaders which confuse the people and convince them that the truth is too difficult for them to understand. She criticized "a constant line of rhetoric rather than action, style rather than substance."

Mrs. Smith's Senatorial specialty was military defense. Her remarks are reminiscent of her forthright statements made in 1972, when she was the senior Republican on the Armed Services Committee, that one of her chief regrets is "that the American people still have not been told the whole story about how the [Nuclear Test Ban] Treaty [of 1963] worked to the Russians' tremendous advantage and to our own vast detriment."

She told how the President and Secretary of Defense classified vital information as "secret," thereby prohibiting her and others who had official access to it from telling us the treaty was "a disaster for the American people and a great victory for the Russians." President John F. Kennedy and Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara hailed the treaty "as a great peace breakthrough," while they used the power of their office to classify information and thereby silence potential critics.

This is a good description of how the Carter Administration is selling SALT II. Carter and Defense Secretary Harold Brown are working in tandem alternately to scare us with threats of nuclear war and to promote apathy with cheap assurances that we do not need to worry; to confuse us by the artful and misleading use of the complexities of nuclear weaponry; and to classify information to frustrate potential SALT critics.

A good example of the "constant line of rhetoric rather than action" is Carter's announcement that he will go ahead with the development of the MX mobile missile. Senator John Stennis hailed it as a good move and said it will help SALT II ratification; Senator George McGovern deplored it and said it might make him vote against SALT II.

Carter's announcement was not a military decision but a political ploy; he needs the Stennises more than he needs the McGovernes. A closer inspection of Carter's announcement shows that the joker word is "development." Carter did not promise he would build the MX mobile missile; he merely teased us with the hope that deployment might begin in 1986.

Carter will not be calling the shots in 1986, so holding out hope for 1986 is a promise he can cheaply make. The question is, what will protect us from the Soviet missile force *until* 1986 when the MX mobile missile will supposedly take the strategic place of our Minuteman missile force?

When Defense Secretary Brown spoke to the 1979 Annapolis graduates, he said that the Soviets will have "high assurance of destroying most Minuteman silos in a preemptive strike after the SS-18 and SS-19 deployments are complete, sometime in the early 1980s." But the "early 1980s" start in a few months, and there are five years between the "early 1980s" and 1986.

It's a good move to "develop" the MX missile, but that's not enough and it's not fast enough. We "developed" the B-1 bomber, but Carter cancelled its deployment when it was ready for production. There is absolutely nothing in Carter's or Brown's record to give us the slightest assurance that the MX is headed for any fate other than the B-1's.

## Soviet Sea Superiority

The United States and other Western nations have allowed their naval strength to slump to where they will soon be vulnerable to Soviet military blackmail, according to *Jane's Fighting Ships*, the authoritative volume on the world's navies published in London. The manual said that Soviet military blackmail could mean "deprivation of raw materials, markets and the freedom of those friends who are not strong enough to guarantee their own security."

*Jane's Fighting Ships* is the annual report which provides the world's official "count" of naval vessels. The 1979 volume reports that the U.S. Navy now has only 535 active combatant ships, whereas the Soviet Union has more than 2,500.

The most important and most advanced of the Soviets' fighting ships is the Delta submarine, a weapon system which constitutes a revolution in strategic power because it carries the world's first submarine-launched intercontinental ballistic missile (SLICBM). The 5,000-nautical-mile range of the Delta missiles allows them to reach American population centers from Soviet home ports. Unlike other submarines of the United States and the U.S.S.R., the Deltas do not have to sneak out of their ports, make their way through narrow passages where the enemy can detect them, or travel thousands of miles to get within range of their targets. A Soviet Delta missile-launching submarine is on-station at all times.

The SALT I Agreement allows the Soviets to have 950 submarine-launched nuclear missiles as opposed to our 710. However, we have built only 41 submarines carrying 656 missiles while the Soviets built their full

quota, resulting in the Soviets' having a 3-to-2 superiority.

In addition, the Soviet Delta has twice the range of the U.S. Poseidon. As Admiral Hyman Rickover testified, "the Russians already have the equivalent of our Trident." The trouble is, we do not yet have a single operational Trident, while the Soviets already have a fleet of Deltas.

The range of the Delta missiles gives the Delta submarine about ten times as much ocean to hide in as our Poseidons. It is easy to visualize this with a globe and a flexible plastic ruler or piece of string. First, swing a 5,000-mile radius centered on New York. You will see that the ocean depths for nearly half the globe are available to hide Soviet Delta submarines prowling within range of U.S. targets. No present or prospective anti-submarine warfare techniques can cope with a force of submarines with such a vast on-station area, especially when those areas include the waters of Soviet home ports.

Used as a first-strike weapon, the Soviet Deltas could launch their missiles from near their home ports, then return to superhardened submarine pens for reloading. The inertial guidance of their missiles would ensure enough accuracy for their first launch to destroy hardened U.S. missiles. Reloads could then be held to threaten our cities and preclude any retaliation by U.S. Poseidon submarines.

The Soviet Delta is a nearly invulnerable weapon system, incomparably more so than our Poseidon force. The Soviet Delta is an ideal first-strike weapon and should serve as conclusive evidence of Soviet intentions to achieve a first-strike capability.

## Sputnik Anniversary

The nuclear-space age was born 22 years ago this October when the Soviet Union in 1957 launched Sputnik, the earth's first man-made satellite in space. It was a little moon, only 23 inches in diameter and weighing only 185 pounds. It circled the earth every hour and a half at a height of 560 miles. To Americans who stood in their yards and streets and gawked at that glow in space, it had a traumatic effect. It was tangible evidence that the Soviets had won the first leg of the space race based on technology we did not possess.

To those who understood weapons of war, Sputnik had an ominous portent. It proved that the hydrogen bomb could be married to a man-made satellite and then wing through space at fantastic speeds to rain massive destruction on enemy targets.

Sputnik offered the Kremlin masters the vision that their longtime goal of world conquest could become a reality. Khrushchev immediately started a program to build an offensive force of nuclear-space weapons.

Sputnik's effect on Americans was just as dramatic. The American people and their political leaders never even considered the possibility of acquiescing in this new Soviet space superiority. The American people and their government made a collective resolve to take every step and to pay any price to make sure that no new technology or invention could ever endanger the national security of the United States.

The Eisenhower Administration developed a very clear strategy for dealing with the possibility of aggression in the nuclear-space age: overwhelming nuclear superiority and a war-winning capability. To implement this strategy, the Eisenhower Administration devised what was called the Triad of our nation's defense.

On land, we built the intercontinental ballistic missile; for the sea, the Polaris-Poseidon; and for the air, the B-52 bomber. Those were the weapons designed to defend America in the late 1950s and early 1960s.

What was good enough for the 1960s is not good enough for the 1980s. There are those today who say that we can't afford to build the space-age weapons necessary to regain our superiority over the Soviets, but that is a defeatist mentality out of touch with the facts.

According to *Aviation Week & Space Technology*, the hallmark of the Carter Administration has now become "vacillation and retreat." This respected technical journal blasted Carter's cancellation of the B-1 bomber without even asking for any reciprocal concessions from the Soviets as "the most naive gesture an American President has ever made."

Elimination of the B-1 has been a priority goal in every U.S.-U.S.S.R. weapons negotiation, but Carter blithely gave it to the Soviets for nothing. *Aviation Week* concluded: "That thoughtless gesture, more than any other single fact, convinced the Soviets that Carter's tough talk was a thin facade that would soon crumble before their bullying." It did, and the unequal terms of SALT II are the result.

It doesn't help SALT II ratification prospects for the Senate to know that it was negotiated by soft-liner Paul Warnke. However, the underlying reason for SALT's unpopularity is the American people's loss of confidence in the defense policies of the Carter Administration.

Carter's actions remind us of a strong warning issued by a former chairman of the same House Armed Services Committee, L. Mendel Rivers. On September 28, 1970, he charged that "we seem hell-bent on national suicide," and cited the B-1 bomber as the prime case in point. "While we debate the question of maintaining our military capability," he said, "the Soviet Union quietly but openly forges ahead. . . . If present trends continue, the United States will find itself clearly in second position with the Soviet Union undisputably the greatest military power on earth."

Fortunately, God has blessed our country with a Gross National Product more than twice that of the Soviet Union. Anything that the Soviets can do, we can do twice as well or twice as much of. The fact is, we can't afford NOT to rebuild our military superiority if we care about our homes and country.

The first and most important constitutional duty of government is to "provide for the common defense." We should rekindle the Can Do psychology that fired up Americans when the Soviets launched their Sputnik 20 years ago, and resolve to make certain that any potential aggressor or combination of aggressors knows in advance that America has more than enough weapons to defend our nation against any threat.

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