



# The Phyllis Schlafly Report



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## Questions On Salt II

*Aren't there already enough nuclear weapons to kill everyone in the world several times over?*

The "overkill" argument is fraudulent emotionalism. There are enough rifle bullets in the world to kill everyone several times over. There are enough drugs in the pharmacies to kill everyone several times over. Those are irrelevant statistics because rifle bullets and drugs will never be used that way.

The real question is: in a nuclear exchange, how many Americans and how many Russians would be killed? The best answer is, 140-150 million Americans but only 15-20 million Russians. Soviet losses would be smaller than they suffered in World War II. So, from the point of view of those who place no value on human life, that exchange would be very profitable to the Soviets.

*Isn't nuclear war "unthinkable"? Don't the Soviets realize that neither side could win a nuclear war?*

Even if it were true that a nuclear war is unwinnable (which cannot be proved), the evidence is overwhelming from the mouths of Kremlin leaders that the Soviets think that nuclear war is "thinkable" and that they can "win" a nuclear war. It takes two to make peace, but it takes only one to make war. As long as the Soviets think nuclear war is winnable and plan all their military strategy to "win" and to survive a nuclear war, Americans are supremely foolish to pretend otherwise.

*Do nuclear weapons have any use other than to kill millions of people?*

Absolutely. They are immensely useful for political and economical blackmail. The day after SALT II is ratified, the Soviets can immediately push the Arabs to use their "oil weapon" against the West through a new oil embargo or a new doubling of oil prices. When we failed to protect our sources of oil in Iran and other Middle East countries, the Arabs realized that we cannot or will not oppose Soviet aggression there. The immediate danger of SALT II is no gasoline at the pump.

*Won't SALT II stop the Soviets from building more nuclear weapons than they would otherwise build?*

No. The numbers set in SALT II are exactly the numbers of weapons the Soviets need to attain decisive nuclear supremacy. SALT II does not prohibit the Soviets from building anything they need to control the world. SALT II, for example, allows the Soviets to keep all their 308 "heavy" SS-18 missiles, each of which

contains ten MIRVs; that makes 3,080 two-megaton warheads of great accuracy. By contrast, our entire force of Minuteman missiles can deliver only 1,650 warheads of about 170 kilotons each (only one-tenth the power of the Soviet warheads).

*Won't we be able to verify whether the Russians are cheating on SALT II?*

No. Many of the major provisions of SALT II are unverifiable by satellite photography. Cameras cannot see what is going on under the roofs of buildings. They cannot discover the number of warheads in ICBMs or the range of cruise missiles. The Soviet K.G.B. purchased from U.S. spies highly-secret information about our satellite systems which makes it easy for the Soviets to encode data given off during missile tests and thereby evade our verification. We have lost our valuable on-ground listening posts in Iran close to the Soviet border. The Carter Administration does not even claim that SALT II is verifiable. It claims only that it is "adequately verifiable." Would you be satisfied if your spouse was "adequately faithful"?

*If we reject SALT II, isn't the alternative an "arms race" which will lead to nuclear war?*

History proves that a disarmament race is a bigger cause of war than an arms race. It was a disarmament race that led to World War II: the London and Washington naval treaties that supposedly limited the number of ships owned by the major powers, the Kellogg-Briand Pact that supposedly outlawed war, and the Munich Agreement which the Prime Minister of England said brought "peace in our time."

The greatest danger in the world is not from an arms race but from superior nuclear weapons in the hands of ruthless men. To paraphrase an old bumper strip: "When nuclear weapons are outlawed, only international outlaws will own nuclear weapons."

*If the United States shows its good faith by not building more nuclear weapons, won't the Soviets do likewise?*

No. The United States stopped building intercontinental ballistic missiles and nuclear missile-firing submarines in 1967. Since then, we have not added a single ICBM to our total of 1,054, or a single nuclear missile-firing submarine to our total of 41. The Soviets have continued to build missiles and submarines as fast as they can turn them out, until now they have 1,400 ICBMs and 90 missile-firing submarines. Carter cancelled our B-1 bomber, but the Soviets have continued to build their new Backfire bomber. We cancelled our

anti-missile system and closed down the one ABM we had in North Dakota, but the Soviets have maintained their ABM defenses around Moscow and Leningrad, and have built a massive civil defense system.

*Haven't the Soviets as much at stake as the United States in avoiding nuclear war and in ending the arms race?*

No. The Soviets have proved time and again that they will always sacrifice human life to Communist goals. They deliberately killed some 30 million of their own people. The thought of losing about 15 million people in order to defeat America is not a fearful thought to the Kremlin bosses.

*If we don't ratify SALT II, won't we have to increase the defense budget?*

There isn't the slightest evidence that SALT II will save us any money. The Pentagon is asking for more money next year than last even with the prospect of SALT II. Whether or not we ratify SALT II, the United States must go ahead with weapons essential to our defense such as the MX mobile missile. The portion of our defense budget spent on strategic nuclear weapons is a very small percentage of the total.

*Can we trust the Soviets to keep SALT II?*

No. The Soviets have broken or cheated on every treaty they ever signed, including SALT I. Soviet cheating on SALT I was well documented by former Defense Secretary Melvin Laird in the December 1978 issue of *Reader's Digest*. The Soviets have even brazenly cheated on the Kennedy-Khrushchev agreement of 1962 in which they agreed not to send offensive weaponry to Cuba. The only rule the Soviets can be trusted to keep is Lenin's maxim: "Promises are like piecrusts, made to be broken."

## Verification and Credibility

"Verification" is the principal issue to be resolved before the SALT II Treaty has a chance to be ratified -- or so goes the prevailing wisdom in Washington. It now appears, however, that the question really is whether the Carter Administration is to be believed in its claim that SALT II can be verified.

A sensational news scoop by the *New York Times* indicates that the Carter Administration simply cannot be believed on the issue of verification. Thanks to the great American institution of freedom of the press, that newspaper uncovered and published a vital piece of information that had been suppressed for two years by the Carter Administration.

Two years ago this spring, Andrew D. Lee and Christopher J. Boyce were convicted of attempting to sell the Russians some secrets about a proposed U.S. satellite system called Pyramider. Since Pyramider was never built, the convictions were not treated as major news and the two men went quietly off to prison.

Now the truth is out about the additional evidence which was suppressed at the time of the trial. Lee and Boyce also sold the Soviet K.G.B. for \$80,000 the secrets of our most modern functioning satellite systems, including the major ones called Rhyolite, Argus, and Keyhole.

Rhyolite and Argus are used to intercept telemetry signals transmitted by Soviet missiles during their test launchings. They, along with the on-ground monitoring stations in Iran (which are now lost), were the primary means by which our country planned to help verify Soviet compliance with SALT II. Rhyolite can also monitor Chinese missile tests.

Russian knowledge of the workings of Rhyolite and Argus makes it easy for them to code or camouflage their missile tests and sites and to transmit erroneous data to deceive us, thereby diminishing or eliminating the ability of U.S. satellites to discover what the Russians are doing.

The thousands of documents which Lee and Boyce sold to the Soviets also contained information about another photo reconnaissance system called Keyhole. Young CIA employee William Kampiles completed the Soviets' information about this system by selling the top-secret Keyhole technical manual to a K.G.B. agent in Greece for \$3,000.

CIA security restrictions are supposed to prevent any one person from having access to several intelligence gathering systems. But somehow, "inadvertently," a youth named Boyce was permitted to have access to many intelligence gathering systems. Boyce was employed by TRW Systems Group, a California aerospace company, at \$140 a week. He worked in a communications vault transmitting coded messages between the TRW plant and the CIA. His good friend, Andrew Lee, was a heroin addict.

What do you suppose motivated the Carter Administration to suppress all this at the trial of Boyce and Lee? Obviously it was not to protect national security or to keep secrets from the Soviets. The Russians already knew the secrets which were sold and delivered to them by Boyce, Lee, and Kampiles.

Only the American people were denied the right to know. Why? So the Carter Administration could mislead us into believing we have SALT verification capabilities when we have not? An Administration that would keep us in the dark about something so crucial to our national security as this is simply not worthy of belief about SALT verification.

But hiding the truth from the American people is only part of the problem. What about the coverup and protection of the higher officials who allowed security to be so lax that one minor employee sold for \$80,000, and another minor employee sold for \$3,000, top defense secrets that cost us hundreds of millions of dollars to develop, and may have irreparably damaged our nation's chance for survival?

The Watergate coverup sent many men to jail and removed President Nixon although it was no threat to national security. Why doesn't the Justice Department prosecute the higher-ups who were responsible for the sale to the Russians of our military satellite secrets?

## Mobile Missiles Needed

Mobile missile production is probably the best way that the United States could shore up our sagging strategic power in the face of the continuing Soviet nuclear buildup. That's why top Defense Department officials are urging the full-scale development of a mobile land-based missile system called the MX.

The steady improvement in missile accuracy means that the day is approaching when fixed-base ICBMs will be obsolete because they can be so easily targeted. Mobile missiles will become the only reliable land-based weapons.

In the 1960s, the United States considered mobile ICBMs so desirable and practicable that we invested many millions of dollars in research and development of a mobile Minuteman type. Just prior to production the project looked so valuable as a strategic system that then Defense Secretary Robert McNamara cancelled it

-- just as he did all other programs that would have retained U.S. nuclear superiority.

The SALT I Agreement signed by our President in 1972 gave the Soviets the legal and moral right to continue to produce and deploy land-mobile launchers and missiles in any numbers, in any type, and in any size they choose. They have the capability of having produced at least 2,000 land-mobile launchers and missiles since SALT I was signed.

The "Unilateral Declaration" by the U.S. SALT delegation that the United States would consider the deployment of mobile launchers as "inconsistent with the objectives of the agreement" never had any legal effect whatsoever. It could not possibly make illegal the Soviet exercise of a right accorded them by the agreement itself and that they specifically refused to give up.

The frightful record of how much our military power has declined in the last ten years in comparison with the Soviet Union's was recently described by Air Force General and Senator, Barry Goldwater. "In intercontinental missiles, we have gone from over 200 ahead to over 400 behind. In Polaris-type submarine missiles, we have dropped from 600 ahead to about 150 behind.

"In intercontinental bombers, we have fallen from 500 ahead to 300 behind. In tactical aircraft, we have dropped from 1,000 ahead to about 1,000 behind. In ground force divisions, we have dropped from 125 behind to 150 behind.

"In major surface ships, we have fallen from 120 ahead to 60 behind. In tanks, we have dropped from 28,000 behind to 39,000 behind.

"The Soviets are deploying a new, advanced strategic bomber -- the Backfire, which with refueling could devastate the heartland of America. Meantime, with spit and bailing wire, we keep our aging B-52 bombers aloft and relegate the powerful B-1 to the other end of the President's deep freeze."

The bottom line was stated recently by General V.H. Krulak: "The Russians are spending at least 20 percent of their Gross National Product on arms for themselves and their satellites. We spend less than 5 percent."

Mobile missiles are the best answer to national survival in an increasingly dangerous world. There is no time to lose in starting to build them.

## The MX Mobile Missile

Within days after boasting that, under the terms of the SALT II Treaty, the United States will be permitted to build the MX mobile missile, the Carter Administration began laying plans to scuttle it unilaterally. The hatchet man is Defense Secretary Harold Brown who learned such scuttling techniques when he was Secretary of the Air Force under Defense Secretary Robert McNamara.

The problem is that, in this era of fast-moving technology, our Minuteman missiles will soon be so vulnerable to attack that they will be obsolete for all practical purposes. Indeed, on the "Meet the Press" program, Defense Secretary Brown, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, and their questioners spoke casually about our "vulnerable" Minuteman missile force. This is because the accuracy and the power of Soviet ICBMs are increasing so rapidly that they can "take out" (destroy) our Minuteman missiles in their hardened concrete silos.

One way to avoid having our Minuteman missiles destroyed would be for the United States to adopt a launch-on-verification-of-warning strategy. This would involve a simple announcement by our President or Secretary of State that, if we received verified confirmation that the U.S.S.R. had launched its SS-9s and SS-18s at us, we would immediately launch our Minuteman missiles at them, leaving only empty holes for the Soviet missiles to hit. On the same "Meet The Press," Brown and Vance refused to say this is our strategy, leaving Russians and Americans to conclude that there is a 50-50 chance that our President will leave our Minuteman missiles in their silos like sitting ducks to be destroyed by the Soviet ICBMs.

There is another way to safeguard against the vulnerability of our Minuteman missiles: to build and deploy the MX mobile missile. The strategy of the MX mobile is to combine missile power with one of the greatest American assets: our far-flung and efficient transportation system.

Three alternative deployment plans have been under consideration: (1) the so-called "shell-game" basing system in which about 250 MX missiles would be shuttled at random among thousands of underground silos so that the enemy would never know which silos housed the missiles at any given time; (2) deploying the MX aboard a new type of cargo plane which could be moved at will; and (3) deploying it on big trucks that would keep rolling on the highways.

At a White House meeting in May presided over by Secretary Brown, he laid the groundwork to scuttle all three alternatives and substitute hypothetical talk about the future possibility of building more submarine-launched missiles. The rationale for this was that abandoning the MX mobile missile would "facilitate future arms control talks with the Soviet Union."

SALT II isn't even yet signed or ratified, but Secretary Brown is already making concessions to the Soviets for SALT III! Yet to cancel the MX mobile missile would mean phasing out (abandoning) the entire land-based missile leg of our Triad, and relying exclusively on submarines and our old, slow B-52 bombers.

The Soviets do not need to worry about the vulnerability of their missile force. The United States has no "heavy" missiles of the SS-9 or SS-18 class which can destroy Soviet ICBMs in their concrete silos, even assuming we can find them all in the tremendous land mass of the U.S.S.R. with its tight security.

Harold Brown and Cyrus Vance learned their weapons-scraping techniques when they were Defense Secretary Robert McNamara's lieutenants in the 1960s. It is a technique of discussing "alternatives" ad infinitum, "reserving options" for future decisions which are never made, and cancelling weapon systems which have been developed and are ready for production in favor of those that exist only on the drawing board.

Major weapon systems cancelled with these methods during the 1960s by Defense Secretary McNamara, Deputy Defense Secretary Cyrus Vance, or Air Secretary Brown included the Skybolt missile, the B-70 bomber, the AMSB (advanced manned strategic bomber), the 24-megaton bomb, Pluto, Dynasoar, Orion, and the anti-missile missile. The end result has been to keep America in a strategic weapons freeze since 1967.

## The Beam Weapon

History is full of examples of individuals who had the vision to see and develop a breakthrough in science, technology or weaponry, but were pitted against an establishment which refused to recognize the possibilities.

The Wright Brothers, in their little bicycle shop in Ohio, had to oppose the prevailing scientific wisdom of their day which had decreed as a dogma of scientific "truth" that heavier-than-air flight was impossible. Fortunately, America provided a climate of freedom where the Wrights could build and fly a plane even if some highly educated and prestigious men declared it could not be done.

Another American inventor named Robert Fulton obtained an interview with Napoleon when that famous conquerer wanted to cross the English Channel. Napoleon failed to see the potential of Fulton's designs and models for the world's first steamboat -- although only a few steamboats would have enabled him to have destroyed the wind-driven British Navy.

At the beginning of World War I, the European representative of the Holt Tractor Company tried to sell German General Von Hindenberg on the idea of a revolutionary new weapon made by covering the tractor with armorplate and equipping it with machine guns. Hindenberg said no. Three years later, the Allies seized the idea and made the tank the decisive weapon of World War I.

Several years ago, when Maj. Gen. George Keegan was head of U.S. Air Force Intelligence, he discovered that the Soviets are researching and developing a particle beam weapon. If ever brought to the point of practical use, it would be as dramatic a revolution in strategic and tactical warfare as the atomic bomb.

General Keegan reported that some 2,000 topflight physicists are working in 350 Soviet laboratories on particle beam weapons. He based this on our reconnaissance satellites, his careful analysis of Soviet scientific reports, and information from our agents inside Russia.

General Keegan concluded that the United States must explore the military feasibility of a directed beam weapon in order to safeguard our nation against any major technological surprise. In taking this position, he ran headlong into the "it can't be done" syndrome, which then dictated U.S. policy.

The Central Intelligence Agency, which has a deplorable record in discerning and evaluating Soviet weapons developments and movements (such as the shipment of offensive missiles to Cuba in 1962 and the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968), would not admit what Air Force Intelligence reported was going on at the Soviet research facility at Semipalatinsk.

The Livermore Laboratory nuclear physicist alumni lined up against General Keegan's conclusion for different reasons. Having tried and failed to develop charged particle beams in Project See-Saw, they smugly took the position that, "since we can't do it, the Russians can't do it either."

The result was that our official policy became "hear no beam weapon; see no beam weapon; beam weapon can't exist." Defense Secretary Harold Brown tried to debunk the whole idea as just a type of Star Wars fiction.

For three years, General Keegan, now retired, has waged a tremendous public crusade to lift the blinders from U.S. research and development. The respected journal *Aviation Week & Space Technology* has published mounting evidence showing that the Soviets are years ahead of us in beam weapon research.

Finally, the Pentagon appointed a Blue Ribbon panel of 53 scientists from government laboratories, universities and industry to examine the evidence and to make recommendations. With each passing month, the evidence presented by General Keegan and *Aviation Week* grew more credible. The 53 scientists reported that the Soviets are five to seven years ahead of U.S. physicists in beam weapon research.

## The Eleventh Hour

If you only read one book this year, that book should be *The Eleventh Hour* by General Lewis W. Walt, USMC (Ret.). He tells what every American needs to know about our crumbling defenses, the life-and-death danger we face from the superior Soviet missile force and SALT II, how and why trusting Americans have been betrayed by our political leaders, and what we must do if our nation is to survive.

It is short, straightforward, and simple. You can read it in one sitting -- and you won't forget it.

If anyone has the knowledge and authority to speak out on military matters, General Walt is the one. He was the former commander of all U.S. Marines in the Vietnam War, and also served in combat during World War II and the Korean War. He has had more combat experience than any other living Marine.

As a lifelong soldier, General Walt had drummed into his psyche that a soldier's job is to fight -- while the politicians decided who to fight, when and where. But he learned to his sorrow -- in Korea and then in Vietnam -- that U.S. "civilian leadership was willing to sacrifice American lives in no-win wars and to keep the policy secret from the American people." He gives poignant proof from his own eye-witness experiences during the Korean War of how valiant American servicemen were betrayed and sent out to die because their civilian bosses did not want to defeat the Chinese Communists.

It happened all over again in Vietnam.

The next time, the American deaths won't be 7,000 miles away. They will be in our home towns. Listen to General Walt's words of warning: "If someone in the Kremlin decided at this moment to push the nuclear button, there is nothing your government could do to save the lives of you and your loved ones. Within a matter of hours, somewhere between 60 million and 100 million men, women, and children would die. The U.S. has no civil defense program, no anti-ballistic missiles, and no appreciable defense against even a bomber attack. The stripping of our defensive forces has been a deliberate policy move on the part of our civilian defense officials."

I urge you to buy General Walt's book. Make check payable to Pere Marquette Press, and mail to Box 618, Alton, Illinois, 62002; \$9.95, hardbound only. Read it yourself and loan it to your friends on a systematic basis. We offer a \$100 prize to the one who returns the book to Eagle Forum by September 10 with the largest number of signatures in the front or back of the book signed under the heading "I certify that I have read this book."

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**Phyllis Schlafly** is the co-author of five books on nuclear strategy and weaponry: *Kissinger on the Couch* (1975) and *Ambush at Vladivostok* (1976) covering the Kissinger years, and *The Gravediggers* (1964), *Strike From Space* (1965), and *The Betrayers* (1968), covering the McNamara years. These books made a series of remarkable predictions about the increase of Soviet nuclear power and the decrease of U.S. nuclear power which have, unfortunately, all come true. *Kissinger on the Couch*, which is really a laymen's textbook on nuclear strategy, contains a detailed analysis of SALT I and explains the motivation and the strategy of the men who have been controlling U.S. defense policies since 1961.

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