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The Nixon Administration's First 1,000 Days: One Legislator's Appraisal

SPEECH

OF

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OF OHIO

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

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Mr. ASHBROOK. Mr. Speaker, on April 8, 1957, Senator BARRY GOLDWATER rose on the Senate floor to criticize the spending policies of the Eisenhower administration. At that time, the \$71.8 billion budget was the largest peacetime budget in history. In the book, "Portrait of an Arizonan" by Edwin McDowell, he is quoted as saying:

I felt badly about it but it was something I felt I had to do. After all, we Republicans had promised a change from the big-spending policies of the Democrats and we were simply promising more of the same.

There is a concern among many of us today just as Senator GOLDWATER felt and expressed in 1957.

Mr. Speaker, my concern today is even greater. The world is far different from what it was in 1957. Our military superiority has dwindled. Inflation, only warned about then, is a reality. We are virtually on bended knees asking concessions from our erstwhile allies. Yet, the administration today charts a course much different than the change we promised in 1968, even though we promised changes a weary electorate sought.

The evidence to back this contention is extensive and well-nigh irrefutable, and the object of this speech in part will be to set this evidence on the record. At home and abroad, the Nixon administration has continued and even accelerated the drift of national policies to the left in many areas rather than moving the Nation toward a moderate conservatism which supporters of the President in 1968 had been led to expect. The President has made occasional forays to the right and been free with conservative language, but the record overall supports the celebrated dictum of liberal Senator HUGH SCOTT of Pennsylvania:

We get the action, and the conservatives get the rhetoric.

From the President's announcement of a revolutionary welfare program in a conservative-sounding speech to John Mitchell's advice to civil rights leaders to "watch what we do, not what we say," presentation of liberal policies in the verbal trappings of conservatism has become a distinguishing mark of this administration.

It is difficult at this stage to recall the statements the President made about domestic and foreign policy during the 1968 campaign—so abruptly has he departed from so many assertions and so great has been the alteration in political climate as a result of his reversal. Among other things, in 1968, Mr. Nixon said repeatedly that we needed a dispersal of Federal power, demanded restraints on Federal spending, flatly opposed wage and price controls, called for abolition of the Job Corps, attacked the idea of a guaranteed annual income, promised an end to the surtax, and so forth. Given the various nuances and balancing phrases, his domestic presentation was strongly conservative.

In foreign affairs, the story was much the same. Mr. Nixon attacked the idea of defense parity with the Soviets and said America must strive for strategic superiority, opposed credits to nations dealing with North Vietnam, recommended a tightening economic quarantine on Cuba, said Communist China should be neither admitted to the United Nations nor granted American recognition until it proved itself a law-abiding power, and in general assailed the incumbent administration for policies of cold war weakness. His stand on these issues, despite a softening of the old anti-Communist image, was in keeping with his reputation as a knowledgeable opponent of communism and attuned to the concerns of his conservative supporters.

On most of these issues, the President as of 1971 has reversed his stands of 1968. In matters of domestic policy, the most notable feature of President Nixon's performance has been his readiness not merely to continue but to expand upon the social and economic programs of his Democratic predecessors.

During the early phases of his administration, the President attempted marginal restraints on Democratic spending policies and concomitant long-term expansion of the money supply. Even here, however, the effort was half-hearted at best—an attempt to practice economy around the edges while refusing to challenge and, therefore, tacitly sanctioning the revolutionary domestic programs launched by the two previous administrations.

The first 3 years of this administration have produced enormous budgetary deficits which will amount by current estimates to something like \$60 billion—a

peacetime record for the American Government. Administration brochures boast that we are for the first time spending more money for social welfare than for defense. And, earlier this year, the President himself asserted that—

I am now a Keynesian in economics.

The \$229 billion Federal budget and potential \$30 billion deficit for this fiscal year are not, it should be stressed, immutable facts of nature which the administration is powerless to change. While spending authorizations must be voted by Congress, the administration has many weapons at its disposal—including its original budget recommendations, its lobbying and liaison activities on the Hill, its influence with Republican Congressmen, and the Presidential veto. With only sporadic exceptions such as the veto of the child development program, these weapons have not been used in behalf of economic conservatism; on many occasions, indeed, they have been thrown into the balance to insure that radical-liberal programs were continued or strengthened.

Also, the President has proposed what only can be termed a radical family assistance plan which could double the number of people on welfare. He has come up with his own variant of "national health insurance"; launched a determined effort to override local zoning and building codes; and proposed an enlargement of Federal aid programs in a variety of fields, including higher education. We are informed that in several of these cases the President himself was indifferent to what happened to such programs—or even mildly opposed to their continuation—but that such administration appointees as Donald Rumsfeld, George Romney, and Daniel Moynihan insisted that the programs be continued and that the President simply acquiesced in these urgings, a passive victim of zealous subordinates. Since the subordinates were there because the President appointed them, however, this explanation does not alter the responsibility for what happened or conceal the fact that the President's campaign pledges on such issues have been flagrantly violated.

The President has capped the performance with his program of peacetime wage and price controls—a scapegoating tactic historically employed by inflationist governments to blame their own malfeasance on private citizens, a policy which he himself had repeatedly denounced on previous occasions. Nothing I am afraid

better symbolizes his flight from conservative principle than this basic reversal of policy. The best commentary on the whole program is provided, in fact, by the President's statement of June 17, 1970:

Now, here is what I will not do. I will not take this nation down the road of wage and price controls, however politically expedient that may seem. Controls and rationing may seem like an easy way out, but they are really an easy way in—to more trouble, to the explosion that follows when you try to clamp a lid on a rising head of steam without turning down the fire under the pot. Wage and price controls only postpone a day of reckoning. And in so doing, they rob every American of a very important part of his freedom.

The area of domestic performance in which this administration has represented a clear improvement is in the realm of the "social issues"—law and order, social engineering, permissiveness, and so on. By far the most widely acclaimed of the President's initiatives has been his approach to the Supreme Court. Warren Burger and Harry Blackmun, his first two appointments, appear on the record to date as moderate "social issue" conservatives, and Nixon's more recent appointees, Lewis Powell and William Rehnquist, seem even more so. There is no question that court nominations by a Democrat President would have been far to the left of those selected by President Nixon, and this is an obvious consolation to conservatives. The court is exhibit A in the argument that conservatives should support the President.

Unfortunately, exhibit B is hard to come up with.

For example, while the President has talked against busing, the Justice Department has pressed suits requiring busing and the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare has issued orders requiring school districts to adopt racial balance formulas.

If the President's domestic performance is bad, the foreign policy record, save possibly for Vietnam, is far from what we had a right to expect in 1968. The principal impact of the President's cold war conduct has been to confirm and deepen the illusion of detente—again in direct defiance of his statements across the years and many specific pledges made when running for the Presidency 3 years ago. Considering the fact that his public reputation was made as a tough and knowledgeable anti-Communist, this has been his principal apostasy. And, because it involves the question of our national survival, it is also the most frightening.

Again, there are aspects of the administration's policy with which conservatives have found themselves in agreement—chiefly his refusal to bow to frenetic pressures for an immediate pull-out in Vietnam and his limited foray into Cambodia and Laos for the sake of Vietnamization. While the Vietnamization formula seems successful at the present time, one cannot help but wonder how long it will remain viable as the administration begins to conciliate Red China and permits that Communist monolith to enter the power vacuum being created by our rapid withdrawal of forces from Southeast Asia.

The truly disturbing item, however, is the President's apparent belief that he

can somehow cut a deal with the rival Communist powers of Red China and Russia as is evidenced by a multitude of actions, including his scheduled summit meetings in Peking and Moscow, and the SALT talks.

Stepping up of the volume of our trade with Communist countries everywhere, including a truck factory for Moscow, presiding over a further deterioration of our nuclear defense arsenal; standing by while Communist China entered the United Nations and Nationalist China was expelled; and in general extending the strategy of conciliation and retreat which constituted the Kennedy-Johnson foreign policy would be some of the actions we cannot possibly defend.

During the 1968 campaign, Mr. Nixon said of the Soviet Union, Communist China, and the Communist nations of Eastern Europe:

I believe, as far as those countries are concerned, the United States should not provide any credits or anything that could be treated as, or classified as, aid to those nations if they persist in trading or aiding the enemy in North Vietnam.

Now, in a \$140-million deal with Moscow, his administration is providing food grains to the Soviets at less than the cost of production. On a trip to the U.S.S.R., Commerce Secretary Maurice Stans told Red trade officials:

Restrictions have been reduced greatly in the last year and we are in the constant process of reducing them.

That statement is supported by estimates that U.S. licenses for export of potentially defense-related items to the Soviets increased tenfold in 1971—\$1.2 billion compared to \$118 million the previous year.

Of particular interest, in view of the President's statement about Soviet bloc aid to North Vietnam, has been the administration's effort to secure construction of a massive truck factory complex by American firms for the Soviets. The Commerce Department has issued a host of licenses for this deal, despite stated objections to such transactions by the Pentagon and despite the fact that, according to an estimate last spring by U.S. News & World Report, the Kremlin is supplying some 350 trucks a month to Hanoi—trucks used to transport the materials of war down the Ho Chi Minh Trail for use in combat against American forces.

While building up its trade with the Communists, this administration continued the Johnson-instituted boycott of anti-Communist Rhodesia. This policy, allegedly required to keep faith with Britain and adhere to the dictates of the United Nations, had the result of cutting off American access to Rhodesian chrome, a metal necessary to our defenses. The deficiency was supplied by purchasing chrome from the Soviet Union—at vastly inflated prices. The absurdity of the procedure prompted a bipartisan majority in Congress to vote through a commonsense requirement that importation of materials from an anti-Communist nation could not be barred so long as the same materials were imported from a Communist one. Until Congress moved, our administration had done nothing to alter this self-defeating policy.

Add to this the disaster area of our China policy—the master strategem by which the President and his chief foreign policy adviser, Henry Kissinger, managed to exalt Communist China in the councils of the world, acquiesce in Peking's admission to the United Nations, and permit our ally Nationalist China to be ousted. In the wake of this debacle, the administration helped inspire a surge of anger against the world body—anger which was thoroughly justified, but which, from the President's standpoint, had the advantage of diverting public displeasure from himself.

The administration's responsibility is manifest on several counts: The general softening of U.S. policy toward Peking, initiated by the President; the administration's acquiescence in Red China's entry, ignoring all legal questions concerning Peking's inadmissibility; its capitulation on the legal issue of whether the veto power could be used to block Red China's admission; Mr. Nixon's refusal to use our considerable economic leverage to bring the U.N. into line and, finally, the exquisite timing by which Mr. Kissinger was dispatched on yet another prestige-conferring trip to China precisely at the time the U.N. was getting ready for its crucial vote.

These maneuvers have been explained to unhappy conservatives as an example of realpolitik necessary to serve our self-interest. Just how our interests or those of the free world have been served, however, is difficult to determine. On the readings to date, our China policy has undercut the effective anti-Communist forces in Asia—not only the regime of Chiang Kai-shek on Taiwan, but also the anti-Communist Sato government in Japan and in South Korea. The President's strategy has dispirited anti-Communist leaders throughout the Pacific, and given the friends of Communist China enormous impetus. The administration has handed the Communists a monumental victory, gratuitously and with barely a sign of struggle.

If the China debacle has been the President's most specular cold war failure, it may not be the most serious. The most grievous default of the administration has apparently occurred in the realm of defense. Again inspection shows that the White House has made marginal gestures to conservative opinion, but these have been marginal indeed. The substance of his defense policy has been fully in keeping with the liberal approach to matters of defense and, insofar as such things are measurable, to the left of the stance assumed by President Johnson.

Long since abandoned in the administration's defense policy is any mention of "superiority" or strategic "edge." Instead, the talk is of "sufficiency"—a notion difficult to distinguish from the Johnsonian concept of "parity" attacked in 1968. Little if anything has been done to upgrade the condition of our arsenal which, as pointed out in a special study compiled by Dr. William Schneider for the American Conservative Union, represents in its delapidation a clear and present danger to American security.

As Dr. Schneider notes, our Strategic Air Command is the merest shadow of its former self—some 450 long-range bomb-

ers compared to 2,200 medium and long-range planes a few years back. There has been a simultaneous slowdown in the development of our missile technology, particularly antimissile defenses.

In the two previous administrations, disarmament theoreticians like Walt Rostow, Jerome Wiesner, and a coterie attached to the Institute for Defense Analysis devised the notion that we must get rid of weapons systems "provocative" to the Communists or "destabilizing" to the cold war balance of terror. The major point of this theory was that we should not try to be more powerful than the Communists, and that anything we could do to avoid the strengthening of our defenses was all to the good. Considered particularly anathema in this conception were manned bombers—first strike weapons and therefore "provocative"—and antimissile defenses, which by protecting our own people from potential destruction would make the Communists uneasy. Far better, from the standpoint of the disarmament buffs, to reassure the Communists by not protecting our own people from potential annihilation—a move which has the added benefit of keeping our population terrorized and therefore receptive to disarmament.

These notions are so close to clinical lunacy that it is hard to believe any administration, even one controlled by liberal Democrats, would predicate a national policy upon them. Still harder to believe, but true nonetheless, is that a supposedly conservative and anti-Communist administration would adopt such ideas and make them the basis for its policy as well. This is clearly indicated by the President's stance on ABM, formulated exactly along the lines of disarmament lobby reasoning. The President in his March 14, 1969, statement announcing replacement of the Johnson Sentinel program with the Safeguard system stressed that we were forsaking population defense and that Safeguard therefore was not "provocative." The point was driven home by former Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard in an appearance before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

Safeguard, Mr. Packard asserted, had nothing to do with population defense. It was planned instead "to emphasize defense of our retaliatory forces. Further, those Safeguard sites planned for initial deployment in ICBM fields defend some of the most sparsely populated portions of the United States." As for protests against multiple-targeted reentry vehicles, Mr. Packard pointed out that—

The small size of the MIRVed warheads resulted in a lower capability in our forces to destroy Soviet retaliatory forces than could otherwise have been the case.

Moreover, he disclosed, "this administration made a deliberate decision not"—note, not—"to improve the accuracy of our MIRV . . . to what was and is technically possible."

Thus we make certain our population is not protected from enemy attack, while simultaneously insuring that our own weapons cannot inflict too much damage on the enemy. Thus we talk of standing firm against Communist aggression in Asia, while moving to provide the Kremlin with implements required to prose-

cute that aggression. And thus we speak of peace and international amity while presiding over the admission of the world's principal aggressor into the United Nations.

It is argued that while the President shares conservative concerns on the issues, he is faced with intractable conditions. He must confront, in the first place, a hostile Congress which wants to go much further in the liberal-left direction than does the administration, and the administration's half-measures are intended to prevent even worse things from occurring. In addition, there is the fact that certain things must be done for political reasons even though President Nixon himself may not like them. There is the further fact that the President has to face up to hostile pressure from the media and from marching mobs, and that some of these things must be done to placate these forces. The invariable clincher is that any imaginable alternative to what the President is doing would be infinitely worse, so conservatives should back the President even as he is heading to the left.

On examination, each of these extenuations for the President's policies appears to be mistaken. It is not true, for example, that many of the Chief Executive's leftward initiatives are forced on him by a hostile Congress. On several occasions, indeed, as my colleagues are well aware, there have been indications that Congress was quite willing to take a conservative stand on some issue and representatives of the administration have stepped in to prevent such an outcome.

This is exactly what happened in 1969 when there was considerable sentiment here in Congress for permitting Governors to have effective veto power over poverty projects in their States. Heavy lobbying by Donald Rumsfeld and a resulting cross-over of some Republican votes prevented this reform from occurring. As a result of the administration performance, according to my esteemed colleague from Oregon (Mrs. GREEN):

Congress did not achieve a single change in the . . . program in terms of administration—in terms of structure—in terms of all the abuses that have occurred—and in terms of what I think are outright violations . . . of congressional intent . . . The only change in the bill was to say to OEO, "We will give you an additional \$295 million to spend in the way you want to spend it."

Equally to the point, Mr. Nixon has repeatedly failed to use the considerable leverage of his office in other ways. Assuming a continuing tension between the White House and Congress, the obvious course for a President seeking maximum conservative results would be to make vigorous demands—a total end to OEO, deep slashes in Federal spending, a "thick" ABM, and so on. The resulting compromise with the legislature would fall somewhere between the President's view and that of Congress. This administration's course has been quite different—the White House proposes its own variant of liberalism to be matched against the liberalism of Congress, with the resulting compromise being a matter of administrative detail rather than of substance.

The nature of this process has been well stated by the National Observer, which comments that—

Unlike earlier conflicts of ideology in Washington, there is now no fundamental dispute over commitments, only a narrow haggling over techniques. There are artificial liberal positions and less liberal positions, with the pulling and hauling largely between Senate Democrats and the White House, but the conservatives have been foreclosed from debate. Because the liberals have been surprisingly efficient in organizing the loyal opposition, congressional conservatives have no choice but to join in support of the somewhat "less liberal" White House.

The argument that the President must head left for political reasons is even less persuasive. If the things he is doing are what the American people want, and if these are imperative steps for a presidential politician—why did he not campaign on them? Or, conversely, since he campaigned on exactly the opposite premises while his Democrat opponent campaigned on issues approximating the President's current stand, why did not the American people elect the gentleman from Minnesota?

The excuses offered for this administration's performance leave out yet another factor, perhaps the most important of all—the factor of presidential leadership. While on certain matters like taxation and rising prices public attitudes seem relatively stable, on others they are responsive to cues provided by the White House. This is particularly true on foreign policy and defense questions where information levels are low, issues complex, and the whole business remote from the man in the street. On issues such as these, strong presidential advocacy can shape and alter public opinion.

In the case of Red China, to take the obvious instance, there was little or no pressure of public opinion on this administration to pursue a course of appeasement. To the extent that the American people had any settled notions on the issue, they were decidedly the reverse. And, of course, on the defense philosophy professed by the President and outlined in detail by former Deputy Defense Secretary Packard, there would be massive consternation among the American people if they clearly understood that their leaders were leaving them exposed to potential attack in order to "reassure" the Soviets.

One sad consequence of the administration's policies has been the effective silencing of all but a small handful of conservative spokesmen in the Congress. I have spoken out often but, unfortunately, I have been joined very few times, particularly on the other side of the Capitol. What many viewed with alarm under President Johnson they now seem willing to point with pride to under a Republican President. This, I fear, is one of the basic reasons why the public places us in such collective low esteem. I still believe it is in the best American tradition to speak out, even when it is in criticism of your own party's actions. I have not and will not retreat from that role, regardless of the consequences.

If a Democratic administration, for example, had proposed the family assistance plan, one could have counted on

most Republicans in Congress—and certainly all of the conservatives—to have opposed it solidly, and in combination with the Southern Democrats perhaps to have brought about its defeat. With the same proposal coming from a Republican President, GOP opposition was largely nullified and the measure passed the House with the majority of my Republican colleagues voting in its favor, 93 to 83 to be exact.

This effect is nowhere more apparent than in the silence of conservatism's political leaders. This result, of course, cannot be blamed entirely on the President. Conservative leaders could speak out against his policies if they chose to do so, but they have chosen otherwise. While each has voiced muted disagreement with administration programs here and there, the sum total of this dissent has amounted to very little. My good friend, Senator GOLDWATER, for his part, has not only generally endorsed the President's moves but gone out of his way to criticize rank and file conservatives who speak up in opposition. In a political sense, therefore, this administration has left American conservatives bereft of big-name political leadership. There have been some countervailing efforts here in the House and freshman Senator JAMES BUCKLEY of New York has made a notable effort to speak out on some of the principal issues on which the White House has veered left, but at this point such efforts can hardly overcome the almost unanimous silence of other conservative leaders.

The assumption of the congressional and other leaders who tell conservative rank and filers to support the President appears to be that, by staying close to the administration, withholding criticism, and not breaking party ranks, they can maximize their influence and help steer the White House on a conservative course. While that approach may be useful in getting occasional appointments for political friends, where larger policy questions are concerned it would on the record seem to be almost completely mistaken. With the evidence we have concerning the decisionmaking process in the White House, such an approach amounts indeed to a virtual suicide pact for conservatives.

Two episodes detailed by Rowland Evans and Robert Novak in their new book, "The Nixon Years," give some good insight into the workings of this administration. One concerned the announced White House policy on food stamps which were supposedly to be abandoned under FAP. However, the President's consultant on hunger, Prof. Jean Mayer, threatened to quit the administration unless food stamps were restored; he made similar threats concerning a conference on hunger the administration wanted to avoid. In both cases, the Nixon regime backed down under the threat of Professor Mayer's attack.

A similar story on a larger scale was written at the time of Cambodia-Kent State when the President went on the air with his "tough" line, followed up by describing some student demonstrators as "bums." He then changed course under the onslaught of the marchers and the liberal media. He ended up attempting

to "rap" with "the kids" during a dawn foray to the Lincoln Memorial and asserting in a press conference that—

I agree with everything that they are trying to accomplish.

The hard line turned to soft line overnight, only to wander back to hard line again when the immediate pressures eased. These are, I think, instructive episodes.

They tell us, for one thing, that the do-not-make-waves approach of conservative political leaders is precisely wrong. The President's continued assurance that he will have the support of these leaders, no matter what, makes it certain he will move left to absorb the insistent pressures pounding in from that quarter. Since almost all of the noted conservative leaders have virtually stated they will not jump ship even when the President engages in the most overt liberal initiatives, the President may assume he has the conservatives in his pocket. He is free to move as far left as he wishes in order to placate the liberals. The performance of the conservative leaders is thus, in itself, a major contribution to the leftward drift of the administration.

There is also another curious phenomenon here in the Washington landscape: The pervasive defeatism which afflicts the administration and its congressional Republican supporters. There is plenty of evidence to suggest such defeatism is unjustified. There is to begin with the fact that Richard Nixon and George Wallace in 1968, both running on emphatically antiliberal platforms, between them secured no less than 57 percent of the vote. That outcome was universally and correctly interpreted as a stinging repudiation of the liberal way of doing things in Washington and a mandate for moving the country back to the right. If we had nothing but that statistic to go on, we would have reason to believe that Washington's assumption of inevitable liberal victory is mistaken. But in fact we have much more.

There are many other indices which show liberalism to be a declining political force, but a few examples will have to suffice. We may note, for one thing, the explosive growth of the suburbs and their army of homeowning, taxpaying voters who do not want handouts from Government, but who do want restraint on Government spending. In the 1970 census, for the first time in our history, the suburban population outstripped in total size the population of the central cities. Repeated election results show these suburban voters can be successfully appealed to by a Republican Party which stands for economy in Government and low taxes.

We may note as well the complementary fact that members of labor unions are more and more susceptible to conservative appeal on economic as well as "law and order" grounds. Much of the suburban population explosion involves members of unions, and an AFL-CIO survey in the late 1960's disclosed no less than 50 percent of the union's members now live in the suburbs, and that as economic status and place of residence have changed so have political attitudes. Anyone who works with union members on a

regular basis can testify to this alteration from his own experience. The political opportunities for an effective conservative appeal presented by this change are truly enormous.

These demographic generalizations are fully supported by recent surveys of public opinion. Americans are up in arms against excessive spending, welfarism, and taxation—to the point where seven out of 10 would sympathize with a tax revolt and Louis Harris surmises that—

The prevailing mood of New Deal days . . . has now reversed almost 180 degrees.

That conclusion is underscored by the surveys of Dr. Gallup, which show the level of popular anxiety over big government as "the biggest threat to the country in the future" more than tripled during the decade of the 1960's—from 14 percent in 1960 to 49 percent in 1967.

Harris and Gallup surveys likewise reveal a steady increase in explicitly conservative sentiment in the country. In the wake of the 1968 election, Harris found his respondents choosing the designation "conservative" to describe themselves by a 2-to-1 margin over the designation "liberal"—38 to 17 percent. In the spring of 1970, Gallup found for the first time in 30 years that the self-designated conservatives in his poll results far outdistanced the self-designated liberals. In Gallup's inquiry, the conservatives outstripped the liberals by a margin of 52 to 34.

Such data, taken together, present a major opportunity to the Republican Party and the conservative cause. With effective leadership they could be molded into a powerful political majority, and it was widely assumed that the President as politician would sense this fact and act to assemble the constituent elements of the latent new majority. The result of such leadership could well have been a period of conservative and Republican ascendancy to match the Democratic era that followed upon the victory of Franklin Roosevelt. Instead, the net result of this administration may be to frustrate for years to come the emergence of the conservative majority.

The lessons to be drawn and the course of policy for rank-and-file conservatives are nonetheless clear. It is apparent first of all that conservatives do have the power even now to alter the conduct of our Government for the better—if they will use it. Exercise of that power depends on throwing off the delusion that the American conservative right must be bound hand and foot to this administration. The hope of conservatism, and of the Nation in turn, rests not in supporting the President's liberal policies but in opposing them through all effective and proper political means.

There will be criticism of any course of action which criticizes this administration, even I fear, from many who nonetheless know that the future of our party and of the Nation demands our earnest efforts to reassert our basic historic party mandate, our principles, platforms, and promises. Recall the words of a great man who properly noted not too long ago:

Robert A. Taft: "If you permit appeals to unity to bring an end to criticism, we endanger not only the constitutional liberties of our country, but even its future existence."