



The Phyllis Schlafly Report



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The Demise of Detente?

Embassy Eavesdropping

At last the national news media are reporting on what many people for many months have believed is the biggest national security scandal in the country: the fact that Soviet agents in Washington, D.C., are eavesdropping on most of the long-distance calls made to or from our Government offices.

The Rockefeller Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States originally had nine pages on this subject in its 1975 report, but all but two paragraphs were deleted because Henry Kissinger didn't want to upset detente. Senator Church's Committee Report on the CIA referred to this situation with one paragraph, stating simply that we can't do anything about it.

Ignoring the problem did not make it go away. Listening devices in the Soviet Embassy have the capability of monitoring 12,000 telephone conversations a minute and of picking up all telephone conversations transmitted by microwave within twelve miles of the Soviet Embassy. The Soviets are carrying on this massive eavesdropping from each of their six pieces of property in our country. These are located in Washington, D.C., the United Nations, Long Island, Maryland, San Francisco, and Chicago.

By monitoring American telephone calls, the Soviets can get access to all kinds of secret military and economic information known to executive branch officials, member of Congress, and some private citizens. Out of the traffic of unimportant phone calls, Soviet high-speed computers sort out those containing sensitive information.

There is widespread speculation that such telephone eavesdropping may have given the Soviets secret economic information which enabled them to make the deals for their huge grain purchases in 1972, which ultimately became known as the Great Grain Robbery. It is even possible that "Deep Throat," the mysterious informer who passed inside information about Watergate scandals to the press, may have been somebody in the Soviet Embassy who learned the secret tidbits by telephone monitoring.

The United States has similar monitoring equipment in our U.S. Embassy in Moscow, but it is only about ten percent effective because the Russians jam it by beaming radiation at our Embassy. This is what causes the high radiation readings at our Embassy. Sci-

entists and physicians are divided on the question of how harmful this is to the health of American personnel and whether it caused the several cases of cancer among U.S. diplomats who have been stationed there. U.S. protests against this deliberate radiation of our Embassy have fallen on deaf Soviet ears.

The recent news stories which detail the facts of Soviet Embassy eavesdropping on American telephone conversations suggest that there are only three solutions to this problem: burying all the telephone lines underground, or installing scrambling or coding devices. All these methods would cost millions and perhaps billions of dollars.

There is one simple solution, however, that would stop it immediately at no cost. Just tell the Soviets to stop their outrageous eavesdropping or else we will close their embassy and consulates and expel their espionage agents and electronic experts.

For years, the liberals have defended the practice of extending diplomatic recognition to Communist countries on the argument that our embassies serve as valuable "listening posts." It is now abundantly clear that the Soviet Union is doing ninety percent of the listening.

B-1 Cancellation

President Carter has made a big thing out of paying \$6,000 in income tax that he didn't owe so he could identify politically with all the rest of us mortals who pay more taxes than we think we should. I suggest that now President Carter trade in Air Force One, the most beautiful plane in the world, and fly around in a 20-year old plane. While he is at it, he should also trade in his White House limousine and replace it with a 20-year old automobile.

Why not! By his decision NOT to build the B-1 bomber, President Carter is making our best pilots fly in 20-year old worn-out B-52s.

The B-52 was a great plane; I'm not knocking it. My 20-year-old refrigerator is still functioning, too. But when it finally collapses, as my stove, washing machine, drier, and automobiles have already done over a 20-year period, I know I'll be able to buy a new refrigerator and have it delivered immediately.

The trouble with not building replacements for our old B-52s is that we can't get same-day delivery of the B-1 after Carter closes down the assembly line. The

10,000 skilled employees of its manufacturer will have dispersed to other jobs. It would take years to create a new B-1 assembly line.

After Pearl Harbor in 1941, America had two years, insulated by our oceans, to gear up war production. But Soviet military writers have said there will be no advance warning of World War III. There will be no chance to train workers and buy the tools to make the B-1.

When interviewed after President Carter's decision to cancel production of the B-1 bomber, one union worker who will lose his job said ruefully, "I voted for Carter; I thought he was too smart to do this." It is hard to understand how the worker could be surprised. Carter campaigned against the B-1, and he kept his promise.

How "smart" Carter is, is indeed one of the issues in the B-1 decision, as House Minority Leader John Rhodes also detected when he leveled his charge of "rank amateurism."

The most amateurish part of the Carter decision was his statement, "I can't deny that was a factor," when a reporter asked him if his decision might signal the Kremlin that he is striving for progress in the SALT II talks. The Soviet bargainers would be far more apt to be reasonable if we were building instead of scrapping the B-1.

It was grossly negligent to cancel the B-1 without obtaining any weapons concession from the Soviet Union. For months SALT II negotiations have been stalemated by Russian intransigence, and now President Carter has thrown away one of our principal trump cards and gotten absolutely nothing for it.

The other evidence of amateurism is Carter's apparent belief that we can rely indefinitely on the aging B-52s to deliver the proposed cruise missile. Our B-52s are great planes, but they are 20 years old, they are subsonic, and they had hard usage in Vietnam. Near the end of the Vietnam War, 14 slow B-52s were shot down in two days by surface-to-air missiles that were then 10 years old.

Cruise: A Bird in the Bush

President Carter argues that we don't need the B-1 because we are developing the cruise missile and it is a more effective weapon. In the first place, the B-1 is a bird in the hand, while the cruise missile is a bird in the bush. It isn't ready for production as the B-1 is. Even when the cruise missile is ready, it will only fly 1,500 miles, so it must be carried by aircraft for two-thirds of its journey to its target. Under the Carter plan, that aircraft will be the old, subsonic B-52 instead of the supersonic B-1.

In the second place, those who oppose building the B-1 are the same people who oppose building the cruise missile. They are pitting the B-1 as a competitor to the cruise missile and hoping to bury both.

Those who can remember back to 1962 have an ominous feeling of *deja vu*. Defense Secretary Robert McNamara canceled the great long-range heavy bomber called the B-70, despite full funding for its development by Congress and its spectacular successes in flight tests at mach 3. He said that we did not need the B-70 because the B-52s equipped with Skybolt missiles could do the same job more "cost-effectively."

That sounded plausible then. Skybolt was a marvelous long-range air-to-surface missile with inertial guidance that could fly a thousand miles. But a few months later, McNamara canceled Skybolt.

So now President Carter has canceled the supersonic B-1, telling us that we can rely on the subsonic B-52 to carry the cruise missile. If history repeats itself, we can now expect the cruise missile to be canceled or surrendered in SALT II.

The probability of history repeating itself is enhanced when you remember that Carter's chief advisers on the B-1 and SALT are highly experienced in canceling U.S. weapons. Both Defense Secretary Harold Brown and Secretary of State Cyrus Vance were principal lieutenants of the same Robert McNamara who gave the double whammy to the B-70 and Skybolt.

The cancellation of Skybolt brought Winston Churchill out of retirement to issue a warning to the West which is still valid today: "Sometimes in the past we have committed the folly of throwing away our arms. Under the mercy of Providence, and at great cost and sacrifice, we have been able to recreate them when the need arose. But if we abandon our nuclear deterrent, there will be no second chance. To abandon it now would be to abandon it forever."

Lead-Time

When the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, they hit a sleeping giant not prepared for war. We not only had to build the weapons, the planes and the ships we needed to fight a two-front war, but we had to build the factories to produce the weapons, planes and ships.

When the atomic bomb, born in 1945, was married to the intercontinental rocket, born in 1957, this revolutionized the way wars henceforth would be fought between super-powers. In any confrontation between two nations that possess intercontinental weapons of mass destruction, such as the United States and the Soviet Union, the only weapons that matter are those in-being on the day war begins. There will never again be a grace period to tool up and build up after a Pearl Harbor-type surprise attack.

As weapons have become more sophisticated and more expensive, they also take longer to build. They need more and more of a precious ingredient, worth more than money, called lead-time -- that is, the length of time it takes to get a new weapon system from the drawing board to the assembly line.

The lead-time required for our Minuteman missile was four years from the go-ahead to the first operational flight. The lead-time required for our Polaris submarine was five years from the go-ahead until the first boat was launched. The B-47 bomber took eight years, the B-52 took eight and a half years, the B-58 took eleven years. The latest model strategic bomber, now called the B-1, has already consumed twelve years and production is not yet in sight.

Because the Soviets have a closed society with military secrets tightly guarded, we don't find out about their new weapons until they start operational tests. Each time U.S. intelligence discovers a new Soviet weapons system or technique, the Soviets already have a headstart on us of at least three-fourths of

the lead-time.

While we can outproduce the Russians by a ratio of at least two-to-one, our economic superiority will count for naught if we are caught short on lead-time to build the weapons we need to defend our country.

When we make a decision as to whether or not to build a new weapons system, such as the B-1 or the cruise missile, we should remember this lesson. If we build a weapon and find we don't need it, all we lose is money. If we don't build the weapon and we find we do need it, we won't be able to buy it at any price because the lead-time will be all gone.

Soviet Beam Weapon

In May 1972, the Soviets persuaded President Nixon to sign the SALT I Treaty under which we agreed to stop deployment of our anti-missile system. We subsequently dismantled even the one ABM installation we had built.

This giant step backwards was based on the theory that, instead of building weapons of defense, we should rely on our weapons of offense, namely, intercontinental ballistic missiles launched from fixed land bases and from submarines. The SALT I Treaty forced us to put all our nuclear eggs into the one basket called ICBMs. The theory was that we don't need to build weapons of defense because the Soviets know that our ICBMs can destroy their country.

Now comes the highly respected and reliable journal called *Aviation Week and Space Technology* with evidence that the Soviets have invented and tested "a directed energy beam weapon capable of neutralizing the entire United States ballistic force." This weapon, which up until now existed only in Buck Rogers and other science fiction, has been made a reality, by the Soviets.

The *Aviation Week* report is based on hard evidence of eight successful Soviet tests plus the brilliant work of a small group of young American scientists.

The importance of this report to every American can hardly be overemphasized. It means that the Soviets have leapfrogged a generation of high-energy physics technology and developed a workable experimental model of a directed-energy beam weapon that can destroy all our ICBMs. It is a breakthrough in weaponry and an ushering in of a new era that ranks with the invention of gunpowder and the atomic and hydrogen bombs.

It will take the Soviets some time to perfect and manufacture their new beam weapons. If we let them proceed with development and production of their new weapon without building our own, the day will come when the Soviets can laugh at our mighty force of Minuteman and Polaris missiles and say, "Go ahead and press the button, Uncle Sam. We know you can't hit us because we can stop your missiles dead in their tracks." If that happens, we will be able to live on earth only at the mercy of the men in the Kremlin who have repeatedly proved they have no mercy.

When the Soviets launched the world's first satellite in 1957 called Sputnik, the Eisenhower Administration started a crash program that produced the weapons that are the backbone of our defense today. The new Soviet technological surprise should have the

same effect, if we care about our freedom.

Is Nuclear War Winnable?

To the Founding Fathers, it was self-evident that some values are worth fighting and dying for, and that among these are freedom and independence. With the advent of the nuclear age, however, a contrary assumption came into vogue, namely, that war is now unwinnable, and that the winners, if any, will be no better off than the losers. The trouble with this is that it takes two to tango, and there is no evidence that the other superpowers believe it.

In a welcome breath of realism, a recent news story in the *New York Times* concedes that the Soviets are now convinced that a future war "can be won by the side that has nuclear superiority." Unfortunately, there is no indication that Cyrus Vance, Paul Warnke, or our other SALT negotiators understand this basic element of Soviet strategy, and they appear more interested in signing a SALT treaty than in what it contains.

In order to get an agreement, U.S. negotiators seem willing to exchange substantial concessions on our cruise missile for meaningless restrictions on Soviet weapons.

U.S. negotiators pretend to seek a ceiling on Soviet long-range mobile missiles, while ignoring the fact that intermediate-range mobile missiles can be converted to long-range without anyone knowing it, and while concealing from Americans that we have no mobile missiles at all.

U.S. negotiators make a big thing about a so-called "ceiling" on Soviet production of the Backfire bomber, but that ceiling is far higher than the Soviets ever intend to reach. Our negotiators have even accepted the impudent Soviet assertion that the Backfire is a medium-range rather than a long-range bomber, and therefore should not be counted in the "strategic" weapons limit. This is unrealistic in view of the fact that most experts believe the Backfire can reach America even without refueling, and of course, it can always land in Castro's Cuba.

Soviet negotiators are directing their efforts toward persuading us to limit the range of our cruise missile so that it can't hit Russia. The argument used against our building the new weapons systems we have ready for production is that we must not escalate the "arms race." However, Professor Albert Wohlstetter of the University of Chicago recently concluded that there is no such thing as an "arms race" because America long ago gave up racing. His statistics show that the U.S. budget in strategic weapons declined from a peak of \$32 billion in 1952 to \$7.7 billion in 1976.

Americans should ponder this fundamental question: is it possible to maintain our liberty and independence in a world in which the Soviets have remained in the arms race on the assumption that they can win a nuclear war, while our leaders have abandoned the arms race and seek only a paper agreement without substance or sanctions?

Economic Linkage With Russia

When a U.S. Secretary of Defense in the 1950s put his foot in his mouth by saying, "What's good for General Motors is good for the country," he was covered with scorn. Businessmen are more circumspect in their speech now, but that same premise appears to be what

motivates the some 100 U.S. businessmen who visit Moscow each week, as well as the 14 American corporate offices and three U.S. bank branches that have set up shop there.

Having a Russian contract is "in." The status-seekers gladly pay \$10,000 to join the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Trade and Economic Council. They are trying to make deals that are good for their companies regardless of their impact on the good of our country.

In 1962 the late Senator Everett Dirksen made headlines by reading into the *Congressional Record* a secret report written by State Department official Walt W. Rostow which espoused the theory that the Soviet Union was "mellowing" and going through a process of "evolution" in which it would abandon its goal of world conquest and grow more like the United States. This was the so-called theory of "convergence" of our country with the Soviet Union. It was born in the murky waters of Foggy Bottom and melted away when exposed to the glare of reality.

In the last several years, "convergence" has reemerged under the label "linkage." According to this reincarnated version of the same theory, "economic linkage" should be established between the United States and the Soviet Union by subsidized U.S. credits to the U.S.S.R., the transfer of American technology, the export of grain, the development of Soviet mineral resources through investment of U.S. capital, and U.S.-Soviet joint ventures in underdeveloped countries of the Third World.

Although the word "detente" has become a no-no in the political arena, "economic detente" is now a favorite cliché. We are encouraged to "spin a web of vested interests" in the hope that the Soviets reform their international behavior.

The Soviet Union has been eagerly trying to lure American businessmen and bankers with the prospect of a large potential Soviet market and special tax advantages. It is clear, however, that the Soviet motive is not merely trade for profit's sake.

The Soviet trade pattern reveals two primary purposes. One is to tap Western technology and long-term credits in order to develop inaccessible resources rapidly, especially oil, natural gas, timber, and rare metals. The other is to import complete industrial installations wholesale, especially in chemical and petrochemical industries, computer production, the automotive field, the energy sector, and modern metallurgy. All these are, of course, of strategic importance.

The Soviets are buying several chemical plants, a new steel mill with the latest technology, oil-drilling and manufacturing equipment, and a complete shipyard from Britain that can produce warships and submarines.

Soviet Tactic: East-West Trade

Over the last several years, the Soviets have bought nearly a thousand "turn-key" plants with ready-to-go manufacturing facilities. Soviet bloc governments have set up more than 800 joint manufacturing ventures with Western firms, particularly in the mechanical engineering, chemical, and transportation fields.

Among the advanced American technology shipped to the Soviet Union in the last couple of years is precision grinding machinery to manufacture miniature ball bearings to tolerances of a 25 millionth of an

inch. The Soviets bought 164 of these machines, which are an intricate part of the guidance mechanism for MIRVs, while the United States has only 77.

In 1972 Soviet orders for Western technology were nearly \$2 billion. In 1973 this figure rose to \$2.5 billion, in 1974 to nearly \$4 billion, and in 1975 to almost \$5 billion. The Kremlin has demanded and gotten very low interest rates, favorable long-term credits normally extended only to underdeveloped nations, and the wholesale transfer of factories without the profit repatriation or partnership arrangements that American companies usually get in other countries.

Back in 1958, the American Bar Association Special Committee on Communist Tactics, Strategy and Objectives identified "East-West trade" as a major tactic of the Soviet Union. Although for years the Cold War inhibited fulfillment of that goal, it received a great leap forward under Henry Kissinger's strategy of economic interdependence between the Soviet Union and the United States, financed by large-scale credits provided by the American taxpayers.

Kissinger's theories persist through his deputy Helmut Sonnenfeldt, who was a U.S. spokesman at an economic conference held this spring by NATO in Brussels. Except for a lone dissent from the German participant, who insisted realistically that the Soviets view foreign trade not as a business matter but as part of their political strategy to control the world, the other economists agreed with Sonnenfeldt that the Cold War is a thing of the past and that East-West trade is the wave of the future.

The ivory tower that cloisters such so-called experts seals them off from the reality that the East bloc currently owes the West some \$40 billion, and there is no indication that this debt will be paid in the near future, if ever.

More important than the financial loss from selling to customers who can't or don't pay their debts is the export of priceless American technology to a country whose principal industry is building military weapons of mass destruction. The Soviets are not working toward economic interdependence, linkage, convergence, or any of the other elusive goals that U.S. accommodationists profess to seek, but are picking our best brains in order to serve Soviet military objectives.

Award and Anniversary

We are pleased to announce that the *Phyllis Schlafly Report* has received an honor award from Freedoms Foundation of Valley Forge, Pennsylvania for the newsletter of June 1976 entitled "Private Enterprise Versus Socialism."

This is the ninth honor award to Phyllis Schlafly from Freedoms Foundation.

This issue of August 1977 marks the Tenth Anniversary of continuous monthly publication of the *Phyllis Schlafly Report*. Special thanks to all charter subscribers who are still with us, as well as to all those who have joined us along the way.

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