



# The Phyllis Schlafly Report



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## Who Is Outwitting Whom?

### Another Grain Robbery

It looks as though American farmers have been victimized again by a Soviet grain robbery. Our successful private-enterprise production has been forced once again to cover the losses of the unsuccessful state-controlled Communist economic system.

The Russian 1977 grain harvest turned out to be 19 million tons short. Apparently, to fill the gap, the Soviets secretly bought millions of tons of U.S. grain at depressed prices, in violation of their agreement with the United States to buy only openly.

At least since 1962 the Soviets have followed a nationally enforced policy of guns instead of bread. Soviet officials will not allow any diversion of resources from their nuclear weapons-building program even for such fundamental consumer essentials as grain. Anyway why should they -- if they can outsmart American capitalists into shipping them cheap food so the Soviets can spend all their money on weapons.

If the Soviets had openly admitted that their 1977 harvest would never reach its official goal and they were in the market for more grain, the present depressed world price would have risen. Instead, the Soviets secretly and quickly bought up large amounts of low-priced American grain through European agents who did not reveal the identity of the real purchasers.

Why should the Soviets have admitted what they were doing? Because they signed an agreement in which they promised to do exactly that. Apparently, some of the dewy-eyed devotees of detente in our Government thought that the Soviets would play fair and square.

The consistency of the Communists in breaking their international agreements is exceeded only by the consistency of U.S. State Department and other U.S. negotiators in falling into the trap of signing more agreements and then believing that the Soviets will honor them.

The expression "great grain robbery," originated by Senator Henry Jackson, has gone into the English language as the popular description of the highway robbery that the Soviets visited on American farmers, taxpayers and consumers in 1972.

That was the year when the Soviets, after a particularly disastrous harvest, secretly and rapidly bought up 18 million tons of U.S. grain. Much of it was paid for by loans from the U.S. Commodity Credit Corporation,

some of it was subsidized by other Federal funds, and the rest was sold at bargain-basement prices cheaper than what Americans had to pay for our own grain.

The Soviet grain deal cost the U.S. taxpayers three-quarters of a billion dollars in loans and subsidies, and cost the American consumers a couple of billion dollars in higher bread and meat prices. The General Accounting Office later confirmed that the deal caused higher prices for bread, beef, pork, poultry, eggs and dairy products.

As a result of the way Americans were fleeced in 1972, the United States and the Soviet Union signed an agreement to prevent future secret purchases of American grain. The Soviets formally agreed to buy a minimum of six but no more than eight million tons of grain each year.

If the Soviets want to exceed this amount, they are obligated under the agreement to notify the U.S. Government directly rather than place orders with private firms. The agreement also calls for monitoring Soviet crops by satellite, accompanied by on-site inspection of major Soviet grain-growing areas by U.S. Agriculture Department experts.

Our 1977 grain experience with the Soviets should have a salutary effect on SALT II negotiations. If the multi-billion-dollar U.S. intelligence-gathering apparatus can't accurately locate and identify fields of growing wheat, how in the world can it possibly locate and identify Soviet mobile and reload missiles which are easily capable of being moved and camouflaged?

### Letter From Leonid

The State Department plunged to new depths of diplomatic failure when it leaked out that, since the Soviets steadfastly refuse to include their new Backfire bombers in the number of strategic delivery vehicles limited by SALT II, the Carter Administration would settle for a "letter" from Leonid I. Brezhnev promising not to use them against the United States.

Brezhnev is old and in ill health; he has leukemia. He runs a tight dictatorship now, but after he is dead he may, like Stalin, become a non-person. It is risky to rely on a treaty with the Soviets; it makes no sense at all to rely on a letter from a dictator with a short life expectancy.

Ten years ago, one of the esoteric slogans put forth by the anti-defense lobby was "unilateral reciprocal in-

initiative." This meant that the United States should indulge in unilateral disarmament initiatives, and then the Soviets would reciprocate in a sort of noblesse oblige.

If there is anyone still around who believes in such fairy tales, the strategic bomber story provides the classic refutation. In a dramatic act of unilateral initiative, the Carter Administration cancelled our B-1 bomber, the best in the world, without any quid pro quo. The Soviets responded by stepping up production of their own new strategic bomber, the Backfire.

Having thrown away its trumps, the Carter Administration pleaded with the Soviets to make some concession about the Backfire in the SALT II negotiations. The Soviets thumbed their noses at us. Then the Carter Administration made a cringing public appeal to Brezhnev asking him please to give us a letter saying he will never use the planes he is spending billions of rubles to manufacture. Nobody asks the question why Brezhnev would build the bombers if he has no plans to use them.

Our State Department seems never to learn anything in dealing with the Russians. One of the most crucial issues in the SALT I negotiations was the Soviet Union's program of converting its older "light" land-based ICBM launchers into modern "heavy" missile launchers.

The Soviets had started a massive and tremendously expensive program of converting their older light SS-11s and SS-13s into new modern heavy SS-17s and SS-19s, and they had no intention of permitting a mere treaty to interfere with their plans to build weapons powerful enough to knock out U.S. missiles in their silos. They avoided any treaty restraints on their building program by refusing to agree to a definition of a "heavy missile."

Unable to get any agreement out of the Soviets, the U.S. SALT delegation expressed its solemn "regret" in "Noteworthy Unilateral Statement D": "The U.S. delegation regrets that the Soviet delegation has not been willing to agree on a common definition of a heavy missile. Under these circumstances, . . . the United States would consider any ICBM having a volume significantly greater than that of the largest light ICBM now operational on either side to be a heavy ICBM. The U.S. proceeds on the premise that the Soviet side will give due account to this consideration."

A "unilateral statement," regardless of how "noteworthy" it might be called, is not legally binding. The Soviets did not give "due account" to our definition, but instead continued converting their older light SS-11s and SS-13s into new heavy SS-17s and SS-19s, as well as converting their heavy SS-9s into very heavy SS-18s.

When will the State Department learn that, when the Soviets refuse to bind themselves to an agreement, they have a strategic reason for that refusal? No unilateral statement or letter will restrain the Soviets from carrying out their plans.

## Understanding Soviet Tactics

Zbigniew Brezezinski, President Carter's national security assistant, is getting his lumps in the press. While he holds the same position that Henry Kissinger did under President Nixon, Brezezinski shows no signs of being able to parlay it into comparable influence.

Zbigniew Brezezinski (pronounced Zuh-big-nyeff Bre-zin-ski) has many of the same assets that Kissinger

started with. Kissinger's patron was Nelson Rockefeller; Brezezinski's patron is the even more powerful David Rockefeller. Brezezinski put together the Trilateral Commission for David, one of whose members (Jimmy Carter) became U.S. President. Many others turned up in Cabinet-level posts.

Brezezinski is clearly not as skillful as Kissinger in dealing with the press. Reporters found Kissinger erudite and witty, but now describe Brezezinski as boring and pedantic. As one senior correspondent described it, "A Brezezinski briefing is a lecture. . . . Worst of all, it is a freshman lecture."

The difference between Kissinger and Brezezinski, however, is in form not in substance. The overall goal of both is accommodation with the Communist bloc from Southeast Asia to the Caribbean to Moscow.

The "freshman lecture" that would be highly worthwhile for Brezezinski himself to hear would be the recent CBS television film on Simas Kudirka. That two-hour program is a good lesson in what Soviet Communism is all about and what's wrong with the vacillating and humiliating U.S. response.

Simas Kudirka was the Lithuanian seaman who leaped from the deck of a Soviet fishing trawler to the U.S. Coast Guard ship the Vigilant on November 23, 1970, and asked for political asylum. The two ships were then anchored side by side in American waters off Martha's Vineyard, Massachusetts, to participate in fishing rights negotiations.

The Russians demanded that the U.S. Coast Guard return Kudirka. To their everlasting shame, Coast Guard officers allowed Soviet crew members to board the Vigilant, search it until they found and captured Kudirka, beat him into unconsciousness, and carry him back to the Soviet ship. He was subsequently sentenced to ten years in a slave labor camp.

The Lithuanian-American community rallied to Kudirka's defense and kept demanding his release from Russia. In their investigations they discovered one of history's strangest coincidences. Simas Kudirka turned out to be an American citizen because his mother, although she lived in Lithuania, had been born in Brooklyn.

According to U.S. laws then in effect, although Kudirka had never been to the United States and had lived behind the Iron Curtain all his life, he is nevertheless an American citizen. U.S. Passport Chief Frances Knight issued Kudirka an American passport. Grassroots American freedom-lovers intensified their demands that our Government pressure the Soviets to release Kudirka. Finally the Soviets concluded it wasn't worth the trouble to keep a prisoner holding an American passport, and they released him.

Simas Kudirka is a living reminder of how much men will endure to escape from Communist tyranny and reach a free country. His case is dramatic proof that terrorist tactics did not die with Stalin, but are part and parcel of the Soviet system today.

The Simas Kudirka case should motivate us to resolve to build whatever weapons are necessary, at whatever price, in order to deter Soviet aggression, lest we ultimately have to fight with our bare hands as Kudirka did.

## Soviet Intentions?

Defense Secretary Harold Brown stated recently that the Soviets are building four new types of intercontinental ballistic missiles, but he doesn't know

"*why* the Soviets are pushing so hard to improve their strategic nuclear capabilities."

At a Congressional hearing in February 1969, Defense Secretary Melvin Laird was asked *why* the Soviets were engaged in a massive buildup of strategic weapons, especially their huge 25-megaton SS-9 super-missile. He responded with a valid and commonsense explanation: "The Soviets are going for a first-strike capability. There is no question about that."

Our nation's top policy makers, who were than President Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger, did not agree with Melvin Laird's assessment of Soviet intentions. No one has ever revealed what sort of reprimand was administered behind closed doors, but shortly thereafter Laird changed his tune. The next time he was asked the same question, he meekly replied that it was not his function to interpret Soviet intentions.

If it is not the function of the Secretary of Defense to interpret the meaning of a huge buildup by the Soviets of nuclear weapons that are capable of incinerating scores of millions of Americans, then whose is it?

President Nixon and Henry Kissinger admitted that the answer was beyond them. In the 1972 State of the World Report, issued under Nixon's name but admittedly written by Henry Kissinger, they "made it perfectly clear" with an unambiguous assertion: "We cannot know the intentions of Soviet leadership."

The evidence is overwhelming that Laird was correct in his original explanation of *why* the Soviets are building huge strategic weapons. The megatonnage of their missile force is now estimated as at least ten times greater than ours. The Soviet SS-9, for example, has 25 times the megatonnage of our Minuteman missile.

But assuming that Defense Secretary Brown is truthful when he says he doesn't know *why* the Soviets are building four new ICBMs, then the only rational U.S. course of action is to base our defense on Soviet *capabilities* rather than on their intentions. That means building a defense posture superior to Soviet weapons, rather than speculating as to how they intend to use them.

The four new ICBMs that the Soviets are building all have a greater throw-weight than those they are replacing. Three have MIRV warheads. Yet the U.S. response has been to ignore Soviet capabilities as well as intentions. In the last several months, Secretary Brown has halted production of our Minuteman III ICBM and terminated a related program to improve the accuracy of our Minuteman II. President Carter announced his surprise decision to halt production of the B-1 bomber. Our Navy today has fewer ships than at the time of the Pearl Harbor attack, and there are no plans for any significant additions.

If Defense Secretary Brown doesn't understand Soviet intentions, and has chosen to ignore Soviet capabilities, then our only recourse is to invite the American people to join the decision-making process.

One of the outstanding military writers in the country, Brigadier General Edwin L. Black, U.S. Army (Ret.), urged open public discussion in a recent article that won second prize in the annual Institute of Naval Proceedings Essay Contest. He suggests a review of our national strategy by the National Security Council in private sessions to be conducted concurrently with a Congressional review in open hearings. The synthesis could be a national policy that would meet our national security requirements of the coming decade, and also have the support of the American people.

## SALT I Cheating

While Secretary of State Cyrus Vance is busy trying to persuade the Soviets to sign a SALT II treaty, former Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird is charging that "the evidence is incontrovertible that the Soviet Union has repeatedly, flagrantly and indeed contemptuously violated" SALT I.

Laird further charges that the overriding passion for detente has been so intense that our government has either suppressed or minimized the intelligence of what the Soviets are doing. Here are some of the Soviet violations.

SALT I prohibits the development, testing and deployment of any mobile parts of an anti-ballistic missile system. But the Russians have been doing just that.

SALT I expressly forbids tests aimed at upgrading an anti-aircraft missile system to an ABM system. But the Russians made such tests at least five times.

SALT I prohibits replacement of existing intercontinental missiles with substantially larger ones. The Russians produced two new large missiles, the SS-16 and the SS-20. Because they are mobile and concealed, the United States cannot use the "national technical means of verification" approved by SALT I in order to check on these new Russian missiles.

SALT I gave the Soviets a 3-to-2 lead over the United States in land-based and submarine based intercontinental ballistic missiles. Not satisfied with that, the Russians have hidden, with giant tarpaulins, their new submarine construction at the Severodvinsk and Khabarovsk construction yards. Mr. Laird writes that, in order "to gain decisive military superiority over the United States", the Russians "have been willing to dishonor their most fundamental agreements with us."

It makes no sense to play a giant ostrich, bury our nation's head in the sand, and pretend the Soviets aren't violating SALT I when former Secretary Laird presents convincing evidence that they are. It makes even less sense to sign SALT II while closing our eyes to the history of SALT I.

## SALT II Prospects

American Presidents are somehow convinced that it is politically helpful to go to Russia and bring back an agreement, no matter how one-sided, signed by the Soviet dictator. President Roosevelt did that with Stalin at Teheran in 1943 and at Yalta in 1945. Even President Nixon apparently believed that the SALT I agreement he signed in May 1972 helped him to defeat George McGovern decisively.

Now President Carter is making unnecessary and dangerous concessions in order to bring back a SALT II agreement. Paul H. Nitze, a former member of the U.S. SALT negotiating team and former Deputy Secretary of Defense, has charged that political pressures have led the Carter Administration to agree to certain proposals that compromise U.S. security.

Nitze, who is now a member of the Committee on the Present Danger, stated recently: "The President's position is clear. He would like to come up with an agreement." He added that Carter is "surrounded by people he wants to hear", but who have little understanding of the strategic issue or the dangers of SALT II.

What are some of the concessions President Carter has made? First, he cancelled production of the best bomber in the world, the B-1. For this he neither re-

ceived nor even requested any concession from the Soviets.

Then President Carter announced that he would rely on our old B-52s to carry cruise missiles. However, he then agreed to limit the range of our cruise missiles. Soviet MIG-25 Foxbat interceptors, using tanker aircraft to refuel, could keep our slow-flying B-52 carriers more than 600 miles away from the Soviet Union. That's too far away to hit most of the Soviet ICBM fields with cruise missiles.

On July 11 the Defense Department ordered the production of our Minuteman III missiles stopped. In November, the ten Minuteman contractors were asked if they could resume some limited production again. Such off-again on-again production is not only very hard on the skilled employees, but very expensive.

Meanwhile the Soviets are producing one new supersonic bomber, the Tupolev Backfire, four new intercontinental land missiles, the SS-17, SS-18, SS-19, and SS-20, one new submarine ballistic missile, and a new satellite killer weapon that was successfully tested on June 17. The Soviet SS-20 missile is mobile and therefore cannot be effectively targeted. The United States has no mobile missiles, and no satellite killer weapons.

As stated by one Defense Department official to the highly respected *Aviation Week and Space Technology*: "There is now a clear strategic weapons advantage by the Soviets over the U.S."

Mobile missiles were not limited by the SALT I agreement, and the Soviets have taken full advantage of this loophole by going ahead with deployment of their SS-20. One of the most constructive and peace-stabilizing actions the United States could take would be to do likewise. The Soviets' stockpile of mobile missiles gives them a great advantage. Because mobile missiles can be easily moved and camouflaged, it is estimated to require about 20 warheads to destroy a single mobile-based missile. This means that an aggressor nation would have to use so many more of his own warheads than he could hope to destroy that there would be no profit in any attack.

Instead of freezing the present Soviet weapons advantage in SALT II, President Carter should order a go-ahead on the B-1 bomber, assure the continued production of Minuteman III missiles, remove the artificial limits on the range of our cruise missiles, and start production of mobile missiles.

## Military vs. Financial Superiority

An old Greek legend describes a king reputed to have the largest gold treasure in the ancient world. One day the king proudly displayed his vaults of gold bars, coins, and other pieces to a traveling philosopher. As the visitor departed, the king noted that he did not seem overly impressed by the tremendous cache of gold. The philosopher replied, "Your golden treasure is, indeed, impressive. But remember, it can all be taken away from you if another king has more iron than you have."

"Iron" in that legend was used to mean the swords, spears and other military weapons of the ancient world. The story teaches the lesson that military superiority can defeat financial superiority.

The United States has far more economic wealth than any other nation in the world. We have a Gross National Product more than twice that of the Soviet Union. But all our financial power cannot defend us

against the Soviet Union if it has superiority in iron (in the sense of the Greek legend).

Since the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, the Soviets have been building a military machine at a crash wartime rate. Nothing in all history can compare with the tremendous destructive power built by the Russians during the past 15 years.

Despite a large defense budget, it's been ten years since the United States added even a single intercontinental ballistic missile or nuclear missile-firing submarine to our forces. Our self-imposed nuclear weapons freeze began in 1967, and our figures have not changed since then: 1,054 ICBMs and 41 Polaris/Poseidon submarines. The number of our strategic bombers has shrunk from about 600 to about 450.

A November 1977 article in the *New York Times Magazine* admitted that the "Soviet Union now has about a two-to-one advantage in megatonnage -- the total nuclear payload . . . of its missile forces." Three days later, the Defense Department announced the most searching review of our strategic forces since the 1960s. The Pentagon said this study is the result of Soviet missile advances that will "make the American land-based missile force vulnerable by the mid-1980s." However, the Carter Administration is living in some kind of dream world if it thinks it can defer concern about U.S. vulnerability until the 1980s.

After President Carter came out against the B-1 bomber, the Congress dutifully backed him up and knocked out the funds for the fleet of B-1s. Since then, the Congress has had second thoughts.

In 1939 there was a vote in Congress on fortifications for Guam. After Pearl Harbor, many Congressmen discovered that their nay vote was the biggest political mistake of their careers. Unfortified Guam was quickly captured by the Japanese and we lost many men when we had to recapture it.

A vote against the B-1 will be perceived by the voters as a similar mistake unless the United States soon starts to use its financial superiority to regain its former military superiority.

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