



# The Phyllis Schlafly Report



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## The SALT-Selling Campaign

Among the new shows opening on the road before being staged in New York or Washington, D.C., is one that might be entitled "The Selling of SALT II." One road company opened recently on a local Los Angeles television station and another in St. Louis before a national convention and the media.

After the actors have sufficiently polished their lines and their repartee for several months in such local appearances, they can be expected to be ready for star performances on national television and under the klieg lights of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee when it holds hearings on SALT II.

The Los Angeles road company featured Leslie H. Gelb, the State Department officer in charge of politico-military affairs. Translated, that means he is the State Department functionary in charge of selling the American public on policies that the State Department is trying to force on the Defense Department. He appeared in a two-part television news interview filmed at the State Department and shipped to Los Angeles station KABC-TV for airing.

The St. Louis road company featured ex-SALT negotiator Paul C. Warnke, whom the Carter Administration dispatched to sell SALT II to the U.S. mayors at their annual convention, followed by an hour's interview on radio station KMOX.

These were the opening gambits of the new SALT marketing campaign, engineered in the Situation Room of the White House. That is the room where the President would hold his emergency conference if the Soviets ever push the nuclear button. In the interim, it is being used as the headquarters for meetings of the same sales team that put over the Panama Canal Treaties and is now orchestrating a repeat performance for the SALT treaty.

Some might have thought that Carter dropped Warnke from the SALT negotiating team in order to aid prospects of getting the treaty ratified by the Senate, since Warnke is far too soft-line for the tastes of most Senators. Warnke, however, made it clear that he is not about to be kept in the closet while his handiwork is being debated. On KMOX Radio, he proudly proclaimed, "They are not going to hide the fact that I was a SALT negotiator. It will bear my marks."

In the Situation Room cell meetings, plans have already been made to involve NGOs (Non-Governmental Organizations) in the SALT marketing campaign. Anne Wexler, White House liaison with

special-interest groups, and Gerald Rafshoon, Carter's media adviser, are both part of the operation, and a meeting for women's group leaders has already been held. Among the NGOs involved in the SALT-selling campaign will be the Coalition for a New Foreign and Military Policy, with which more than 70 organizations are cooperating. Its agenda includes cancelling the cruise missile, the M-X ICBM, the Mark 12A warhead, and the neutron bomb.

A model for action by the disarmament lobby is the successful operation in 1978 of the National Campaign to Stop the B-1 Bomber, made up of 37 organizations from Common Cause to the War Resisters League. It had offices in Washington, D.C., and was assisted by the tax-exempt American Friends Service Committee.

The disarmament lobby uses all the standard tactics to manufacture a synthetic showing of support for its legislative objective: canned letters for supporters to sign and send to newspaper editors and to Congressmen, petitions, telephone campaigns, sample resolutions for passage at local meetings of clubs and organizations, and sample press releases for every major happening.

A special effort was made to gear the B-1 issue to special-interest groups, and they, in turn, agitated their members with the appropriate trigger words. For example, the National Taxpayers Union claimed that the B-1 represented wasteful spending. The Environmental Action Foundation claimed that the B-1 would damage the ozone layer (even though it is designed to fly at low altitudes).

In the words of the old axiom, good wine needs no bush. If SALT II were a good deal for America, it would not need such expensive taxpayer-financed packaging and propaganda. The fact is, it is a bad deal for America that will make permanent the Soviet superiority in numbers of ICBMs, submarine-launched missiles, heavy missiles, mobile missiles, throw weight, and megatonnage.

### Different Goals of Salt II

Paul Nitze chose an apt analogy when he compared the SALT II negotiations to the courtship between a rich bachelor and an acquisitive beauty -- each aspiring to wedlock, but he for marriage and she with alimony in mind. Both sides want SALT II, but for different goals. We want to reduce the fear and the cost of

nuclear weapons, while the Soviets want to make permanent their nuclear weapons' lead over us so they can be in the driver's seat of international politics.

Fortunately we have the benefit of the first-hand knowledge of a former member of the Soviet SALT team to tell us how the Russians hope to cash in on their SALT "alimony" after going through the formalities of a SALT "marriage." Dr. Igor Sergeyevich Glagolev, a former Soviet SALT team consultant with impeccable credentials as a Kremlin adviser, defected to the West in 1976.

Speaking at a forum in Washington, D.C., Dr. Glagolev pointed out that the terms of SALT II would allow the Soviets "to keep its more powerful weapons" and "perpetuate their superiority." He added that the Kremlin is doing a good job of concealing their superiority from the U.S. public with the help of USSR censorship and the pro-detente media in the West.

The terms of SALT II confirm his criticisms. SALT II would protect one of the Soviets' most important advantages, their "heavy" missiles. Heavies are the missiles that can destroy the opponents' weapons in hardened silos. SALT II permits the Soviets to deploy 308 heavy ICBMs (the SS-9s and SS-18s which carry 25 to 50 megatons each), while the United States may not deploy any ICBMs of that power at all. Our largest missile is our Titan II, rated at 5 to 10 megatons each and much older.

SALT II forbids us to use trucks or railroad cars as mobile launch sites, a principal way that we could prevent our missiles from being vulnerable to Soviet attack. Some experts believe that SALT II would also ban the Multiple Aim Points system under which we could build hundreds of empty silos and transfer our missiles from one to another so the Soviets would never know ICBM locations.

SALT II limits sea- and land-based cruise missiles to a range of 347 miles, making them useless as strategic weapons. It limits air-launched cruise missiles to a 1,550-mile range, making the planes vulnerable to Soviet interceptors. SALT II limits will include our old, subsonic B-52 bombers while excluding the Soviets' new supersonic Backfire bomber, of which they are now producing five a month.

The SALT-sellers are threatening the American people that, if our Senate doesn't ratify the treaty, arms costs will escalate out of sight. This is a red herring. Our current military budget is a lower percentage of our federal budget than in any year since 1950.

The Soviet military budget was never affected in the slightest by SALT I -- its signing in 1972, its five-year life, or its lapsing in 1977. The Soviets simply continue to build for strategic superiority regardless of costs or treaties.

Eugene Rostow, chairman of the executive committee of the Committee on the Present Danger, has correctly analyzed SALT II as "a step toward war, not peace . . . which can only invite more Soviet pressure and more risk. It would freeze us in a position of inferiority, deny us the opportunity to redress the balance, weaken our alliances, and isolate us."

The World War II generation learned by bitter experience that the arms-limitation and naval-reduction agreements of the 1920s not only did not prevent war, but positively encouraged aggressors to attack. It's too bad that each generation has to learn fundamental lessons of international politics all over again.

It isn't that aggressors want war; they don't. As Clausewitz put it so well, the aggressor would prefer to

enter your country unopposed.

## Image-Making and SALT

The appointment of Lieutenant General George M. Seignious 2d (U.S.A., Ret.) to head the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency is another public relations ploy of the Carter Administration. The new White House strategy is to seek to cover the substance of SALT II with the trappings of "image" on the theory that what is said is more important than what is done.

The thought processes of the White House staff must have proceeded along these lines. *Objective*: to sell the Senate on the SALT II agreement with the Soviets. *Problem*: pro-defense and conservative Senators are likely to sound off with a counterattack making such charges as "SALT is soft on Communism," "appeasement of the Soviets," "sellout of U.S. security," and "it smacks too much of disarmament-salesman Paul Warnke." *How to defuse this attack on SALT II*: co-opt a career military man and use him as the up-front salesman for SALT II. The American public will never read the treaty itself, but the public will buy the fine print in the document if a military man assures them it is good for America.

Whether Gerald Rafshoon ever wrote a memorandum along these lines, we may never know. But the above assessment of the American public is realistic. Despite enormous anti-military propaganda, the American people still have confidence that our Armed Forces are genuinely trying to protect our country. And, by and large, the American people never read the text of SALT I.

SALT I was signed by our President near midnight Moscow time on May 26, 1972, just in time to make the U.S. network television newscasts on Friday night, American time. TV coverage consisted principally of pictures of the large trays of champagne brought to the VIPs for the celebration. By Monday night, it was stale news and the TV cameras had moved on to other events.

We can count on one hand the newspapers that ever printed the full text of the SALT I agreements, although in toto they consumed only one full newspaper page. Those few newspapers that did print the text, did so in their light-circulation Saturday editions. The text was not published by any major news-magazine.

General Seignious' unique appointment as disarmament chief also enables him to do double duty as a Carter Administration salesman. Not only can he pump for disarmament as a SALT-seller, but he can also lend credibility to his image as a pro-defense disarmament chief by lobbying for a bigger defense budget, and thereby secure the cooperation of the active-duty military. The average American will be soothed with the ploy that, because we are increasing the defense budget, we must be improving our defense against the Russians.

Of course, that is not true at all, as our unhappy years of experience during the Vietnam War amply proved. Each year we spent more of the taxpayers' money, but each year the Soviets increased their lead in strategic nuclear weapons. The explanation for this anomaly is that our money was spent mostly on personnel and on conventional weapons that are now destroyed or captured by the enemy.

Even today, at least half of the defense budget goes for the volunteer army, which does very little to protect

us against the Soviet nuclear missile and submarine forces.

General Seignious' appointment has not yet achieved its goal of allaying the fears of the pro-defense Senators. But it has achieved a secondary goal of diverting attention away from the crucial terms of SALT II and into such trivial questions as: did he know that the American Security Council (a private group) is opposed to SALT when he joined one of its affiliated groups.

Such questions are full of sound and fury, signifying nothing. When all the Seignious controversy is swept away, the policy underneath is the same as that instituted by Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara in the 1960s: spend more billions, build a bigger Pentagon bureaucracy, but don't increase our numbers of strategic nuclear weapons past 1,054 ICBMs and 656 SLBMs even though the Russians have 50 percent more of both, and don't build a new longrange bomber even though the Russians are building theirs as fast as they can.

### Are You Sure About the Soviets?

The biggest handicap the Carter Administration has in selling the American people on a new arms treaty with the Soviet Union is the intuitive and justified belief that the Soviets are not to be trusted. So Administration SALT sellers are arguing strenuously that SALT is not based on trust in the Soviet Union to keep its agreements, but is based on each nation's own self-interest.

But that begs the question. In order to accept this line of argument, you must be willing to accept Administration spokesmen's definition of what is in the Soviet Union's self-interest. In other words, instead of relying on the Soviets' good faith, we are asked to rely on the clairvoyance of the Carter Administration's assessment of what the Soviets will think in future circumstances.

Thus Paul Warnke, the Carter Administration's chief SALT-seller, confidently assures: "I am quite sure that no Soviet planner in his right mind would assume that the United States would leave its missiles to be destroyed once we had assured proof of a Soviet attack."

In this amazing statement, Mr. Warnke is undertaking to assure the American people that he knows (1) that Soviet planners are in their right mind, (2) what Soviet planners will think in the future, and (3) how Soviet planners will predict the U.S. President's decision about pushing the nuclear button in response to an attack. None of these assurances is valid.

The American people themselves don't know whether the U.S. President will push the nuclear button in retaliation or not, so how in the world could the Soviets know? Furthermore, it's not what the U.S. President will actually do that matters in Soviet decision-making, but what the Kremlin leaders think he will do.

How do we know that the Kremlin bosses will be men in their right mind? Or, if they are, how do we know whether their judgment will be either accurate or in their own self-interest?

When the Japanese warlords attacked Pearl Harbor, were they in their right mind? If so, did they act in their own best interest? They guessed they would be able to destroy our Navy at Pearl Harbor and that we could not retaliate. It took a million American casualties to prove that their judgment about U.S. retaliation was totally wrong.

Was Hitler in his right mind when he declared war on the United States? Did he act in his own self-interest? It is obvious he failed to anticipate that the United States would make Germany and not Japan its number-one enemy.

The Russians have an extensive civil defense system with underground shelters for most of their urban population. There is plenty of evidence that they calculate that a nuclear war with the United States would cost them only a small fraction of our casualties, much less than they suffered in World War II.

We have no effective civil defense system. The Russians have anti-missile systems at Moscow and Leningrad; we have none.

The theory of the SALT treaties is that the Soviets won't attack us because they think that, if they do, we will strike back and kill millions of Russians. In other words, SALT is based on leaving Americans like sitting ducks in the face of any attack, while we threaten to kill millions of Russians. Our weapons are all designed to kill people. None is designed to keep Americans alive.

The only intelligent way to plan the future is to have an alternate plan if our Number One plan fails. Those who want to rely on the SALT II treaty have no alternate plan. If their Number One plan doesn't work, they will wring their hands and say, "Too bad that 100 million Americans had to die. We thought nuclear war was unthinkable."

We need an alternate plan just in case (1) the Soviet leaders don't act in their own self-interest, or (2) they misjudge how Americans will retaliate. A greatly expanded civil defense program is the alternate plan we need. American lives are worth saving regardless of the cost. The life you save may be your own.

### How a "Frame of Mind" Colors the Facts

The mythology put out by the Carter Administration, when it recently dashed the hopes of those who had been hoping our country would start an effective civil defense program, goes like this: Yes, the Soviet Union has a civil defense program, but don't worry about it; above all, don't allow it to persuade us to build a meaningful civil defense in the United States.

The Administration conclusion was based largely on a CIA report which has been thoroughly debunked by Leon Goure, America's foremost analyst of Russian civil defense. Dr. Goure called it "a crash effort" by analysts who have "no prior knowledge of either civil defense in general or Soviet civil defense in particular." He called it "a politicized and regrettably distorted treatment."

This is not the first time that the CIA has distorted the facts in order to accommodate White House policy prejudices. The same thing happened in 1962 when the Kennedy Administration refused to believe that the Kremlin had shipped offensive missiles into Cuba. The Senate Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee subsequently reported that the Administration's almost-fatal delay in believing the evidence was due to "the predisposition of the intelligence community . . . that it would be incompatible with Soviet policy to introduce strategic missiles into Cuba."

The July 1965 issue of the prestigious journal of the Council on Foreign Relations, *Foreign Affairs*, blamed the refusal to believe the evidence on a "frame of mind" that offensive missiles in Cuba were unthink-

able. "When an official policy or hypothesis is laid down, it tends to obscure alternative hypotheses, and to lead to overemphasis of the data that support it, particularly in a situation of increasing tension, when it is important not to 'rock the boat'."

A similar "frame of mind" is preventing the Carter Administration from believing the factual evidence about the extent of Soviet civil defense and its strategic implications. Dr. Edward Teller has warned us: "We choose to live in a world of dreams. We choose to call what we don't like 'unthinkable.' And the tragedy is that what is unthinkable will happen. But if we think, we can still prevent it from happening."

The unthinkable event that could happen, even if we don't think about it, has been described by Nobel Laureate Eugene P. Wigner of Princeton University. He estimates that our lack of civil defense exposes 60 percent of our population to nuclear attack or blackmail, but, because of the extensive Soviet civil defense and evacuation programs, their population losses in case of an attack would be, at most, only four and a half percent.

The Administration argues that the Soviets are spending their money needlessly for civil defense. But the Soviets believe they know, from bitter first-hand experience, that preparation for war in the homeland is essential. If we do nothing about civil defense, the Soviets may deduce (a) that we are fools, or (b) that, when the chips are down, because we have no civil defense, we will strike first.

The latter, as a matter of fact, is part of the still-operable Khrushchev doctrine. Repeatedly expressing a paranoid fear of a U.S. attack on the USSR, he warned, "If a country's defenses are paralyzed, then war really is inevitable." Dr. Teller calls this Soviet suspicion "THE unstabilizing circumstance in a situation that is unstable enough already."

If the Carter Administration would allow our intelligence-gathering agencies to report the facts uncolored by the Administration-dictated "frame of mind," it would seem that the most stabilizing plan we could undertake would be to build a realistic and effective civil defense program to safeguard the American people from nuclear blackmail.

The Soviet Union is spending \$2 billion a year on civil defense measures designed to protect its population against nuclear attack. It is time we directed some attention to the problem of saving the lives of our own people.

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## Glossary of SALT Terms

As the SALT II debate heats us, Americans find themselves confronted with a new vocabulary of unfamiliar words. Many feel that the SALT news stories are written in a kind of code language, even more foreign than STAR WARS lingo. So here is a glossary to keep by your side as the SALT II debate unfolds.

**SALT:** Strategic Arms Limitation Talks between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. The SALT I talks began in 1969 and culminated in the agreements signed in 1972. SALT II talks began immediately and are expected to culminate in a treaty signed in 1979.

**SALT I Agreements:** consist of the SALT I Treaty "of unlimited duration" between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. banning most anti-missile defenses; the SALT I Interim Agreement, a 5-year agreement which expired in 1977, limiting construction of some types of offensive missile launchers; and the Protocol which specifically limits the U.S. to 44 modern ballistic missile submarines and 710 submarine-launched missiles, while the U.S.S.R. is allowed 62 and 950, respectively.

**ICBM:** Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile; a missile with a range of more than 4,000 nautical miles carrying a nuclear warhead; can travel between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. in 30 minutes.

**SLBM:** Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile; a long-range nuclear missile launched from a submarine.

**Cruise Missile:** a guided missile that does not follow a ballistic path and cannot leave the atmosphere; can be launched from planes, ships or submarines.

**MIRV:** Multiple Independently-Targeted Reentry Vehicle; the part of the reentry vehicle in an ICBM or SLBM which can be individually targeted. (ICBMs and SLBMs pass through outer space and their warheads are capable of reentering the earth's atmosphere.)

**Warhead:** the explosive charge, nuclear or conventional, with its detonating mechanism, delivered by a missile or other delivery system.

**Heavy missile:** an ICBM which carries enough power to knock out enemy missiles in hardened silos; includes only the 313 Soviet SS-9s and SS-18s; the U.S. has no missiles of that yield.

**Megaton:** nuclear explosive power equivalent to the explosive power of one million tons of TNT; equivalent to 1,000 kilotons.

**Kiloton:** nuclear explosive power equivalent to the explosive power of 1,000 tons of TNT.

**Minuteman:** the principal U.S. ICBM; range 8,000 statute miles. The U.S. has 1,000, a figure which has not changed since 1967. Minuteman II has a yield of 1+ megatons; Minuteman II has a yield of three MIRVed warheads estimated at 170 to 200 kilotons each (0.2 megatons).

**SS-9:** Soviet heavy ICBM; range 7,500 nautical miles; carries a single warhead of 25 megatons or three MRVs (Multiple Reentry Vehicles) of 5-megatons each.

**SS-18:** Soviet super-ICBM; range 7,500 miles; carries a single warhead estimated at 33 to 50 megatons, or up to ten MIRVs of 2+ megatons each.

**MAD:** Mutual Assured Destruction; name given by its advocates to the theory that the populations of each of the nuclear super powers should be undefended by anti-missile defenses or other civil defense, in order that the cities of each side are kept hostage to the other.

**Verification:** Inspection techniques and procedures to ascertain whether either side is cheating on the terms of an agreement; a major issue in SALT II.