



The Phyllis Schlafly Report



VOL. 10, NO. 10, SECTION 1

BOX 618, ALTON, ILLINOIS 62002

MAY, 1977

What's At Stake in The SALT Negotiations?

Civil Defense

A 374-page book that sells 500,000 copies is a best-seller in any language. A book that sold that many copies inside Russia was published this year in the United States. I wonder if it will sell even 1,000 here. The book has no sex appeal. The people pictured in the book are covered with many layers of clothing.

The book is entitled, simply, "Civil Defense." For the Russians, it is a how-to-do-it manual on how to survive a nuclear war. For Americans, it is a manual to dispel the four myths that our government and people have swallowed during the last decade.

1. "Nuclear war is unthinkable." While Americans have engaged in the mass delusion that they could cram the nuclear genie back into the bottle by NOT thinking about it, the Soviets have been doing a great deal of imaginative thinking about it. They think about how to fight a nuclear war, how to win it, and how to survive it.

2. "Detente and disarmament are the key to peace." The Soviets don't buy that American myth at all. The Soviets believe and proclaim that nuclear superiority of one nation is the key to peace -- on their terms, that is. The top Russian military strategist and Marshal of the Soviet Union, A. Grechko, stated shortly before he died: "The greater the combat ability of the armed forces of our country, the more powerfully they are equipped, and the better the personnel are trained, the more peace there will be on earth."

3. "Nuclear war will be deterred by mutual assured destruction." The theory of this myth is that each country will be deterred from striking the other by the knowledge that the other will strike back. The civilian population of each side is, thus, hostage to the other. The trouble is, the Soviets haven't the slightest intention of cooperating in this mutuality, and their book on civil defense proves it. The Soviets believe that one side can carry out a preemptive first-strike so massive that it will preclude the other from striking back at all.

4. "Nuclear war would be so destructive that, once one side pushes the button, it will be the end of the human race." This was the message of such popular books and movies as *On The Beach* and *Dr. Strangelove*. The Soviets reject this theory in toto. Their book on civil defense shows how they plan to save lives in the event of nuclear war.

Dr. Leon Goure of the Center for International Studies at the University of Miami has said that "the United States might lose as many as 100 million people

in the event of a Soviet attack; . . . the Soviet Union, on the other hand, might lose less than it did in World War II." General Daniel James, Jr., Commander-in-Chief of NORAD, recently explained why the United States stands to lose so many: "We have NO [antiballistic missile] defense against ballistic missiles."

The best-selling Soviet book on civil defense explains why substantially all the Russian population will survive. Their civil defense plans are detailed, comprehensive, and expensive. They include urban evacuation, shelter construction, the training of civil defense units and of the general population, and the protection of industry, services, and agriculture.

Civil defense in the United States is best described in one forceful four-letter word: a joke.

The underlying theory of the Soviet civil defense program is that, as Grechko emphasized, "the winning of victory in a war depends in the final analysis on the standard" of the country's preparation for defense against a nuclear attack, and that it "must have the same organized and planned character as the training of the army and navy."

If the Soviet manual on civil defense could become a best-seller in the United States, we might have a chance to replace the false myth of mutual assured destruction with the safety of mutual assured survival.

Paul Warnke Nomination

It's probably a good thing that Paul C. Warnke was appointed our chief arms negotiator for the SALT II Agreements. His record of opposition to our building strategic weapons is so clear that it makes suspect any agreement he might conclude and provides an excellent basis for the Senate's rejecting it out of hand.

Although at the Senate hearings on his nomination Warnke said he rejected the "concept of unilateral disarmament," his published writings clearly prove the contrary. In the spring of 1975, Warnke wrote an article for the magazine *Foreign Policy* called "Apes on a Treadmill." In it he argued that we should go beyond "formal agreements" with the Soviet Union on arms control and "try a policy of restraint, while calling for matching restraint from the Soviet Union."

At the Senate hearings this year, Warnke restated his notion of "reciprocal" or "parallel" restraint in weapons building.

When the Senators questioned Warnke about such statements, as well as about his opposition to most of our major nuclear weapons including the B-1 bomber,

the cruise missile, MIRVs, the ABM, the Trident, and improvements to our Minuteman, he arrogantly replied: "I cannot defend today everything I may have said in the past, and I won't try."

The reason Warnke cannot defend his statement about "restraint" is that no informed person could rationally believe that unilateral military restraints by the United States will result in reciprocal restraints by the Soviet Union.

In the fall of 1958, the United States adopted a major weapons restraint. We unilaterally announced a moratorium on all nuclear tests and stopped our nuclear development. We continued to negotiate in good faith in Geneva to reach a formal agreement.

In September 1961 the Soviets abruptly terminated the nuclear test ban talks and began the largest series of nuclear tests in history. They cheated "big" and ultimately exploded more than 90 bombs, including one that former Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara said would "weaponize" at 100 megatons. Since it took at least six months to prepare for these explosions, the Soviets were obviously cheating during the moratorium, and the Geneva talks were a farce and a trap.

Or, take the restraint shown by the Kennedy Administration in the months preceding the Cuban Missile Crisis in suspending our U-2 surveillance of Cuba. The Soviets did not respond with reciprocal restraint. Instead, the Soviets devoted that year to manufacturing nuclear missiles, transporting them by land and sea halfway around the world, and setting them up on launching pads in Cuba where they were targeted at most major U.S. cities.

Or, take the restraint the United States tried again during the negotiations for SALT I. For two and a half years, we maintained a policy of voluntarily and unilaterally remaining in a weapons freeze while we negotiated in good faith in Helsinki and Vienna. We did not add a single ICBM or a single nuclear-firing submarine to our forces during those years.

The Soviets used those same years to build their margin of superiority over the United States so that, when SALT I was finally signed in 1972, the agreement froze the superior Soviet numbers then existing, namely, 1,618 ICBMs to our 1,054, and 62 nuclear-firing submarines to our 41.

Anyone who truly believes that a U.S. "policy of restraint" will result in "reciprocal restraints by the Soviet Union" is of too limited intelligence or has too little knowledge of history to be entrusted with a post of responsibility.

There remains the possibility that those who ignore the Soviet 30-year record of aggressive response to our unilateral restraint simply do not want the United States to be stronger than the Soviet Union.

Soviet Treaty Violations

Americans should rejoice, not mourn, at the collapse of the strategic arms negotiations in Moscow. It is unlikely that any agreement that could have been reached would have been advantageous to us militarily, and it is almost certain that any agreement would have been disadvantageous psychologically.

Secretary of State Cyrus Vance would not have been so surprised at the Kremlin's abrupt rejection of our proposals if he had kept on his desk a quotation from a great American phrasemaker, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes: "A page of history is worth a volume

of logic."

Our diplomats were apparently relying on their own logic that "the Soviets want an arms control agreement just as much as we do" and "it's in the Soviets' self interest to sign a treaty limiting nuclear weapons." "A page of history," plus Al Smith's still-valid maxim "let's look at the record," would have braced our State Department for their verbal confrontation with Soviet negotiators.

Reliance on nonaggression treaties with the Soviet Union is the most fatal mistake any country can make. In 1964 the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee completed a lengthy study of the Soviet record of treaty violations. The conclusion was that the Soviets have violated every major agreement they ever entered into, except the August 1939 agreement they signed with Adolf Hitler which started World War II.

A separate research study was made by the distinguished historian Dr. Anthony Bouscaren. He listed 93 major treaty violations committed by the U.S.S.R.

Soviet doctrine is wholly in harmony with Soviet practice. As Lenin stated the principle, "Promises are like piecrusts, made to be broken." Stalin's description was just as colorful: "Good works are a mask for concealment of bad deeds. Sincere diplomacy is no more possible than dry water or iron wood."

The speed record for treaty-breaking was set on August 20, 1968 when the Red Army invaded Czechoslovakia with 600,000 troops. The Soviets had signed a treaty guaranteeing Czechoslovakia's "independence" and "freedom" only 17 days before.

Soviet treaty doctrine reached its most sophisticated implementation in the SALT I Agreements of 1972. They were cleverly crafted one-way loopholes that only the Soviets could exploit.

First, the SALT I Agreement restricted only *new fixed-base* ICBM launchers. The Soviets adamantly refused to include *mobile* ICBM launchers. Within several months of the SALT I signing, the Soviets began testing their new SS-16 mobile ICBMs. The United States has no mobile missiles, not even under development.

Second, the SALT I prohibition against a more-than-15-percent enlargement of ICBM silo dimensions was supposed to be a "safeguard" against converting "light" missiles into "heavy" missiles. Immediately after the SALT I signing, the Soviets started testing three new types of ICBMs, all far more powerful than the older missiles they replaced.

Third, SALT I restricted merely the number of *launchers*, not the number of missiles, thereby putting no restraint on reloads. Immediately after SALT I was signed, the Soviets unveiled their new "cold-launch" or "pop-up" technique which makes reloads practical to stockpile. Since we have no cold-launch-type ICBMs and are not developing any, we cannot use reloads.

The Soviets are obviously stalling on SALT II until they can devise a new series of one-way loopholes to bind us, but not them.

Vance's Mission to Moscow

Those who read the Communist press have long been accustomed to the extravagant rhetoric, such as "imperialist capitalist fascist reactionary warmonger," that Soviet writers hurl at American leaders. It came as a surprise, therefore, to hear a brand new charge leveled at U.S. officials by the Soviet newspaper *Izves-*

tia after the Moscow strategic arms negotiations collapsed. The Soviets accused Secretary of State Cyrus Vance of trying to "outwit" the Soviet Union by proposing an agreement that is advantageous to the United States.

That's really a new charge! Amid all the impossible crimes, such as "germ warfare" during the Korean War, that the Soviets have accused us of over the last 30 years, they have never made that accusation before! Maybe that is because none of our previous U.S. negotiators ever did -- either outwit the Soviets, or even try to outwit them.

A good example of how the Soviets have customarily outwitted U.S. negotiators from Franklin Roosevelt to Henry Kissinger was the SALT I Agreement signed by Richard Nixon in 1972. SALT I put a limit on the number of missile launchers, but no limit on the number of missiles. U.S. negotiators apparently thought this was not a significant difference because, when our missiles are fired, the blast off burns out the silo and the launcher is not reuseable.

Immediately after SALT I was signed, however, the Soviets unveiled their new "cold-launch" or "pop-up" technique which makes it practical to reuse their launchers and to stockpile reloads. We have no cold-launch-type ICBMs and are not even developing any, so we cannot use reloads. The Soviet negotiators outwitted us and conned us into signing an agreement cleverly crafted with one-way loopholes which only the Soviets could exploit.

Congressman Jack Kemp has urged Secretary Cyrus Vance to make public the mounting evidence about Soviet refire capability and how it makes a mockery of the limits supposedly agreed upon in SALT I. Congressman Kemp is also urging Secretary Vance to make sure that the Soviets do not circumvent any SALT II ceiling on strategic nuclear delivery vehicles by the subterfuge of building an unlimited number of reloads.

Salt Secrecy and Advisers

Will the American people find out the truth of what is really going on during the SALT II negotiations? Will reporters have the courage to tell us what they discover?

When William Beecher, then a senior military reporter for the *New York Times*, accurately reported what was going on during the SALT I negotiations on the front page of his paper of July 23, 1971, the White House retaliated by wiretapping his telephone. "National security" was the grand rationale for this and the other illegalities connected with Watergate.

But Mr. Beecher didn't give away any designs or blueprints of how our nuclear weapons were made. He merely published a truthful account of what kind of deal our SALT diplomats were offering the Russians. It wasn't what he revealed to the enemy that made Henry Kissinger press the panic button, but what Mr. Beecher revealed to the American people.

I can personally testify to the paranoid secrecy of those SALT I negotiations. In Vienna, when I tried to interview anyone connected with SALT, I found that the entrance was sternly guarded by an American soldier armed with a gun and a host of evasive answers that gave no information whatsoever. When he noticed that my eyes lingered on a floor plan of the building posted in the vestibule, he asked me to wait outside in the cold for my taxicab, instead of in the building paid

for by the American taxpayers.

The first good look the American people had at the SALT I Agreement was when the television cameras photographed the trays of champagne carried in to celebrate the signing on May 26, 1972.

Keeping the American people in the dark about U.S.-U.S.S.R. agreements has long been standard operating procedure for our State Department. Senator Margaret Chase Smith, then the senior Republican on the Senate Armed Services Committee, gave this warning in 1972 about the Moscow Nuclear Test Ban Treaty of 1963: "The American people *still* have not been told the whole story about how the Treaty worked to the Russians' tremendous advantage and to our own vast detriment. . . . In reality, it was a disaster for the American people and a great victory for the Russians who, with their superior nuclear technology, were soon embarked on a military buildup that has no parallel."

If you were negotiating an agreement on medicine, it would seem only logical to have doctors present. If you were negotiating an agreement on construction, it would be essential to have some engineers advising you. If you were negotiating an agreement on legal practice, you surely would need some lawyers at your side.

But somehow, in our military and weapons negotiations with the Soviet Union from 1969 to 1977, U.S. officials never had a military adviser present. Henry Kissinger would not permit it. The Joint Chiefs and their representatives were "included out," to borrow a favorite Sam Goldwynism.

For the drama of the strategic arms negotiation on SALT II, the cast of characters on the Soviet side is substantially the same as in previous conferences. On the American side, however, something new has been added -- a military adviser representing the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

This appears to be one concession that the Carter Administration made in order to win confirmation of Paul Warnke as our chief SALT negotiator. The double confirmation of Warnke for two jobs (U.S. disarmament chief and arms control negotiator) may represent two steps backwards for national security, but the presence of a military adviser is at least one step forward.

Who's Ahead In The Arms Race?

"How Do We Know Who's Ahead?" was the title of the editorial in the *Washington Post* commenting on the exchange of views on the U.S.-U.S.S.R. strategic balance between Major General George J. Keegan, Jr. and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. If the editors of the leading newspaper in our nation's capital can't figure out which statement should be believed, it is no wonder that the American people are confused.

Neither side revealed its sources of information but, since General Keegan recently retired as head of Air Force Intelligence, his current military information is obviously just as reliable as that of the Joint Chiefs.

Newspaper headlines indicated that the Joint Chiefs refuted some of General Keegan's charges, but he replied that the Joint Chiefs really corroborated most of his statements. Instead of concentrating on the differences between the two statements, let us focus on the areas of agreement between them.

1. General Keegan said that, while U.S. military strategy is premised on war-avoidance, Soviet strategy is premised on war-winning and the belief that success in war, even nuclear war, is attainable. The Joint

Chiefs agreed.

2. General Keegan said that the 1972 SALT Treaty was based on the theory of mutual vulnerability to retaliatory attack, which in turn was dependent on our 1972 assumption that the Soviets would not engage in any major civil defense effort. The Joint Chiefs agreed.

3. General Keegan described the tremendous civil defense program of the Soviets since 1972. They have hardened about 35,000 installations including 75 underground command posts in the Moscow area, some of them several hundred feet deep and capable of withstanding 1,000 psf. of blast pressure. General Keegan claimed that the Soviets have built enough mass shelters collated with manufacturing plants to protect more than 60 million people from nuclear attack. The Joint Chiefs questioned only "some of the details."

4. General Keegan estimated that, in case of a nuclear exchange between the United States and Russia, we would lose 35 to 40 Americans per single Soviet fatality. The Joint Chiefs' estimate is 10 U.S. fatalities per one Soviet fatality. It is difficult to see how anyone could call the Joint Chiefs' statement reassuring.

5. General Keegan asserted that the Soviets have hardened 10,000 surface-to-air missile defense sites and are now hardening 4,500 battlefield early warning and ground control intercept radars. The Joint Chiefs said these statements "are essentially correct but overstate the case somewhat."

6. The Joint Chiefs agreed with General Keegan that the Soviet Union has attained superiority over the United States in missile throw-weight and missile megatonnage. While the Joint Chiefs claimed that the United States is still ahead in other things, all experts agree that throw-weight is the best measure of nuclear power.

7. General Keegan concluded that the U.S.S.R. has already achieved military superiority over the United States. The Joint Chiefs agreed that "the U.S.S.R. is engaged in a program designed to achieve such superiority," but said "they have not attained this goal." In other words, the Joint Chiefs believe the Russians are coming, and General Keegan believes the Russians are here.

Whichever version you choose to believe calls for immediate U.S. action to shore up our deficiencies because of the long lead-time required to research, develop, and produce nuclear weapons. As Admiral Hyman Rickover has aptly said, "it's better to sweat in peacetime than to bleed in war."

Chile's Gift To The West

The government of Chile, which has taken some brickbats from the world's press during the past year, is entitled to our thanks for working out the deal under which Vladimir Bukovsky was granted his freedom from imprisonment in the Soviet Union. Bukovsky has important messages for the West, based on his ten years in Soviet prisons and mental asylums, and it is good to know that President Carter and Vice President Mondale are listening.

If the Chilean government hadn't had the foresight to prevent an important Communist named Luis Corvelan from leaving the country, the Soviets never would have been willing to make the trade and let Bukovsky go free. Corvelan's importance to the Kremlin was shown by the fact that, as soon as he arrived in Russia, he was presented with the Order of Lenin by President Nikolai Podgorny.

Although the Chilean government could never redeem itself in the eyes of the left-wing media for the unforgiveable sin of overthrowing a Communist government, there probably is no other way for Chile to recover from the disaster of the Allende years except through a vehicle such as the present junta.

Life under Allende was intolerable for nearly everyone, especially in the last months of his regime. The annual inflation rate was pushing 1000 percent, and Chile suffered severe food shortages for the first time. Many items could not be bought at any price. Housewives had to spend up to six hours a day standing in line for food and other essentials.

During the Allende regime, citizens could not turn on the radio or television without hearing a political speech. Industrial and agricultural production fell off substantially as the Allende government channeled the energies of the workers into political rallies. His comrades would encourage factory workers to strike, and then use the strike as a pretext to take over the factories.

Newspapers that published the truth were closed for weeks and their reporters jailed. Government corruption was everywhere. There was a flourishing black market.

At the end, it was the women who initiated the overthrow of Allende. On December 3, 1973, while Castro was visiting Chile, they staged an impressive demonstration called the March of the Empty Pots. Thousands of women marched through the streets of Santiago beating with spoons on their empty pots and pans. The first demonstration was followed by other Marches of the Empty Pots, during which the women were harassed by tear gas thrown by Allende's police and with potatoes stuck with razor blades hurled by the Communists.

After it became too dangerous to march in public, the women retaliated by leaning out of their windows every evening at ten o'clock and beating on their pots and pans to make a deafening clatter.

The women kept up their demonstrations until, finally, the men had the courage to act and, in a nearly bloodless coup, took control away from Allende, who then committed suicide. The coup came just in time to prevent Allende from sending all the anti-Communists "to the wall" as his buddy Castro had done.

The Chilean people who lived through the economic chaos and political terror of the Allende regime, and who watched how the non-Marxist politicians stood back and did nothing to stop his Communist consolidation of power, are understandably distrustful of all politicians and political parties. They have no desire to return to a political free-for-all at the present time. They prefer the justice and order of today's Chile to the poverty and injustice of a Communist Allende or Castro dictatorship.

The more Bukovsky and Solzhenitsyn talk about life in the Soviet Union, the happier the Chileans will be about their timely decision, and the more we should renew our resolve to make sure that Communism does not take over any more countries in the Western Hemisphere.

The Phyllis Schlafly Report

Box 618, Alton, Illinois 62002

Published monthly by Phyllis Schlafly, Fairmont, Alton, Illinois 62002.

Second Class Postage Paid at Alton, Illinois.

Subscription Price: For donors to the Eagle Trust Fund -- \$5 yearly (included in annual contribution). Extra copies available: 15 cents each; 8 copies \$1; 50 copies \$4; 100 copies \$8.