



The Phyllis Schlafly Report



VOL. 5, NO. 5

Box 618, ALTON, ILLINOIS 62002

DECEMBER, 1971

The Problem Of The Republican Incumbent Who Turns Liberal After He Is Elected

A major dilemma confronting Republicans today can be described as "the problem of the Republican incumbent who turns liberal after he is elected."

This strange transformation can take place on any level of government, from President to State Legislator. A man who is apparently a traditional Republican is elected to office by dint of the diligence, the dollars, and the dedication of hard-working volunteers who believe in the candidate and his promises.

Then one day, his hat suddenly isn't big enough for him. He travels to Washington and makes a sharp left turn. He becomes afflicted with a contagious malady known as Potomac Fever. He loses touch with the folks back home. He starts voting for huge foreign giveaways, aid to countries shipping weapons to North Vietnam, higher taxes, bigger Federal deficits, unlimited welfare and other domestic handouts, and tight restrictions on the free market. He abandons his campaign promises, defends such absurd policies as buying inferior expensive chrome from Soviet Russia instead of superior and cheaper chrome from Rhodesia, and answers his constituents with form letters because he is too busy on the cocktail circuit.

Crucial votes come up, and he votes the wrong way. This happens once, then again and again. At first, the voters don't believe what is happening, but ultimately they must face the fact that the man they elected no longer represents their best interests.

Now comes the question of what to do about it. There is one school of thought which argues that, in the interest of Party harmony and the election of all Republican candidates, we should not oppose the incumbent in the primary or convention. We should all close ranks and back the incumbent because, "He's the lesser of two evils," or "We must not be divisive," or "At least he is better than a Democrat," or "Consider the alternative . . ." This school of thought thus puts loyalty to the Republican label ahead of loyalty to Republican principles.

There is a contrary school of thinking emerging today among traditional Republicans which calls for direct opposition to a Republican incumbent who has turned liberal after he was elected. There are five basic motivations that bring Republicans to this view. These Republicans, thus variously motivated, provide a new coalition of formerly hardcore Republicans who are determined to take direct action. Here are the arguments:

Country Above Party

1. We must put Country above Party. Theodore Roosevelt expressed this view when he said, "Our loyalty is due solely to the Republic; it is unpatriotic not to tell the truth, whether about the President or anyone else."

According to this view, while many issues such as domestic spending may be compromised in the face of political reality, the Soviet missile superiority today threatens the very survival of America, and our defense against it never can be compromised. Either a politician -- or a President -- is *for* the defense of America against its enemies, or he is not. Unfortunately, there is no middle course in a world in which the Kremlin dictators still seek world conquest and have built the nuclear weapons to achieve their longtime goal.

Keep Faith With Voters

2. We must keep faith with the voters. The 1968 Republican Platform expressed this view very well: "We emphasize trust and credibility. We have pledged only what we honestly believe we can perform. In a world where broken promises become a way of life, we submit that a nation progresses not on promises broken but on pledges kept."

According to this view, the Republicans who raised the funds and rang doorbells, asking citizens to vote Republican, did so on the promise that the Republican Party and its candidates stood for certain principles of national security, fiscal integrity, and a pro-American foreign policy. Unless we are going to put ourselves in a class with the cynical statement of windy Wendell Willkie that his pre-election pledges were just "campaign oratory," we have a moral obligation to fulfill our promises. If the Republican incumbent betrayed us, then we have an obligation to the voters to replace him with one who will keep faith with our pledges.

"The Democracy of the Party"

3. We believe that "the primary is the democracy of the Party." The primary is where the rank and file of the Party can freely express their views -- on candidates, on principles, and on policies. This is the arena where we find out if the incumbent still represents those who elected him and has sufficient support from his own people to win reelection--or if he is doomed to defeat and will drag the rest of the ticket down with him.

According to this view, the pragmatic political

question is: can the Republican-incumbent-turned-liberal be reelected? When a national survey shows, for example, that 32% of grassroots Republicans who voted for Richard Nixon in 1968 will *not* vote for him in 1972, is the incumbent an electable candidate?

Surely it is better for the Republican Party organization to find out in the primaries whether or not the incumbent can win -- than to be swamped by surprise and smitten by remorse the day after the election. The primary is the testing ground. Either we practice the self-government we say we believe in -- or we accept boss control like the Daley Democratic machine in Chicago, where all decisions about candidates are admittedly made by the "slatemakers" in a smoke-filled hotel room a couple of weeks before the primary.

"The Squeaky Wheel"

4. We believe that the incumbent-turned-liberal must be opposed publicly because, as the old adage says, "the squeaky wheel gets the oil."

According to this theory, President Nixon is under heavy pressure not only from the Democrats, but from the leftwing press such as *The New York Times*, *The Washington Post*, David Brinkley and Walter Cronkite. If the President does not hear from conservative Republicans with just as loud a voice, practical politics will cause him to go along with leftwing demands in the mistaken belief that conservatives no longer care about their principles, and, anyway, "conservatives have no place else to go." According to this theory, conservatives are really doing President Nixon a favor by demonstrating strong public grassroots support for the conservative policies he would like to pursue if he were not under such heavy pressure from the leftwing press and Senate.

One of the late Senator Everett Dirksen's favorite stories was about an expensive parrot who didn't speak up and therefore was cooked in the oven. When Senator Dirksen strongly opposed President Nixon's appointment of a certain liberal to the HEW Department, a reporter asked him the question, "Why are you, the Senate Minority Leader, opposing and embarrassing your President?" To which Senator Dirksen replied, "I am helping the President, not hurting him, by saving him from making a bad appointment."

Some will argue that "Republicans should not wash their dirty linen in public." But it has been abundantly proven that quiet messages sent behind closed doors have had no effect. Therefore, it becomes necessary to publicly demonstrate the falsehood of the assumption that "conservatives have no place else to go."

The Lesson-Teaching Theory

5. We must teach the Republican-incumbent-turned-liberal the lesson that, when he betrays his promises, the consequences are defeat at the polls. This lesson will then be learned by others who might be tempted to take the same left turn. When politicians abandon principles, there is only one language they really understand -- the threat of defeat at the next election. We wish every public official were highly motivated, but the fact is that they are not, and so, like a parent disciplining a child, the voters should have the maturity to administer the stick as well as the carrot.

What happens to this theory when traditional Republicans have no good candidate to substitute for the Republican-incumbent-turned-liberal and no realistic hope of electing a conservative Republican? Some will say, "Consider the alternative... such efforts will only result in electing a liberal Democrat."

According to the lesson-teaching theory, it is still worth the effort because, as soon as Republican politicians get the message that grassroots Republicans are willing to go the limit and accept a Democrat liberal instead of a phony Republican, then traditional Republicans have acquired real political muscle. They have forged for themselves a veto power which can force a Republican incumbent to fulfill his campaign pledges in spite of the financial and social rewards dangled by the eastern establishment.

One famous example of how the veto power over the selection of candidates functions was President Franklin Roosevelt's famous remark about the selection of his running-mate in 1944. To the Democratic bosses working on a replacement for Vice President Henry A. Wallace, Roosevelt warned, "Clear everything with Sidney." Sidney Hillman was the labor boss whose power over the selection of the U.S. Vice President was such that it was thus openly acknowledged by President Roosevelt.

Even when traditional Republicans cannot elect a real conservative to office, they can have enormous influence on U.S. policies by the judicious exercise of a veto based on solid political muscle and a willingness to use that muscle in behalf of *principle* rather than candidate or Party label.

Because conservatives raise the money, do the precinct work, and provide the votes for the Republican Party, they have every right to demand that the President "clear everything with conservatives." In fact, if conservatives fail to demand this, their behavior can only be read as a rejection of responsibility and an unwillingness to put their muscle where their principles are.

What are the ways in which traditional Republicans can exercise their political muscle to solve the problem of the Republican-incumbent-turned liberal?

Importance of Convention Delegates

In 1972, the big power of the Republican Party will rest in the hands of some 1,300 Delegates to the Republican National Nominating Convention who will meet in August in San Diego. For four days these men and women will hold in their hands the fate of our Nation. They will have total power to decide who will be the Republican candidate for President and Vice President. They will determine the Platform and policies of the Party for the next four years. For that one week, *every* facet of the Republican Party is subject to their control, including the election of the Republican National Committee.

Many Republicans today are so defeatist about the problem of the Republican incumbent that they are taking no action to elect conservative or independent-minded Delegates. They argue that President Harry Truman proved at the 1948 Democratic National Convention that an incumbent President -- however unpopular -- can always force his own renomination.

These Republican prophets of defeat have forgotten that that same 1948 Democratic Convention administered a stinging rebuke to President Truman by flatly rejecting his hand-picked choice for Vice President and nominating instead the man who had fired the Convention with a stirring Keynote Address, Senator Alben Barkley. Barkley's vigorous, hard-hitting campaign helped elect the Truman-Barkley ticket.

In 1960, the Republican Convention Delegates had the same identical opportunity, and they kicked it away. After Richard Nixon was nominated for President, his hand-picked running-mate was that darling of the foreign-giveaway crowd, Henry Cabot Lodge. Republican Convention Delegates wanted the

man who had delivered the best Convention Keynote Address of this century, Congressman Walter Judd. But the Delegates didn't have the backbone to nominate Dr. Judd. The Delegates caved in under such craven arguments as "the Presidential nominee should pick his own running-mate," and "we must go along for the sake of Party unity." Lodge's lazy and inept campaign lost Nixon more than the narrow margin of John F. Kennedy's victory.

Independent Delegates in California?

Conservative Republicans in California at the present time are considering the advisability of running an independent slate of Delegates to the 1972 Republican National Convention. In California, Delegates run as a team, or slate, on a winner-take-all basis. Governor Ronald Reagan has announced that he will lead a slate pledged to President Nixon. An independent slate may appear on the ballot under the name of a candidate, if conservatives have one, or under the name of the chairman of the slate.

Some people are asking the question, what hope for success can conservatives possibly have in running against both an incumbent President and a popular Governor? Why are they doing this when they haven't a candidate to put on the ballot at the head of their independent slate? What could they accomplish if they won? Is it worth the effort?

To answer these questions, let us examine what happened to the California Delegation in 1952.

Earl Warren was then Governor of California and at the peak of his popularity. He announced that he was heading a slate of Delegates to the Republican National Convention pledged to himself as favorite son. He handpicked the Delegates to serve on that slate.

The front-runner for the Republican Presidential nomination in 1952 was Senator Robert A. Taft. Taft was persuaded by his advisors not to enter a slate of Delegates in California because that would be divisive to the Republican Party and alienate Governor Warren.

A few patriotic Republicans knew the consequences would be bad if California's 70 Delegates were boss-controlled by Earl Warren. They made the politically courageous decision to run an independent slate of Delegates against the Warren slate. Since Taft would not permit the use of his name, they had to run under the name of the fine but little-known Congressman who spearheaded the slate, Thomas H. Werdel of Bakersfield.

The Werdel slate made a valiant effort. It isn't easy to campaign against a slate headed by the incumbent Governor with all his power of patronage and press. The Werdel slate received a good vote, but the Warren slate won. Many people dismissed the Werdel campaign as a futile gesture.

But history has conclusively proved that the Werdel Republicans were 100% correct in what they did. If they had won, the whole course of history could have been different. Here is what happened.

The men and women who were elected on the Warren slate were legally bound to vote for Warren at the 1952 Republican National Convention. But they were *not* legally bound to vote as he ordered them on *other* Convention issues. As it turned out, the decisive issue at that Convention was not the vote for President, but the Fair Play amendment, and the Credentials Committee report. Out of the 70 California Delegates, 70 voted the way Warren instructed them on the Fair Play amendment, and 62 voted the way Warren instructed them on the Credentials Committee report. The California vote on these issues was the crucial bloc which swung the majority. It was widely known that California caucused and announced its

vote before listening to any evidence presented by Convention committees. If the Werdel slate had been elected, all 70 California Delegates probably would have voted against Warren's instructions.

For delivering 70 and 62, respectively, California votes on these decisive issues, the New York kingmakers promised Earl Warren the first vacancy on the U.S. Supreme Court. After Eisenhower was elected President, the first Supreme Court vacancy occurred with the death of Chief Justice Fred Vinson. President Eisenhower was apparently only then apprised of the payoff that had been promised to Warren. Eisenhower felt duty-bound to honor the promise, but saw no reason why Warren should be Chief Justice. President Eisenhower dispatched Attorney General Herbert Brownell to tell Warren that he would be appointed to the Supreme Court, but that Robert Jackson, an experienced sitting Justice, would be promoted to the top position.

Warren threw a tantrum, said that he had been promised the *first* vacancy, that it was just his good luck that the first vacancy was the Chief Justiceship, and he demanded his payoff. President Eisenhower caved in and appointed Warren. Years later, he told friends that he regretted this decision more than any other in his life.

While Warren was cracking the whip at the 1952 Convention, the second busiest California Delegate was Richard Nixon. Never a close friend of Warren, Nixon had made a separate deal with the New York kingmakers and spent his time lining up secondary support for Eisenhower among individual Delegates. He cultivated the psychological ground in which California Delegates could rationalize voting as per Warren's instructions on the Fair Play amendment and the Credentials Committee report; after all, the net result was to help Eisenhower, and Nixon had assured them that Eisenhower was preferable to Taft. For his careful craftsmanship in lining up the California Delegates, Nixon was paid off with the nomination for Vice Presidency. Without this, he might have lived out his life as a lesser-known Senator.

The same kind of politicking for the New York kingmakers which was done inside the California Delegation by Richard Nixon, was done inside the Minnesota Delegation by an energetic lieutenant of Harold Stassen named Warren Burger. It was the Stassen-Burger ploy which provided the last nine votes required to defeat Senator Taft. Burger was rewarded with a Federal Court appointment from President Eisenhower, and then in 1969 promoted to Chief Justice by President Nixon.

What Might Have Been

If the Werdel slate had been elected, the whole course of history would have been different. If the California Delegates had voted differently on those two decisive issues, the Republican nominee would have been Robert Taft instead of Dwight Eisenhower. Here is the real measure of the difference between these two men. If Taft had been elected, his first appointee to the Supreme Court would have been -- not Earl Warren -- but Dean Clarence Manion, former Dean of the Notre Dame Law School, and founder of the radio weekly program called the Manion Forum, a respected platform of conservatism for the last 17 years. If Taft had been elected, his Vice President would have been -- not Richard Nixon -- but General Douglas MacArthur, the greatest soldier-statesman-patriot of the 20th century. These differences are not speculation, but facts which were known to those who worked closely for Taft in 1952.

When California Republicans voted in their 1952

primary, and made their choice between Warren and Werdel, little did they know that they were choosing the Republican nominee for President not only in 1952, but in 1956, in 1960, in 1968, and perhaps in 1972, plus two Chief Justices of the Supreme Court.

One point which should be remembered is that many of the California Warren Delegates were not liberals at all. Many were good Republicans -- and even conservatives -- such as George Murphy and Senator William Knowland. But they were beholden to Governor Warren for the favor of putting them on the Warren slate -- and so they voted as Warren instructed them even when they were not legally bound to. That is how a liberal Republican incumbent can influence good men.

The only answer is to have independent Delegates to the Republican National Convention -- men and women who are not subject to boss control, who put country above Party, and who put loyalty to Republican Party principles ahead of loyalty to the Republican office-holders.

The Presidential Primaries

Lyndon Johnson in 1968 and Wendell Willkie in 1944 provide examples of how the titular head of the Party can be forced to withdraw by the presidential primaries which function as "the democracy of the Party." When Senators Eugene McCarthy and Robert Kennedy began campaigning against President Lyndon Johnson in 1968, they knew they could not defeat the incumbent President in the Convention. But by entering the presidential primaries and showing a significant percentage of opposition to the President in his own Democratic Party, they convincingly persuaded Johnson to quit while he was ahead and take himself out of the race.

In 1940, the Delegates to the Republican National Convention were bribed, bamboozled and brainwashed into nominating for the Presidency a registered Democrat named Wendell Willkie. After he lost the election, Willkie was exposed as a complete phony.

He traveled the world promoting the Roosevelt foreign policy, foreign aid to Communist countries, and other America-Last economic policies. Willkie had only pretended to be a Republican before the election, and after the election he dropped all pretense. But Willkie and the liberal press pictured him as the incumbent leader of the Party with all the rights and privileges pertaining thereto. As 1944 rolled around, he assumed that he would again be the Republican nominee for President.

The Wisconsin primary was the first real test of Willkie's grassroots Republican popularity. He hired a railroad car and campaigned up and down the state for weeks. Wisconsin Republicans were wise to this Wall Street phony and defeated him so decisively that that was the end of Wendell Willkie.

The Power Of A Third Party

Republicans in New York State back in 1960 faced up squarely to the problem of the Republican-incumbent-turned-liberal. They appeared to be hopelessly boxed in by Nelson Rockefeller and Jacob Javits. After the Rockefeller-Javits axis sat on its hands in 1960 and let John F. Kennedy capture New York, traditional Republicans knew they had had all they could take of such one-sided "Party unity." They sent out a letter explaining their position. As reproduced in J. Daniel Mahoney's book, *Actions Speak Louder*, this letter said:

"New York's conservatives have no vote in state-wide elections. The reason is simple. Both major parties in our state are now dominated by the liberals. These elements have saddled the Republican Party with the leadership of Nelson Rockefeller, the New Deal's legacy to the G.O.P., and Jacob Javits, the only 'Republican' in the Senate with a 100% A.D.A. voting

record .

"We propose direct political action to break this strangle hold: a Conservative Party which will run candidates for Governor and Senator in the 1962 New York election .

"Most of us are lifelong Republicans. We place a high value on Party loyalty, and have tried for years to work within the Republican Party for our political beliefs. We have concluded, very reluctantly, that this is no longer possible in New York.

"We are faced with a choice between time-honored Republican principles and a Party leadership that spurns them. The Rockefeller-Javits leadership, confident that conservative New York Republicans are a captive vote, is leading the Party in an unabating march to the left. Real Party loyalty demands that we stand by Republican principles and combat the New York leadership that has abandoned them .

"Our only alternative is to run independent conservative candidates for Governor and Senate in 1962. The Rockefeller-Javits elements must be made to realize that so long as they abandon Republican principles in pursuit of liberal backing, they will be denied the support of the conservative Republicans who constitute the backbone of the Party . . . "

From infant beginnings, the Conservative Party of New York grew steadily. It fielded candidates who were conservative, principled, and articulate. By 1966, the Conservative Party outpolled the Liberal Party of New York and thereby acquired Row C on the New York ballot, bumping the Liberal Party down to fourth place.

In 1970, opportunity knocked at the door of New York conservatives, and, because of ten years of planning, dedication, and hard work, they were ready. A Republican-incumbent-turned-liberal named Senator Charles Goodell came up for reelection. He had been a conservative upstate New York Congressman who had gone to the Senate, and turned left. The Conservative Party nominated and, to the total consternation of the liberal Republican establishment, elected James Buckley to the U.S. Senate.

Bolting the Republican Party in favor of a third party is a course of action which has long sounded anathema to the ears of traditional Republicans. But the New York experience has made it one of the most successful political tacks ever taken by traditional Republicans. For many years, the New York Liberal Party has been a potent political force because of the veto power it exercises over the Democratic Party. While the Liberal Party could not elect its own nominee, it could force the Democratic Party to nominate an extremely liberal candidate by the threat of nominating its own Liberal Party candidate and thereby siphoning off enough Democratic votes to permit the Republican to win.

New York Conservatives now have the same kind of veto over the Republican Party -- only more so because, *mirabile dictu*, the Conservative Party candidate actually won!

In many other states, Republicans are moaning and groaning about the problems of the Republican-incumbent-turned-liberal. They say, "If only we had a candidate like Senator Buckley . . . if only we had the opportunity to work for a real conservative." The answer is best summed up in one of Ann Landers' pert retorts: "Opportunities are everywhere. The trouble is they are usually disguised as hard work, and most people don't recognize them." The New York Conservatives recognized their opportunity when it was disguised as ten years of patient drudgery to build a new Party. They have given the entire country a pattern for action.

The Phyllis Schlafly Report

Box 618, Alton, Illinois 62002

Published monthly by Phyllis Schlafly, Fairmount, Alton, Illinois 62002.

Second Class Postage Paid at Alton, Illinois.

Subscription Price: For donors to the Eagle Trust Fund -- \$5 yearly (included in annual contribution). Extra copies available: 15 cents each; 8 copies \$1; 50 copies \$4.