



The Phyllis Schlafly Report



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The Soviet Military Threat to the Free World

In last month's Report, we reprinted excerpts from four of the many excellent speeches delivered at a European Regional Conference hosted by the British Chapter of the World Anti-Communist League in London on August 29 through September 1. This month, we reprint excerpts from two more of those speeches: one concerning the Soviet military threat in nuclear weapons, and the other describing the Soviet military threat in conventional (non-nuclear) weapons.

The Soviet Nuclear Threat by Phyllis Schlafly

The year 1969 was the year when an American walked on the moon for the first time. It is obvious that such a feat did not "just happen." An achievement of such magnitude required a *plan* of appropriate vision, duration, and financing. First, the idea had to be dreamed of by scientists. Then, a strategy had to be adopted by the politicians: in 1961, President John Kennedy proclaimed our commitment to that objective. Then, the resources had to be allocated: Congress voted the funds. The space capsule and other equipment had to be proof tested, and finally produced. Eight years after President Kennedy's commitment, the moon walk finally took place.

The Soviet Communists have a long-range plan for world conquest. The launching of the first Sputnik in 1957 convinced Soviet scientists that nuclear power married to intercontinental rockets could be the key to fulfillment of their Communist dream. By 1960, the Soviet military elite had developed the strategy of the surprise nuclear strike as a means of sending the "capitalist/imperialists" to their grave.

We know this because the great Soviet intelligence agent, Colonel Oleg Penkovskiy, transmitted to the United States, through his British contact, Greville Wynne, at least 5,000 secret Kremlin documents which set forth this strategy in complete detail. He summarized these official documents in these words:

"A future war will begin with a sudden nuclear strike against the enemy. There will be no declaration of war. Quite to the contrary, an effort will be made to avoid a declaration of war. When conditions are favorable for delivering the first nuclear strike, the Soviet Union will deliver this strike under the pretense of defending itself from an aggressor. . . . About 100 nuclear charges, exploded in a brief period of time in a highly industrialized country . . . will suffice to transform all of its industrial areas and administrative-political centers into a heap of ruins, and the territory into a lifeless desert contaminated with deadly radioactive substances. . . . This plan has been worked out in every detail and is on file in the General Staff. . . . I know the extent of their preparations. I know the poison of the new military doctrine, as outlined in the top-secret 'Special Collection' -- *the plan to strike first, at any*

costs. . . . Imagine the horror of a 50-megaton bomb. . . ."
[Emphasis added.]

Colonel Penkovskiy paid with his life for sending these documents to warn the West of the Kremlin's plans. The U.S. Defense Department has never released these documents to the public, but admitted in writing on February 1, 1972 that they are "still extremely relevant to current Soviet strategic doctrine and war plans."

On January 6, 1961, Khrushchev made a lengthy speech entitled "For New Victories for the World Communist Movement," which was recognized throughout the world as a Soviet pronouncement of major importance. President Kennedy called it "a Red blueprint for eventual world domination." Looking back, we can see clearly that it marked the political approval and adoption of the Soviet strategy for a surprise nuclear attack on the United States. As the speech was to be circulated in the West, it was written in "Aesopian language," and the plan for a nuclear attack on the United States was disguised as a means of "preventing" the United States from attacking the U.S.S.R.

Since the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, the Soviets have been in a massive armaments program without parallel in history. Even after overtaking and passing the United States, the Soviets are continuing to spend more than 40 percent of their Gross National Product on armaments. The weapons which the Soviets are building have *no* usefulness except to destroy or blackmail the United States.

In intercontinental ballistic missiles, the Soviets now have at least 1,618. This means they have 3 ICBMs for every 2 that America has.

In addition to this clear superiority in numbers, the Soviets have a stunning superiority in explosive power, which is variously estimated at from 5-to-1 to 8-to-1. Soviet missiles are fantastically more powerful than the American missiles. The Soviets have 300 SS-9 missiles, each of which carries 25 megatons (or 25 million tons) of explosive power. The United States has nothing

comparable, or even 1/4 as powerful.

The new 1973 edition of the most authoritative naval reference work in the world, *Jane's Fighting Ships*, published in London, states that the Soviet Union has made "staggering advances" during the past year, and now has the most powerful navy in the world. It cites particularly the new Soviet ballistic missile submarine, which will carry 4,000-mile-range missiles, a much greater range than the best U.S. submarine-launched missile.

In addition, the Soviets have extensive, already-deployed anti-missile defenses, anti-bomber defenses, an excellent civil defense program, and a new supersonic strategic bomber.

This is the kind of power now held in the hands of the men in the Kremlin who have never deviated from their goal of world conquest, and have repeatedly proclaimed their desire to assist "history" in eliminating the "capitalist/imperialists" so that Communist "peace" can reign triumphant. This is the kind of power in the hands of men who are not restrained from evil by honor, humanity, the Ten Commandments, treaties, the Golden Rule, or the Marquis of Queensberry rules for a fair fight, but respect only *force* in the attainment of their goals.

U.S. Nuclear Disarmament

Whereas after the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Soviets began to build nuclear weapons of mass destruction at a crash wartime rate, the civilian officials in control of U.S. military defense turned in exactly the opposite direction. When they went to the brink of nuclear war in October 1962, they became scared and pressed the panic button.

These officials secretly abandoned the Eisenhower policy of nuclear superiority and started America on a course of unilateral nuclear disarmament. In the face of the rapidly-expanding Soviet nuclear arsenal, these U.S. officials set about deliberately to weaken the United States and to place our reliance on treaties with the Soviets, instead of on U.S. military strength.

The architect of this policy was a New York investment banker named Paul Nitze. He had spelled it out on April 29, 1960 at the Asilomar National Strategy Seminar, a distinguished gathering of some 500 scholars and strategy experts. He said that, in a poker game with several players, the most dangerous hand is "not the worst hand, but the second-best hand. With the second-best hand, one is tempted to follow up the betting, but if one does, one gets clobbered."

Nitze applied his poker analogy to U.S. nuclear strategy, and came up with his sensational proposal that the United States should get out of the "nuclear betting" by giving up all efforts to achieve "a true Class A nuclear capability," and by scrapping the components of the Class A capability which we then possessed.

His speech might have been dismissed as the wild eccentricity of a man who knew nothing of Communist history or military strategy, but, unfortunately, he was appointed to the Defense Department in 1961. He subsequently rose to be Secretary of the Navy, and finally Deputy Secretary of Defense (the number-two position in the Pentagon). Nitze's theories were fully implemented by Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, who was the top official in our Defense Department from 1961 to 1968.

In pursuit of the Nitze theories, Secretary McNamara scrapped all the American nuclear weapons which he could get by with. He scrapped three-fourths of our multi-megaton missiles (the Atlas and Titan I). He hired electricians and demolition men to disconnect

and dig them up out of their silos and destroy them. He scrapped three-fourths of our strategic bombers, leaving many of them to rot in the sun near Tucson, Arizona. He scrapped our intermediate range missiles (the Jupiter and Thor), and abandoned our advanced missile and bomber bases in Europe, Turkey and North Africa. He scrapped our largest weapon: the 24-megaton bomb.

McNamara refused to build the second 1,000 Minuteman missiles which had been planned by the Eisenhower Administration, and refused to build any multi-megaton missiles at all. He refused to build the B-1 bomber or any advanced strategic bomber. He refused to build any space weapons, mobile missiles, an anti-missile system, or a civil defense system.

McNamara cancelled production of the wonderful new weapons which had been developed by American genius and were ready to go into production. The most notable example of this was the Skybolt, a marvelous aircraft missile which could go 1,000 miles from the plane that released it, and would enable bombers to hit Soviet cities without ever flying over Soviet territory.

Each time that McNamara scrapped a weapon, he would claim it was "obsolete." But he never replaced it with anything else. People with common sense do not abandon their old automobile or appliance until they have a new one to take its place.

"I Defied Congress"

During all those years, McNamara kept stating that the United States was four times stronger than the Russians. The year 1967 was the year when the Soviets achieved parity with the United States in megatonnage delivery capability, and McNamara's lies were beginning to catch up with him. He became a political liability, and President Lyndon Johnson "kicked him upstairs" into a highly remunerative and prestigious job as president of the World Bank. Shortly after he went out of the Defense Department, a reporter for the *Boston Globe* asked him one day how he managed to reduce America's defenses so sharply. Caught off guard, McNamara replied frankly: "I defied Congress, crept as close to the edge of the law as possible and got away with it because of some damn good lawyers in the Pentagon." Since then, he has never given another newspaper interview on defense.

Under the Nixon-Kissinger Administration, the United States has done nothing -- absolutely nothing -- to regain our lost nuclear superiority. We have remained in a strategic weapons freeze for the last six years. We have not built one single additional intercontinental ballistic missile, one single additional Polaris-type submarine, one single new strategic bomber, or one single space weapon since 1967. The Nixon Administration even opposed spending funds to improve the guidance and extend the range of our present missiles because the Soviets might think it "provocative."

The late Prime Minister Winston Churchill gave us this solemn advice which is still timely:

"Sometimes in the past we have committed the folly of throwing away our arms. Under the mercy of Providence, and at great cost and sacrifice, we have been able to recreate them when the need arose. But if we abandon our nuclear deterrent, there will be no second chance. To abandon it now would be to abandon it forever."

Unfortunately, America has abandoned a large part of its nuclear deterrent. The only hope for the continued freedom of America and of what is left of the Free World, or for the liberation of the Captive Nations, is American nuclear power, or what has been called the American nuclear umbrella.

The Soviet Threat in Conventional Weapons

by General Sir Walter Walker

Formerly Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces, Northern Europe, 1969-1972.

The Mutual Reduction of Forces Talks in Vienna (MBFR) have built into them potentially treacherous difficulties. The most significant is that the Warsaw Pact's armies and air forces are 2 or 3 times the combined strength of the NATO forces facing them. Therefore, theoretically, Russia and her satellites should disband 2 or 3 divisions for every one division demobilized by the West. Of course, there is absolutely no chance of this happening.

So far, the horse trading about mutual and balanced force reductions has been concerned less with security than with semantics. Having given way on the semantics by omitting the crucial word "balanced" from the title, and having conceded the point that Hungary should take part only as an observer, the West will now enter the Talks at Vienna in October having already lost the first 2 rounds. . . .

Had the Russians accepted the word "balanced" they would, in fact, have been admitting to the numerical superiority of their conventional forces. So they insisted on taking the "B" out of what was originally called MBFR, and we now have the new title: "Mutual Reductions of Forces and Armaments and Associated Measures in Central Europe," which I shall refer to as MURFAAM for short.

The reason why NATO insisted in the first place that Hungary should be a full participant of the Talks was because she is part of Central Europe, and the 40,000 Russian troops stationed in the country, as well as Hungary's own forces, would have had to be included in the scope of the troop-cutting Talks. But Moscow was adamant that Hungary should have only "observer status." This means that Hungary is now going to be excluded from the area where reductions take place.

Giving in to Russia like this is tantamount to our pretending that there are no Russian troops in Hungary at all, and no Hungarian troops either. We must be mad.

Now that Russia will not have to accept verification of her forces on Hungarian soil, she will be able to keep her troops there and will be able to exert pressure on Yugoslavia when President Tito dies. It will also, of course, make it that much easier for her to send in reinforcements, the object being to get Yugoslavia back into the Warsaw Pact fold.

Before the Vienna Conference can get down to any other details, there are 3 principal points which will have to be resolved as top priority.

First, whose troops are to be included in the slimming process? Should they be only Russian on one side and only American on the other, or should other NATO and Warsaw Pact countries also be involved? . . .

The *second* point to be resolved concerns the geographical areas in which the reductions should be made. Reductions in Central Europe must not diminish security in other areas, for example, the northern and southern flanks of NATO, because the alliance as a whole is indivisible and so, therefore, is its defense. Consequently, reductions should not be exclusively concerned with the Central European front, but must also consider the two NATO flanks. . . .

The *third* and most important point to be resolved at the very beginning, at Vienna, is what up to now has been an insuperable obstacle, namely, verification

procedures. The West must insist on international inspection because, by doing so, we shall know quickly how seriously the Soviet Union intends to treat the negotiations. In the past, proposals for on-site verification have always met with stoic Russian refusal.

Apart from the technical means of verification, such as space observation by satellites and by sensors, there must also be on-the-spot verification by setting up a network of observation posts on either side of the frontiers of the geographical areas covered by MURFAAM, in order to monitor military movements.

NATO must insist that this network of observation posts extend up to the Polish-Russian frontier and, if the Russians will not agree to this, then it will mean quite clearly that they have something to hide, or that they have no intention of negotiating seriously. . . .

As I have already been at pains to emphasize, the problem now is that, even in advance of MURFAAM, the Warsaw Pact countries have been continuing to increase their devastating superiority over the NATO allies in Central Europe in terms of both weaponry and manpower. For instance, a recent NATO report shows that the number of Russian tanks in Central Europe has increased by 6,000 in the past year, that is from 14,000 to 20,000, which gives them a 4-to-1 lead over the NATO Allies.

In the face of all the present talk of detente, why is Moscow carrying this big stick and why is it growing even bigger? The answer is that it is Russia's firm intention to maintain *immediately* available, and *immediately* usable, superior forces in key areas, thus giving her a crushing preponderance and enabling her to speak from a position of strength, to exert political pressure, to threaten and to blackmail. And the role of the Red Army, according to the Russians themselves, is to stand by ready to shake the tree when the rotten fruit are ripe to fall.

Inevitable Soviet Domination?

I would like to emphasize that it is not that *war* is inevitable, but rather that *Soviet domination* will be inevitable if American intervention should be foreclosed. . . .

The whole crux of the problem now is that the time has arrived to stop thinking that NATO can go on sheltering under the American nuclear umbrella which, up to the present, has protected us not only from Soviet threats and intimidation, but also from attack. Now that Russia has caught up, and because the strategic balance is no longer favorable to the United States, it is my firm conviction that the role of the American strategic force will be limited to striking at Russian cities only as a last resort, and then only in retaliation for attack against the continental United States itself.

In other words, the balance of terror is now such that it leaves little room for any other alternative American strategic policy. In plain language, we must face up to the fact that NATO no longer has a coherent strategic doctrine which takes realistic account of the quite extraordinary growth of Soviet strategic forces. And the time is already overdue when we should be developing a viable and credible doctrine. Unless we do, there might one day be a temptation for Moscow, in some yet unforeseen crisis, to launch a conventional attack that would leave the NATO Allies with no choice other than capitulation. . . .

And so in the face of this new and serious situation, what the NATO powers should be negotiating is not balanced *reductions*, but balanced *forces*. The Warsaw Pact forces already outnumber NATO forces by about 2-to-1 in manpower, 4-to-1 in battle tanks, and 2-to-1 in aircraft. These ratios are what NATO's problems are all about. Any cuts aimed at achieving a better balance between East and West would therefore have to be asymmetrical, that is to say, with higher percentage cuts on the Warsaw Pact side than on the NATO side. This is unrealistic because of the obvious difficulties of persuading the Russians to reduce their forces more than the West. . . .

What it all really boils down to is that, it would be unrealistic to negotiate MURFAAM unless the Warsaw Pact forces had *first* been unilaterally reduced to a level approximating that of all the NATO and French forces combined. Failing this, for every division removed by the West, 3 divisions would have to be withdrawn by Russia and her satellites. . . .

Russia enjoys many indirect and hidden advantages, most of which are not apparent to the ignorant and uninitiated. But NATO negotiators must be careful to bear them in mind throughout the Vienna Talks. Let me mention the more important ones:

First, the Warsaw Pact standing forces are fully equipped, highly trained and ready to go with the minimum of preparation. They are virtually on a war footing this very day. They practice operations of all kinds in winter and in summer, and the minimum army conscript service is 2 years. The Russian divisions and the East German divisions are stationed much nearer the border than are NATO's.

Second, the organization, logistics, equipment and weapons of the Warsaw Pact forces are standardized of Russian design, whereas NATO forces are armed with a variety of weapons. The Russian quality is excellent and modernization is continuous and carefully programmed. There are no chaotic cutbacks caused by parliamentary elections or adverse motions in Parliament. . . .

Third, every democracy is caught in the same dilemma. We spend 66 percent of our defense budget on pay, housing and welfare. This leaves only 34 percent for all the hardware, spares, research and development, etc. Russia spends only 25 percent of her enormous defense budget on personnel, leaving 75 percent for hardware.

Fourth, the Warsaw Pact forces can concentrate at will in any area in which they wish to bring pressure to bear, and they operate under a unified command, and are helped by the vast number of airfields available.

Fifth, they would be operating on short internal land lines of communication. Neither mobilization of men and material, nor reinforcements, nor supplies would constitute a major problem. Not for them the hazardous transocean journey from the United States at a time when hours and minutes would be vital. The fact that they are able to switch very quickly and extremely effectively was demonstrated in Czechoslovakia. They have the ability to move under cover of darkness and, in very short periods of 12 or 24 hours, change the whole weight of their attack.

Sixth, they are a closed society, with no need to heed public opinion; with no opposition in Parliament, and therefore no need to become involved in time-consuming political deliberations. We would be foolish indeed to think that moral scruples would play any part in the plans of the Communists who are firm believers in the end justifying the means.

Seventh, with a controlled press, censorship and rigorous security, they are able to maintain secrecy and

conceal their intentions until the latest possible moment.

Eighth, and most important of all, they hold the initiative. Therefore, they can apply their superior strength wherever they choose, whenever they choose, and without giving us nearly so much warning as our politicians fondly think we will get. . . .

Resurfacing of the Soviet Military

Another big advantage that has recently reared its ugly head is that, after a gap of 15 years, the Red Army top brass and secret police are now back again at the Moscow top table. This means that external defense and internal security have been elevated to a central position in the making of policy.

You will recollect that before that gilded glamour boy, Brezhnev, boarded his aircraft for the West -- this time to borrow, not to bury -- he considered it prudent to shake up and revamp his Politburo. Up popped Marshal Grechko, the 69-year-old defense minister and architect of the Czechoslovak invasion; and up popped KGB Chief Andropov, dedicated to repression at home and espionage and subversion abroad. . . .

What is so ominous for the West is that henceforth the Kremlin's chief professional adviser in East-West negotiations is the very man who sent Russian troops into Berlin in 1953 to crush a workers' uprising, and Soviet tanks into Prague in 1968 to put down a national revolution. Grechko will ensure that "detente" does not get out of control, indeed, it will be handled more cautiously and with even more concern for the military strength and internal cohesion of the Warsaw Pact. In short, Grechko can be relied on to protect the Red Army's interests in any "detente." That will mean preserving its *crushing superiority* on the ground, for *domestic* as well as *international* purposes. . . .

Although it is no longer fashionable to talk about Winston Churchill's "Iron Curtain," it still exists: an endless girdle of walls, wire, watchtowers, fortifications and mine-fields, right across Germany through the very heart of Europe. Nor is it fashionable to talk about outright Russian aggression, yet the tanks which relentlessly crushed plaintive efforts to obtain freedom in Budapest, Prague and Warsaw, are still there and in ever-increasing numbers.

The fashionable words are now detente and disarmament, and yet the Russians who bellow about them loudest continue to pump billions into their armament program. . . . The unsmiling border guards continue to chalk up on their scoreboards the hundreds of killed and wounded whom they have shot in the back. . . .

My final word is this. I have come to the conclusion that officialdom is not telling the truth, or releasing relevant information on Soviet policies. There is not a shadow of doubt that Russia is interested only in one thing: continuing conflict; and her concept of "detente" is limited only to the absence of a *major* war. Detente is merely a tactical device to overthrow the West at minimum risk. We must insist on concrete measures of detente. Not until detente has been turned into "entente" will it have any practical meaning at all. Europe must wake up and lift its nose beyond the price of butter.

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